CA Unpub Decisions

Vilas Likhite appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of attempted theft by false pretenses arising from a police sting operation in which defendant attempted to sell a pastel portrait that he falsely claimed had been drawn by Impressionist artist Mary Cassatt. Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by objecting on relevancy and hearsay grounds to evidence of certain artworks rather than reminding the court of an in limine ruling limiting evidence of such artworks under Evidence Code section 352. Concluding that defendant is unable to establish ineffective assistance on direct appeal, Court affirm.

Appellant Darian Bojeaux (Bojeaux) is the daughter of conservatees Virginia Mary Samuels (Virginia) and Marshall Light Samuels (Marshall). She was appointed conservator of the persons and estates of her parents in 2000. Thereafter, she filed three accounts, seeking reimbursement of several hundred thousand dollars she advanced on her parents behalf. She also filed a petition for fees, seeking approximately $450,000 for services rendered to her parents as caregiver, conservator, and attorney.
Bojeaux appeals from these orders, contending that the trial court erred in (1) failing to issue a statement of decision, (2) surcharging her for unpaid employment taxes, (3) limiting her award of attorney fees to $25,000, (4) denying her sanctions motion, and (5) denying her request for caregiving fees for Samuels. Court reduce the surcharge order, but otherwise affirm the orders in all respects.

A jury convicted defendant Benjamin Lewis of one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the prosecutor impermissibly exercised peremptory challenges to exclude two prospective jurors based on race and marital status; (2) the trial court erred by preventing defendant from introducing relevant evidence about his legitimate activities on the day of his arrest; (3) the trial court erred by denying defendants motion for a joint trial with another defendant who was arrested at the same time; and (4) the trial court improperly ordered defendant to pay $8,265.18 in attorney fees without notice, a hearing, or findings regarding his ability to pay. Court affirm the judgment but vacate the trial courts order assessing attorney fees and costs and remand to the trial court.

Lenny Dykstra appeals from a final order directing him to pay attorney's fees directly to Zev S. Brooks, counsel for respondent Lindsay Jones. Dykstra contends that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (i) does not authorize an award of fees directly to counsel for the prevailing party. Court agree and direct the trial court to modify its order to make the fee award payable to the prevailing party, Lindsay Jones, and not to his attorney.

A modification decision.

Rodrigo Perez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one count of attempted murder, seven counts of attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer, one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, seven counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count of felony vandalism. The jury further found that defendant personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury, and that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant was sentenced on one of the counts of attempted murder of a peace officer to 15 years to life plus an enhancement of 25 years to life for personal use of a firearm causing injury. Sentences on the remaining attempted murder offenses were imposed concurrently, sentences on the assault counts were imposed but stayed under Penal Code section 654, and the remaining firearm use enhancements were also imposed but stayed, for an aggregate term of 40 years to life in state prison.
For all of these reasons, I conclude that Perezs convictions on eight counts of attempted murder are not supported by substantial evidence. I would therefore reverse.

Jeffery Grandison appeals from the judgment imposed after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1); undesignated section references are to that code) and attempting to dissuade a witness from prosecuting a crime ( 136.1, subd. (b)(2)), and the court found he had suffered a prior strike and serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The jury deadlocked on a further count of making a criminal threat ( 422), which was dismissed.
Appellant was sentenced to a term of 10 years and four months. He contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence of an assault with a deadly weapon, (2) section 654 precluded consecutive sentences for the two offenses, and (3) there was insufficient proof that the prior conviction was for a serious felony. Court affirm the judgment.

In this consolidated appeal, brothers Marcus and Jesse Ochoa appeal from the judgments entered following their conviction by jury after a joint trial.[1] Both were convicted of two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).)[2] Marcus was also convicted of making a terrorist threat and using a firearm during the commission of that offense. ( 422, 12022.5, subd. (a).) Jesse suffered three additional convictions, two for shooting at an occupied vehicle and one for being a felon in possession of a firearm. ( 246, 12021, subd. (a).) In addition, the jury found that he used and discharged a firearm during the commission of one of the attempted murders. ( 12022.53, subds. (b) and (c).) After the verdict, Jesse admitted that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
As to Jesse, we find no error. As to Marcus, we conclude one of the audio recordings should have been redacted. However, Court determine that the error was harmless. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgments.

Ricardo Scott Galvan appeals from the judgment entered following a court trial at which he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1).) The court found true an allegation that appellant had personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to prison for six years. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he had "a good faith claim of right" to recover property stolen from him and because he stabbed the victim in self defense. Court affirm.

Jamel Alvin Adams pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property, admitted a prior juvenile adjudication for robbery, and was sentenced to four years eight months in state prison. Adams appeals from the judgment, contending the use of his prior juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence is unconstitutional. Court affirm.

Michael Gilliam appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of robbery and a bifurcated court trial in which he was found to have sustained prior felony convictions, including two under the Three Strikes law. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motion. Court affirm.

Hector P. was declared a ward of the court following a contested adjudication in which he was found to have assaulted an administrator at a high school in Long Beach on May 10, 2007. The minor was placed home on probation, and it was further ordered that he not be held in physical confinement for a period to exceed six months.
The order under review is affirmed.

Reggie S. (Father) appeals from an October 11, 2007 order denying his request that the juvenile court terminate the legal guardianship as to his daughter J.S. (born in Feb. 2004) and place J.S. in his home. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that termination of the legal guardianship would not be in J.S.s best interests, Court affirm the order.

Plaintiff obtained a restraining order against defendant, her former father-in-law, on behalf of herself and her fianc. More specifically, she obtained an order of protection under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Act) (Fam. Code, 6200 et seq.) to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence (id., 6300; all section references are to the Family Code). The order is affirmed.