CA Unpub Decisions

Raymond Guerra was charged with one count of failure to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (g)(2)). The information further alleged that appellant suffered one prior conviction and prison commitment ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and one strike prior ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Appellant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations. At a readiness conference, Guerra made a Marsden motion, which the court (Judge Danielsen) denied. Approximately two weeks later, Guerra waived jury after being properly admonished of his constitutional rights. Judge Woods found him guilty of failing to register as a sex offender as required by law within five working days of his release from custody. The court also found true both the prison prior and the strike prior. At sentencing, Judge Woods struck both the prison prior and strike prior and sentenced him to two years in prison. The judgment is affirmed.

Jerry Saenphansiri entered a negotiated guilty plea to recklessly evading police (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)) and admitted he had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) in exchange for a stipulated five-year prison term. Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a count of resisting a police officer (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)) and a fourth prior prison term. The trial court sentenced Saenphansiri to the two-year middle term for the evading police count and three consecutive one-year enhancements for the three prior prison terms. The judgment is affirmed.

David and Carissa Meyer appeal a judgment entered after the superior court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to their claims for declaratory relief, quiet title and various damage theories against their neighbor, John Scandalios. They contend that the superior court's ruling was based on the erroneous conclusions that a prior action brought by Scandalios against them resolved the underlying issue in this case and, to the extent the issue was not decided in the prior action, their claims are nonetheless barred because the claims were required to be asserted, if at all, as compulsory cross claims in the prior action. Court conclude the trial court's ruling was correct except as to the Meyers' claim for assault, reverse the judgment insofar as the superior court sustained Scandalios's demurrer to that cause of action and otherwise affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with the following five counts: (1) possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11378); possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.1, subd. (a)); possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)); receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)); and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). The complaint includes two sentence enhancement allegations: (1) defendant was convicted of a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (b); and (2) defendant has five prison priors for purposes of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Juan Louis Lopez II, entered into a plea agreement on March 12, 2004, wherein he pled guilty in case No. MCR14422 to domestic violence (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) and guilty in case No. MCR017922 to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)).[1] Under the plea agreement, additional allegations in both cases were dismissed and Lopez was to be placed on felony probation. On April 9, 2004, the trial court placed Lopez on felony probation upon various terms and conditions, including that he serve concurrent terms of 180 days in both cases with custody credits in each case. In case No. MCR017922, the court placed Lopez on Proposition 36 probation. On January 18, 2007, the probation department filed a new petition to revoke Lopezs probation. On June 18, 2007, after a contested probation revocation hearing, the court found that Lopez violated the terms of his probation and revoked it. On July 16, 2007, the court lifted the stay on Lopezs sentence and ordered his commitment to prison for four years eight months. On appeal, Lopez contends the trial court erred in imposing a $10 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) database penalty assessment pursuant to Government Code sections 76104.6 and 76104.7 as violating the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Court agree. Having found two other clerical errors, Court remand for correction of the clerks minutes and abstract of judgment.

Rudy T., a minor found guilty of misdemeanor possession of live ammunition under Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (b)(1), contends that he falls within an exception under Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (b)(2), because he was accompanied by his mother. He also disputes the award of custody credit. For the following reasons, Court affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing.

On November 26, 2007, appellant Johnny M., a minor, admitted allegations contained in a supplemental juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 777) that he violated conditions of probation imposed in a prior wardship proceeding. That same day, the court readjudged appellant a ward of the court, continued him on probation, and ordered him committed to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility Delta Program (Delta Program) for a period not to exceed 365 days, with the proviso that if he failed to pass a physical and mental health screening for the Delta Program, he be committed to the Juvenile Justice Campus for 270 days. The instant appeal followed. Court dismiss the appeal.

In September 2007, appellant D.L., a minor, admitted allegations that he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and violated the terms and conditions of probation granted in a previous wardship proceeding. In November 2007, the court declared the instant offense to be a felony, ordered appellant committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice (DCRJJ), formerly known as the California Youth Authority (CYA), and declared appellants maximum period of physical confinement to be seven years two months, based on the instant offense and offenses adjudicated in previous wardship proceedings. On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion in ordering appellant committed to the DCRJJ. Court affirm.

Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) (rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating his reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his children, B.L. and M.A. Court conclude his petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, Court dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

Carrie Dunn Ford appeals from her conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale. While conceding she possessed the methamphetamine, Ford argues there is insufficient evidence to support the finding it was for sale as opposed to her personal use. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Barbara Copeland challenges her conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale and transportation of methamphetamine. She contends the identity of a confidential informant (CI) should have been disclosed. She further contends the court wrongly sustained a hearsay objection and wrongly instructed the jury about the required union of act and knowledge. Court affirm. The CIs identity was immaterial, the objected-to question called for inadmissible hearsay, and the court correctly instructed the jury that the charged offenses require defendants knowledge of the methamphetamines presence and its illegal character.

Deep Arora was convicted of attempt to commit a lewd act on a person under the age of 14 and was sentenced to three years probation. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed numerous conditions of probation including one that requires appellant to submit his person and property to search and seizure at any time and with or without reasonable cause or suspicion. When asked, appellant expressly accepted the term. Neither he nor his trial counsel ever interposed an objection to it. The judgment is affirmed.

On May 15, 2006, Manuel Rodriguez was murdered as he walked to an ice cream truck with a friend. According to Jesus Flores, that same day, he received a telephone call from his ex-girlfriend Ruby Suarez, asking him to help her find her brother, Jose Suarez, because he might be in trouble. About an hour after the telephone call, Flores arrived at the Suarez residence where appellant, Juan Suarez, (hereinafter Suarez) lived with his wife Luz Suarez, and their three children, Ruby, Jose[1], and an 11-year-old-minor. Although Jose Suarez was eventually arrested for the first degree murder of Manual Rodriguez, Flores testified that before he arrived at the Suarez house, he was only told that Jose, a known gang member, might have done something wrong. According to Flores, Suarez, Luz, and Ruby were present in the house when he agreed to help Ruby look for her brother. Flores testified that he and Ruby located Jose with his friend Kandace Ortega in Buena Park and he took them to his house in Long Beach where they spent the night. The jury convicted Suarez of being an accessory to murder and acquitted Suarez of being an accessory for the benefit of, direction of, or in association with Joses street gang. Suarez was sentenced to prison and he contends his conviction as an accessory must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence corroborating the accomplices testimony to support the conviction.

Defendant Edgar Mejia Hernandez was convicted of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code), firing a gun from a motor vehicle ( 12034, subd. (c)), firing a gun at an occupied motor vehicle ( 246), and two counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found he had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury ( 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personally used a firearm ( 12022.5, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole plus 25 years to life. He appeals, claiming the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession because the confession was not voluntary and his waiver of the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) was not voluntary, intelligent, or knowing. Court disagree and affirm.