CA Unpub Decisions

The sole issue in this appeal is whether an overt act alleged as part of a conspiracy provides a juvenile offender with sufficient notice to permit amending the petition to allege the overt act as a separate offense. Based on the language of the overt act alleged in the information, Court find the minor had notice sufficient to satisfy due process.

Defendant Mina Ghanizadeh appeals a judgment quieting title in a parcel of real property in favor of plaintiffs Ayoub Bakhshoudeh and California Reconveyance Company (CRC) following the trial courts order granting plaintiffs summary judgment motion. Defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case because she had previously obtained a bankruptcy court judgment quieting title to the property in her name. She further contends Bakhshoudehs actual knowledge of a recorded lis pendens referencing the previous bankruptcy adversary proceeding at the time he refinanced the property defeated his bona fide purchaser status.
We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment and quieted title in plaintiffs favor. The bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over the property as property of the debtor was never properly invoked, and Bakhshoudeh was never afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. Court further conclude defendants recording of the lis pendens did not defeat Bakhshoudehs bona fide purchaser status because Bakhshoudeh recorded his interest before defendant recorded the lis pendens. Accordingly, Court affirm.

The trial court denied Octapharmas request for a preliminary injunction in a minute order. Octapharma appealed from that order. Bio-Medics has moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, and PCCI and Biomat have moved to stay the appeal, based on a forum selection clause in the Plasma Supply Agreement stating the sole place of jurisdiction for any litigation commenced under the agreement is Munich, Germany. Octapharma has brought a motion to admit new documentary evidence on appeal and to conditionally seal the new evidence. Bio-Medics, PCCI, and Biomat have brought their own motions to seal the new evidence.
Bio‑Medicss motion to dismiss or stay the appeal is granted in part and denied in part, and the appeal is stayed as to Bio‑Medics for claims arising out of the Plasma Supply Agreement only. PCCI and Biomats motion to stay the appeal is denied. The order denying Octapharmas request for a preliminary injunction is affirmed to the extent the appeal is not stayed. Octapharmas motion to take new documentary evidence is denied, and the motions to seal the additional evidence are denied as moot.

A jury convicted Terrence Clarke of pimping. (Pen. Code, 266h, subd. (a); all statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise noted.) He contends the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense and his three-year sentence ( 1203.065, subd. (a)), constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Court affirm the judgment and deny Clarkes petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant raises two issues. He argues the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that battery is a lesser included crime to robbery. He also claims the court erred when it did not inform him of the penalties for admitting that the allegations of his prior convictions were true. Court find no error and affirm.

In 1995, Patricia Merrill sued Laboratoire Sebbin (Sebbin) for, among other things, product liability. Merrill and Sebbin reached a settlement. Although the agreement required payment in United States dollars, Sebbin initially attempted to pay the settlement in euros. When Merrill was unable to negotiate Sebbins check, Sebbin issued a new check in United States dollars, for less than the full amount due under the terms of the settlement agreement. Sebbin still has not paid the outstanding portion of the settlement, more than 19 months after it became due and owing.
Merrill also appeals from the trial courts denial of her motion for sanctions against Sebbin. Merrills request was made pursuant to an inoperative statute (Code Civ. Proc., 128.6), and was not in compliance with the operative statute (Code Civ. Proc., 128.7). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the sanctions motion.

Judith S. appeals from the juvenile courts order committing her to a county ranch facility. She contends that Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (b) (now subd. (c)),[1] confers upon the juvenile court the discretion to set her maximum period of physical confinement at the ranch at less than the maximum term of imprisonment imposable on an adult offender, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of her case. She also contends that after the United States Supreme Courts decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) is unconstitutional in that it mandates imposition of a maximum term of confinement on a juvenile offender equal to the upper term of imprisonment imposable on an adult convicted of the same offense, without requiring the juvenile court to find aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Court affirm.

Defendant John Rodewald was convicted by guilty plea of possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor being under the influence of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a)). He also admitted having two prior strikes (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12),[1] and having served two prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). After the trial court denied defendants Romero motion,[2] it sentenced defendant to state prison for the indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court denied him due process when it based its Romero motion decision on unreliable hearsay. Defendant further contends that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Court disagree with defendants contentions and, therefore, will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Loreto Bojorquez Jimenez, driving under the influence of alcohol, was involved in an accident that caused great bodily injury to the driver of the other car involved. Defendant was charged with six counts related to the accident. He pleaded guilty to violating Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b),[1] (driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater) and section 2800.3 (eluding a pursuing peace officer and causing serious bodily injury to another person) and admitted that he personally caused great bodily injury to the victim, Kenneth Patrick Whitcomb (Pen. Code, 12022.7, 667 & 1192.7) and that he had one prior conviction of driving under the influence ( 23103.5). Defendant entered the plea in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a promise of four years and four months in prison. The trial court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon term. This appeal followed, the notice of appeal citing only sentencing error as grounds for the appeal.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts but raises no specific issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed and Court have received no written argument from defendant.

A modification decision.

Ray M. (Father) appeals the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court that removed his daughter, H.M., from his custody and denied him reunification services. Father argues the courts jurisdictional findings that he sexually abused H.M. were based on unreliable hearsay, and the county family services agency failed to timely disclose to father exculpatory evidence that H.M. also made allegations of sexual abuse against another. Father also contends the court erred when it denied him reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) because the findings were not supported by substantial evidence. He argues the court abused its discretion when it conditioned Fathers right to visitation on his completion of sex offender therapy and his apology to H.M. Court affirm.

After pleading no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1]contained in a two-count information, appellant was sentenced to four years in state prison. He appeals, claiming error by the trial court in (1) denying his motion to suppress ( 1538.5) and (2) not conducting in camera interviews of the detective who executed the affidavit triggering the search warrant or the confidential informants whose information was relied upon by that detective. Court reject those contentions and affirm the judgment.

In this dependency matter, L.J., the alleged father of three-year-old Lawrence J., appeals from (1) the juvenile courts May 1, 2007 order denying his petition for modification made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] and (2) the courts July 27, 2007 order terminating L.J.s parental rights pursuant to section 366.26. Both appeals are based on L.J.s allegations that he received inadequate notice of the dependency proceedings. In particular, L.J. argues that the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his section 388 petition, that is, without affording him an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Court affirm the juvenile courts order denying L.J.s section 388 petition because the petition did not establish that it would be in Lawrences best interests to provide the relief L.J. sought and, even if it had, any error regarding notice was harmless. Court also dismiss L.J.s appeal from the subsequent order terminating his parental rights because L.J. was at all times an alleged father and, as such, lacked standing to appeal that order.

Parrish B. appeals from juvenile court orders finding that he committed first degree burglary and first degree robbery and committing him to a juvenile facility for a maximum period of confinement of 13 years. Court reject his contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed the two offenses, but Court cannot determine how the juvenile court arrived at the maximum period of commitment and thus cannot determine if the period is excessive. Therefore Court affirm the jurisdictional order but remand for the court to make further findings regarding the appropriate maximum confinement time.