CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), intimidating a witness (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c)(1)), and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, 242). The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of three years. Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior offense; (2) the evidence that defendant intimidated a witness does not meet the substantial evidence standard; and (3) the trial court did not act with informed discretion when sentencing defendant. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Ian Brent Caldwell appeals from a trial courts order denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm the order.

Rachel Z. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to her son, Brandon Z. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in assuming jurisdiction over Brandon because the petition filed by the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) failed to state a cause of action and her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the petition in juvenile court. In addition, Brandons paternal grandmother, L.B., (grandmother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying her petition under section 388. Specifically, grandmother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to consider information it had previously ordered, and her petition made the requisite showing; thus, the juvenile court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Counsel for minor has submitted a letter brief joining in the position of the Department urging us to affirm the orders appealed from. Court find no error, and Court affirm.

Lucy Bavle (defendant) seeks reversal of the trial courts order denying her reinstatement of Penal Code section 1210.1 probation. Court affirm.

Richard L. (Father) petitions for an extraordinary writ directing the juvenile court to (1) enter an order requiring the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) to continue offering him reunification services;[1]and (2) vacate its order setting a hearing to consider terminating his parental rights to his son, T.L. (Welf & Inst. Code, 366.26).[2] (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a).) Father essentially contends the juvenile court erred by ordering that his reunification services be terminated because (1) substantial evidence does not support the courts finding that it would place T.L. at a substantial risk of detriment to return him to Fathers custody; and (2) the court did not state a factual basis for its finding that T.L. faced a substantial risk of detriment if placed in Fathers custody. Court deny the petition.

Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing. Court affirm.

Appellant, Edwin Waldemar Montepeque, entered into a plea agreement on April 2, 2007. Appellant pled guilty to one count of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) in case No. F07100073 in exchange for the dismissal of case No. F07100310. Under the terms of the agreement, appellant was to be placed on Proposition 36 probation in this action and reinstated on probation in case No. F06101180. The court accepted appellants change of plea and placed him on Proposition 36 probation.
The court terminated Propostion 36 probation based on appellants third violation of probation in case No. F06101180. The court terminated Proposition 36 probation in case No. F07100073 finding appellant was no longer available for treatment. The court ordered appellants confinement in jail for 365 days with custody credits of 76 days in case No. F06101180 plus 46 days in case No. F07100073. The court placed appellant on probation in both matters for two years from the date of the hearing. Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking his Proposition 36 probation. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Civic Partners Vista Village I, LLC (Civic), which is owned by defendant Steven P. Semingson[1] and his wife, obtained rights from the City of Vista to develop a shopping center (the project). Civic encountered several setbacks in developing the shopping center, including a lack of funding and tenant commitments.
The judgment is reversed as to the imposition of liability on defendants on RCLPs promissory fraud claim and as to the punitive damages award. On remand, the trial court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants on RCLPs promissory fraud claim and strike the punitive damages award accordingly. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. In the interests of justice, because each party prevailed in part, no party shall recover costs on appeal.

Vincent Dean Malicek, Jr., appeals the trial courts order granting a restraining order to Lisa Myers under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, 6200 et seq., (the Act)). Because the trial courts conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, Court affirm the order.

We consider when the plaintiff in a malpractice action had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing by her attorneys in the underlying action, and when she suffered actual injury. We conclude the trial court correctly determined plaintiffs malpractice action was untimely filed because plaintiff had knowledge of her attorneys allegedly wrongful or negligent acts or omissions more than one year before the malpractice action was filed. Additionally, Court conclude the limitations period was not tolled, because plaintiff suffered actual injury at the time of the attorneys alleged wrongdoing, not when the underlying action was later settled. Therefore, Court affirm the judgment following the trial courts order sustaining the attorneys demurrers without leave to amend. There is no contention by plaintiff that the trial court erred by declining to permit amendment.

Erick P. and Teresa O. appeal the termination of their parental rights to their daughter, Sarah. They both contend the juvenile courts refusal to provide them with hearings on their petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 was reversible error. Erick also contends there is a legal impediment to Sarahs adoption by her caretaker, thus rendering the juvenile courts finding of adoptability erroneous. Court find no error and affirm.

Defendant pled guilty to the sole charge in the felony complaint, violation of Penal Code section 290, former subdivision (g)(2), failure to register. Imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years of formal probation. Court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on defendants behalf. Counsel noted four potential issues to the court, which Court discuss in turn.

Michael S. argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for both committing vandalism and possessing a graffiti tool. The Attorney General concedes the error, and Court agree. Court therefore reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Defendant Daniel Garcia Ornelas was convicted after jury trial of three counts of lewd conduct on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)),[1] and the jury found true the allegation that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a). ( 667, subd. (a).) The trial court found true the allegation that the prior constituted a strike. ( 1170.12.) The court sentenced defendant to 25 years in state prison, and imposed a $200 fine and penalty assessments pursuant to section 290.3 and a $20 court security fee. Court affirm the judgment as so modified.