CA Unpub Decisions

Alvin K. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, including the denial of his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) The appeal is dismissed.

On appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to Andrew D. (the child), Mandy D. (mother) claims that the juvenile court erred when it found that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) complied with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), and that ICWA did not apply. She claims that the record is insufficient to demonstrate meaningful compliance with the ICWA noticing requirements. DPSS concedes that the record is indeed inadequate. Mother also claims that there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile courts finding that there was no compelling reason to conclude that there existed such a beneficial relationship between the child and mother that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
We find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that proper notice was given under the ICWA, and on that basis reverse the order terminating mothers parental rights.

A modification decision.

Appellant, Steven Wayne Johnson, pled no contest to possession of stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)). On June 19, 2007, the court sentenced Johnson to the mitigated term of 16 months.
On appeal, Johnson contends the court violated the terms of his plea bargain. Court reverse.

Based on a high-speed chase and pursuit, defendant Bryan Lee Beenblossom was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer; one count of misdemeanor assault on a peace officer; evading an officer with willful disregard; resisting, obstructing and/or delaying a peace officer; and driving while his driving privilege was suspended. In addition, it was found true that he suffered a prior serious felony, suffered a prior serious strike felony, and served three prior prison terms. He appeals, claiming the prosecutor committed misconduct when he repeatedly elicited testimony that defendant acted deliberately and that the trial court erred when it refused to give an instruction on his defense of accident. Court affirm.

Following a jury trial, Lonzell Green (appellant) was found guilty of unauthorized possession of marijuana in prison (Pen. Code, 4573.6).[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that appellant had a prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)). On appeal, appellant claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and that the trial court erred when it denied his Romero[2]motion. Court disagree and affirm.

On May 7, 2007, appellant, Dwight Deville Armstrong, pled no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1]and attempted grand theft ( 664/487, subd. (a)) and admitted two serious felony enhancements ( 667, subd. (a)) and allegations that he had two prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In exchange for his plea, the court agreed to impose a stipulated sentence of 14 years 8 months. On appeal, Armstrong contends his sentence violates section 654s prohibition against multiple punishment. Court affirm.

Benito Mejia Munoz (appellant) was charged with one count of forcible rape of Heather M., pursuant to Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2).[1] The jury found him not guilty of the forcible rape but guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape, pursuant to section 220. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found not true the allegation that appellant had a prior serious felony conviction, pursuant to sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and the allegation that appellant suffered a prior felony conviction and did not remain free of prison custody for five years, pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to the midterm of four years in state prison. He was also sentenced to a 16-month consecutive term on a previous case.
Appellant contends his conviction for assault with intent to commit rape must be dismissed because the verdict is not supported by the evidence and it constitutes an inconsistent verdict. Court disagree and affirm.

Following a jury trial, Eric Daniel Brown (appellant) was found guilty of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215), robbery (id., 211), and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851). He was acquitted of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code 496d, subd. (a)). The jury found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking and robbery, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
On appeal appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted two prior theft related convictions for impeachment purposes, that there is insufficient evidence to support the jurys true finding that appellant used a firearm, and that the abstract of judgment must be corrected. Court agree only with his last contention and in all other respects affirm.

It was alleged in a criminal complaint filed May 8, 2006, that appellant Charlene Villareal committed an assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and that she had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). On August 8, 2007, appellant, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled no contest to the charged offense and admitted the enhancement allegation. On December 14, 2007, the court imposed the two-year lower term on the substantive offense and granted the prosecutions motion to strike the prior prison term enhancement.
Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing.

More than 60 days after the Madera County Superior Court terminated appellant fathers parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to his daughter, K.M., the fathers trial attorney filed a notice of appeal.[1] Because a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of the courts decision (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.400(d)), the notice of appeal was untimely. Consequently, the termination order became final, and this court lost jurisdiction to review the superior courts decision. (Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 122.) We so notified the trial attorney, giving him an opportunity to explain why we should not dismiss the appeal. The attorney responded by letter that he mistakenly thought he filed the notice when in fact he misplaced it. Thus, the attorney claimed it was his mistake which led to the late filing. Court also served copies of our order on the father. He did not respond. The fathers appellate counsel urges this court to deem the notice of appeal timely under the constructive filing doctrine. Alternatively, he claims the trial attorney was per se ineffective for not filing the notice of appeal in a timely fashion so that the father should be entitled to this courts consideration of his appeal on its merits. On review, Court dismiss.

There were three commercial burglaries -- essentially, two women shoplifting small but high priced items like diet pills, Prilosec and baby formula at three different stores in Orange County on the afternoon of June 18, 2007. The two women, Veronica Martinez and Fanny Fuentes, shoplifted goods from a CVS pharmacy in Huntington Beach around 12:30 p.m., and from an Albertsons supermarket in Garden Grove around a quarter to 2 p.m. The third burglary, also of an Albertsons, took place about 5:30 p.m. in Newport Beach. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Tru Le sued defendant Phong Hung Tran for breach of contract, fraud, and other claims with respect to a promissory note. The jury found in Les favor, awarding damages in excess of $450,000. Tran appeals, claiming that the trial judge erroneously admitted evidence and that substantial evidence failed to support the verdict. Court disagree and affirm.

On June 6, 2005, before appellant's commitment expiration date of August 28, 2005, the People filed a petition to extend appellant's SVP commitment, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welfare and Institutions Code section 6604 et seq.,[1] until August 28, 2007. The petition included two clinical evaluations dated April 23, 2005, and March 2, 2005, in which psychologists concluded that appellant met the criteria as a sexually violent predator.