CA Unpub Decisions

J.F. appeals after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging she committed two counts of felony vandalism. J.F. challenges the admission of her statements to school officials and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the courts restitution order for damages to the vandalized property. Court affirm.

Defendant S.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] terminating her parental rights to her daughter, B.F., and finding B.F. suitable for adoption. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating parental rights because she presented evidence sufficient to support the exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (beneficial relationship exception). Mother also contends the trial courts finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) did not apply was erroneous because notice to the tribes was inadequate. Court conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mothers parental rights to B.F. and placing the child for adoption. However, we reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings to determine whether respondent Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) complied with the notice provisions of ICWA.

D.D. (Mother) appeals orders entered on February 5, 2008 (the February 2008 order) and March 14, 2008 (the March 2008 order) by the Sonoma County Superior Court, Juvenile Division. These orders, respectively, denied Mothers petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, and terminated her parental rights with regard to E.E. (born August 1999). Mother claims the juvenile court erred in its denial of her section 388 petition without a hearing, and that such error requires reversal of both the February 2008 order and the March 2008 order. As discussed below, we dismiss the appeal as to the February 2008 order and affirm the March 2008 order.

C.R. appeals from a judgment granting him probation after he admitted misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, 242, 243, subd. (a)) as charged in count one of an original wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602, subd. (a)). His appellate counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. C.R. was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he elected not do so.
Having reviewed the record and found no arguable issues, Court affirm the judgment.

On August 5, 2008, the Del Norte County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered an order in this proceeding that terminated reunification services for M.T. (Mother) and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for R.S. (born June 2006). Mother challenges the order by petition for extraordinary writ, contending the Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) failed to offer or provide her reasonable reunification services. As discussed below, Court conclude there is substantial evidence to support the courts finding to the contrary, and accordingly deny Mothers petition on the merits.

In a murder-for-hire scheme, appellant Rudy Limon (Limon) paid appellant Dean Cairo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) $10,000 in cash to kill Sergio Reyes (Sergio). Limon was angry with Sergio, who was formerly his best friend, because soon after Limon and his former wife Celina Reyes (Celina) dissolved their marriage, Sergio secretly began seeing Celina and then married her. In April 2003, Rodriguez shot Sergio, but Sergio survived. In December 2003, Rodriguez murdered Sergio by approaching him as he sat in his Silverado truck (Silverado) and shooting him in the shoulder and through the head.

Plaintiff Mary Altmann, in propria persona, successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate against the City of Agoura Hills City Council (the City), and sought her costs and attorney fees as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure[1]section 1021.5. The trial court awarded Altmann some of her costs and attorney fees for legal work done by a retained attorney (who did not appear in the action), but denied other costs and fees for legal work Altmann (who is not a licensed attorney) did herself. Altmann appeals from the post-judgment orders, contending that she was entitled to all of her costs and fees because she was acting as a private attorney general. The City cross-appeals, contending that Altmann was not entitled to any attorney fees under section 1021.5. Neither partys contention has merit. Accordingly, Court affirm the orders.

Appellant Sensation Leather, Inc. (Sensation) suffered damage to its inventory at the hands of entities insured by an insolvent Arizona insurance company. After obtaining a judgment in California against the tortfeasors in 1999, Sensation successfully obtained recovery of the judgment from the insurance companys receiver in an Arizona proceeding. Sensation also sought to recover postjudgment interest for the period between 1999 and the date of the Arizona judgment. The Arizona Court of Appeals held, however, that Sensation could not recover postjudgment interest. The issue presented is whether Sensation can recover from respondent, California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), postjudgment interest denied by the Arizona court. Resolution of this issue turns on whether the postjudgment interest sought by Sensation constitutes a covered claim under Insurance Code section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(1)(A) (section 1063.1(c)(1)(A)). Court conclude it does not and affirm the trial courts order sustaining CIGAs demurrer to Sensations complaint.

Defendant and appellant David Jacob Villescas entered a plea of no contest to a charge of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted suffering two prior convictions under the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)). His plea and admissions were entered on December 10, 2007, based on allegations that the offense occurred on August 5, 2007. The trial court struck one of the prior convictions, sentenced defendant to the low term of 16 months in state prison on the narcotics charge, and doubled the term to 32 months based on the remaining prior conviction. The trial court ruled defendant was ineligible for Proposition 36 probation because he had previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony, and defendant had not remained free of prison custody for a period of five years prior to the current offense. The judgment is affirmed.

In this premises liability case, Katalin Ettefagh (plaintiff), seeks reversal of a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Westmont Properties, Ltd. (Westmont). The trial court granted summary judgment based on the sidewalk accident doctrine which absolves a property owner whose property abuts a public sidewalk from liability arising from any defects in the sidewalk that were not caused by the property owner. The trial court noted that Westmont denied that it had in any way caused, brought about or contributed to the alleged defect in the sidewalk that had resulted in plaintiffs injuries. As plaintiff produced no evidence, beyond mere speculation, that raised a triable issue on the point, the trial court granted Westmonts motion.
Court agree with the trial courts analysis of the record and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Robert Lim appeals from an order denying his motion to strike the complaint filed by plaintiff and respondent Chase Rhee pursuant Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] Lim contends: 1) all of the statements alleged in the complaint were privileged prelitigation demands for an accounting; and 2) the lawsuit seeks a prior restraint on Lims communications with news reporters. We conclude that Lims statements did not constitute protected prelitigation communication and Lims contentions concerning prior restraints are not properly before us in connection with his motion to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16. Therefore, Court affirm.

The jury found defendant Michael Perkins guilty of sale of narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant admitted one prior sale of narcotics conviction alleged pursuant to section 11370.2, subdivision (a). Defendant was sentenced to seven years in state prison, consisting of the midterm of four years plus three years for the prior conviction. He was ordered to pay $1,050 in attorney fees pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8.[2] Defendant timely appealed. Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support the verdict. He further contends the imposition of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. Respondent agrees the imposition of attorney fees was improper, but contends certain other mandatory fees must be imposed. Court reverse the order for attorney fees, order the additional mandatory fees to be imposed, and in all other respects, affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Malcolm W. Anderson appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211). Defendants appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief which did not raise and arguable legal issues and requested independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 442. After review of the record, Court affirm.

A. T. (mother) and B. R. (father) appeal from the orders terminating parental rights to P. R., now two years old, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Parents contend notice of the proceedings was not given as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the ICWA) (92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963). Court find the contention has no merit and, accordingly, affirm the orders.