CA Unpub Decisions

West Side Health Care District (West Side) appeals from summary judgment entered against it in this action against its former attorneys, Hooper, Lundy & Bookman and David Henninger (collectively Hooper Lundy). West Side claims there were triable issues of material fact as to when it should be charged with having discovered Hooper Lundys fraud for purposes of the statute of limitations and whether Hooper Lundy actively concealed the truth from West Side, thus tolling the statute of limitations as to the other causes of action. It claims Hooper Lundy failed to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact as to causation, so the burden never shifted to West Side to present evidence on that issue; and that the evidence raised triable issues of fact as to the elements of fraud. West Side also claims the court erred in denying its motion for leave to file a sixth amended complaint, and challenges the amount of the fees and costs awarded to Hooper Lundy. Court modify the amount of fees and costs, and affirm the judgment as modified.

The Estate of Odessa Marie Howard, and Paula Letherblaire as special representative of that estate, appeal from the probate court order dismissing their petition for an order requiring Unocal, Chevron, and several other oil companies to pay royalties allegedly owed under certain oil and gas leases. (Prob. Code, 850.) Because the probate court correctly determined that Letherblaire lacked standing to bring the petition, Court affirm.

Craig Sheets appeals a judgment entered pursuant to an order granting summary judgment for respondent Prince of Peace Lutheran Church in his negligence action arising from an automobile collision. He argues respondent is liable for the alleged negligence of a Boy Scout troop holding a joint fundraiser in respondents parking lot. He also argues respondent is vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of the motorist with whom he collided, but he expressly waived that argument in the trial court. Court conclude summary judgment is appropriate because appellant did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Boy Scouts actions substantially contributed to the collision.

The question on this appeal is whether an intentional act by an insured, taken in self-defense, may qualify as an accident for purposes of an insurance policy written to provide defense and indemnification for the insured. The answer is yes; the trial court erred in ruling that it cannot. Consequently, the ensuing judgment for the insurer, based on its successful motion for summary judgment, must be reversed.
The appellant in this case, Vincent Sutton (Sutton), was insured under a homeowners policy issued by respondent Insurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California (Auto Club). The appeal arises from Auto Clubs successful motion for summary judgment against Sutton in his suit for breach of the insurance contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

After the divorce of appellant Francis Coyote Shivers (Shivers)[1]and respondent Laura Pauline Perret (Perret),[2]Perret told people, including a reporter for [as of Sept. 28, 2006],[3]that Shivers was abusive. Shivers sued Perret and her company, Pauley Go Lightly Productions, Inc. (Go Lightly). Perret and Go Lightly filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was granted. On appeal, Shivers argues that Perrets statements did not fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Court find no error and affirm.

Jose Gaspar Lombera appeals from the judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to one count of possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351), contending that the drugs and other evidence found in his possession should have been excluded because there was no probable cause for the police search that located them. Court affirm.

Enrique Casillas (Casillas) appeals from a judgment of dismissal the trial court entered after Casillas repeatedly failed to comply with its orders to file status reports and to complete arbitration proceedings. Casillas appeals, contending the trial court lacked authority to dismiss his action and to terminate the arbitration proceedings. Casillas also claims the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay attorneys fees to the party prevailing on the contract. Court affirm.

Appellant Bruce Seltzer appeals from the denial of his special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16)[1] a petition seeking an injunction prohibiting harassment pursuant to section 527.6 (Petition). The Petition was filed by Seltzers neighbors, Peter and Sophie Pappas (the Pappases), seeking to enjoin Seltzer from harassing them and their children based largely on allegations that Seltzer had deliberately driven his car in a menacing manner in the driveway shared by the Pappases and Seltzer. Court conclude that the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion because Seltzers alleged harassment is not protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute. Court thus affirm.

Defendant Joseph Jerome Flowers appeals his conviction by no contest plea to felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1).) Counsel has advised that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has also advised defendant in writing that he may personally file a supplemental opening brief, but defendant has not done so. There are no arguable errors. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiffs and cross-defendants Ray Haeim and Behnam Rafalian (Rafalian) appeal judgment awarding Sean Ely (Ely) damages and equitable relief. The jury found that Ely and Rafalian had entered into an oral agreement to form a joint venture for the purpose of purchasing five real properties and awarded Ely damages; after a separate equitable trial, the trial court imposed a constructive trust on one of the properties for Elys benefit. Rafalian principally contends the statute of frauds bars Elys claims, and the trial court improperly imposed a constructive trust. Court affirm.

Appellants, J. Victor Ibarra, Tiffany E. Jakstis and Anais Enterprises, Inc. appeal from the judgment after a bench trial in favor of respondent, Placo Investment, LLC, on its complaint for unlawful detainer alleging a material breach of the terms of the parties negotiated settlement agreement. On appeal, Ibarra claims insufficient evidence supported the trial courts finding of a material breach of the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Appellants alternatively argue the underlying judgment results in an inequitable forfeiture as stated in Civil Code section 3275. As explained herein, substantial evidence presented at trial supported the judgment in favor of respondent. Consequently, Court affirm.

Defendant Sammy F. Martinez timely appealed his conviction on two counts of first degree residential robbery, one count of first degree burglary and one count of vandalism. The jury also found two prior serious felony conviction allegations to be true. The court sentenced defendant to a total of 70 years to life. Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the People to introduce a spontaneous declaration. Court affirm.

Defendant, cross-complainant and appellant L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (appellant) appeals from an order granting in part a special motion to strike a cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16)[1]brought by plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants Hotels Nevada LLC, Inns Nevada LLC and Louis Habash (sometimes collectively Hotels Nevada). In turn, Hotels Nevada cross-appeals from the portion of the order denying in part the special motion to strike. Court affirm. The trial court properly granted the motion to strike the three tort claims alleged in the cross-complaint. Hotels Nevada met its burden to demonstrate that the tort claims arose from protected activity, and appellant failed to meet its burden to show that it had a probability of prevailing on those claims, as they were barred by the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The trial court properly denied the motion as to the fourth cause of action for indemnity, as Hotels Nevada failed to meet its burden to show that claim arose from protected activity.

LaHeaven V. Jones appeals from judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and his no contest plea to count 2, possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a).)[1] In accordance with the plea agreement, he was given a suspended sentence of three years in prison and placed on probation, upon certain terms and conditions which included that he complete a one-year residential drug treatment program. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, that one of his probation conditions must be modified and that the minute order must be corrected to reflect the trial courts oral pronouncement of another condition of probation. For reasons stated in the opinion, Court affirm the judgment, modify a condition of probation and remand the matter to the trial court to correct its minute order.