CA Unpub Decisions

Ronald Lee Roberts appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of possession for sale of phencyclidine. (Health & Saf. Code , 11378.5.) Roberts admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (b), and service of five prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Roberts to a term of seven years in state prison. Roberts contends defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial and the waiver of constitutional rights in connection with the admission of the prior conviction allegations was defective. Court reject these claims and affirm the judgment.

Ventura County Professional Peace Officers Association (VCPPOA) obtained an arbitration award that required the County of Ventura (County) to reinstate Real Party in Interest Terry Kitaguchi as an airport operations officer. Kitaguchi appeals from an order vacating the award as contrary to public policy, and awarding costs to County. Kitaguchi contends (1) that the County waived the public policy grounds upon which the award was vacated, because it did not plead nor prove public policy grounds in the arbitration, (2) that the award was not contrary to a well-defined public policy, (3) that the County was not entitled to costs because it did not request them, and (4) that Kitaguchi should be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. Court reverse but deny Kitguchi's request for fees and costs.

A modification decision.

C.G. appeals from the order of wardship entered following a finding that she committed robbery. The minor was placed home on probation and contends that the robbery finding was not supported by the evidence and should not be considered a conviction under the Three Strikes law and that it was improper to order a maximum period of confinement. Court affirm the order of wardship and order the juvenile court to strike reference to the minors the maximum period of confinement.

John Guzman Castro appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422, count 1) and misdemeanor battery ( 242, count 2). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of two years and six months. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting irrelevant and highly inflammatory gang expert testimony. Court affirm.

The Signal Hill Redevelopment Agency (Agency) filed a complaint in eminent domain to acquire real property owned by Traffic Loops Crackfilling, Inc. (Traffic Loops). A jury fixed the value of Traffic Loopss real property at $590,000. The trial court entered judgment in accord with the jurys verdict. Traffic Loops then filed the appeal that comes before us today. The sole issue raised by Traffic Loops on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the Agencys motion in limine to preclude the companys principal from testifying that the value of the property was $800,000 or $900,000. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Leland Lamont Phillips of two counts of forcible rape committed against one child (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2); unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code) and three counts of aggravated sexual assault on another child under the age of 14 ( 269, subd. (a)(3)). The trial court found a prior rape conviction to be true and sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 25 years plus 250 years to life. On appeal, defendant asserts that (1) his right to speedy trial was violated, (2) the court erred in denying his Faretta motion for self-representation (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562]), (3) ineffective assistance of counsel compels reversal, (4) CALCRIM No. 318 unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to defendant, (5) CALCRIM No. 1191 violated defendants right to due process, and (6) the court erred in denying his request for continuance to file a motion for new trial. None of these claims has merit, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

The court entered judgment on March 13, 2007, in favor of plaintiff for $14,410.23, plus attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined after plaintiff files a Memorandum of Costs and files a Motion for the Court to Determine the Amount of the Attorney Fees Awarded to Plaintiff.
When the judgment awards attorney fees but does not determine the amount, the judgment is deemed to subsume the postjudgment order determining the amount awarded, and an appeal from the judgment encompasses the postjudgment order. (Grant v. List & Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 998.) Accordingly, the time for appeal ran from the date of the judgment, March 13, 2007, and the purported appeal on July 17, 2007, was untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) Court shall dismiss the appeal.

Shelly H. (appellant) is the mother of K.C., a girl born on December 31, 1999, and J.C., a boy born on April 19, 2002. She appeals from juvenile court orders sustaining dependency petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subds. (a), (b) and (j)), denying reunification services to appellant, awarding sole legal and physical custody of the minors to their father in Utah, Donald C. (father), granting appellant visitation four times a year, and terminating jurisdiction. (Further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends the reasons for terminating jurisdiction are not supported by substantial evidence, and she claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by making findings under section 361.5, denying her reunification services, and delegating discretion to father and therapists to make arrangements for appellants four annual visits with the children.

A jury found defendant Ronald Merle Fear II guilty of resisting a police officer by threat or violence and failure to appear. The jury also found true two sentencing enhancement allegations, one for a prior prison term and a second for committing a felony while released on bail. On appeal, defendant contends the conviction for the failure to appear should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that he intended to evade the process of the court. Finding there was substantial evidence to support the conviction, Court affirm the judgment.

Aaron Moses Levy appeals a judgment entered following his conviction of felony vandalism, contending the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction and improperly admitting evidence of two prior uncharged vandalism incidents. Court find no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.

Janice L. Vance, formerly Janice L. Colton, appeals a family court order updating child support arrearages and ordering that those arrearages continue to be paid under a 2002 order at the rate of $1,000 per month. Vance asserts the court erred when it made an order regarding arrearages and attorney fees without requiring Roland C. Colton, her former husband, to file an income and expense declaration. She also asserts the family court abused its discretion in setting an installment payment plan for arrearages that was unreasonably low when balanced against the significant amount of unpaid arrearages and Colton's income. We determine her appeal lacks merit and affirm.

Andre W. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor children David W. and Z.V. (together, the minors) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Andre challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the minors were likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. He further contends the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) impermissibly pursued adoption as the minors' permanent plans without considering the paternal grandmother's requests for placement. Court affirm the judgment.

Terrance W. seeks review of juvenile court orders setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Terrance contends the court erred when it summarily denied his petition for modification under section 388 and denied his request to change his status from biological to presumed father. Terrance also asserts he did not receive adequate notice of the dependency proceedings. Court deny the petition.