CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant S. M., mother of A. N. (minor),[1]appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.21, subd. (f) & 395.)[2] Appellant contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that reasonable services were offered to her; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it terminated reunification services; (3) appellants failure to object to the reasonable services finding does not preclude this court from considering the issue on appeal; and (4) any failure to object to the reasonable services finding was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Court affirm the juvenile courts orders as they relate to the minor, and strike the remainder of appellants claims related to S. C.

Defendant Logan Duane Hursh pled no contest to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and admitted personally inflicting great bodily injury on a person 70 years or older. At sentencing, the trial court found defendant presumptively ineligible for probation under Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(3), declined to find it an unusual case, denied probation, and sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison. Defendant appeals, contending the court abused its discretion both in denying probation and in imposing an upper term sentence. Court affirm the judgment.

In a bench trial in case No. CRF06482 (the registration case), defendant Raymond Willard McLaughlin was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years. On appeal, defendant contends his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely and Cunningham. Court affirm the judgment.

Stonecrest Square Auto Center, LLC (Stonecrest) appeals a judgment denying it declaratory relief. Stonecrest contends the trial court erred in determining Equilon Enterprises, LLC, dba Shell Oil Products US (Shell) lawfully and reasonably withheld consent to the proposed assignment of Stonecrest's Shell franchise to a third party. Court conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment.

Following Maurice Garcia's guilty plea to corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code,[1] 273.5, subd. (a)) and false imprisonment ( 236/237, subd. (a)), together with his admissions of a previous domestic violence conviction enhancement ( 273.5, subd. (e)(1)) and a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court imposed a stipulated prison term of six years and eight months but suspended execution of sentence and placed Garcia on probation, conditioned upon, among other things, that he serve 365 days in the county jail. Shortly after his release from local custody, Garcia admitted violating probation and the trial court imposed the previously suspended stipulated sentence. Garcia appeals, essentially contending his sentence should be reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to properly consider the possibility of continuing to stay the previously imposed stipulated sentence and to reinstate him on probation. Court affirm.

We review a defense summary judgment in an employment discrimination action. Plaintiff David Fraitag sued his former part-time employer, the Superior Court of California for the County of Imperial (Employer), contending that its refusal to hire him on a full-time basis was due to age and/or disability discrimination. (Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); Gov. Code, 12900 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) Employer successfully brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking to establish that as a matter of law, Fraitag could not prevail on any cause of action because he could not establish that any age or disability discrimination took place when he was not hired on a full-time basis. (Code Civ. Proc, 437c.) Employer relied on its showing in defense that legitimate nondiscriminatory business reasons existed for its decisions about Fraitag's employment status, e.g., that he was known to have gambled by telephone at the courthouse during business hours after being warned not to do so. After reviewing the record de novo, we conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as a matter of law and the judgment must be affirmed.

Defendant, an immigration lawyer who suffers from mental illness, killed her husband, Henry Sims, and then represented herself at trial. A jury convicted her of first degree murder and also found true the alleged firearm enhancements. ( 187, subd. (a); 12022.5, subd. (a); and 12022.53, subd. (d).) The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive sentences of 25 years to life and stayed the sentence for the enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). ( 654.)
On appeal, defendant charges the court committed evidentiary, instructional, and sentencing error. She objects to the admission of two prior acts of domestic violence from 1992 and 1995. (Evid. Code, 1109.) She contends the court should have given sua sponte Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2007-2008), (CALCRIM) No. 627 about hallucinations. She argues the court should have stricken, rather than stayed, the sentence for the second firearm enhancement. In supplemental briefing, she asserts she was not competent to represent herself. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Sandra Mariela Zuazo appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, 191.5, subd. (a); count 1); driving under the influence and causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a); count 2); and driving with .08 percent blood alcohol or more (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b); count 3). The jury also found true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7) and the offenses were serious and or violent felonies ( 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The trial court dismissed counts 2 and 3 as lesser included offenses of count 1 and struck the personal injury allegations. Defendant was sentenced to a six year midterm prison sentence.

Defendant Robert Eugene Dumire appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for sexually abusing three teenage sisters. During most of the offenses, defendant, who is 71 years old, was living with the girls family. The jury convicted defendant of aggravated sexual assault, oral copulation and rape of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 269, subds. (a)(1) and (a)(4)[1]; counts 1 and 2); committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 ( 288, subd. (a); counts 3, 4, and 10 through 14); and committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 16 ( 288, subd. (c); counts 5 through 9). The jury also found true the allegations that the offenses were against multiple victims. ( 667.61, subd. (e)(5).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 48 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support defendants convictions for aggravated sexual assault against R-1 (counts 1 and 2). Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS), and claims the court committed Cunningham[2]error by sentencing him to the upper term on counts 5 through 9. Court reject defendants contentions and affirm the judgment.

T.M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile courts January 29, 2008, orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]petition seeking additional reunification services for her two daughters, daughters 1 and 2, terminating her parental rights to the youngest of her two daughters, daughter 2, and placing daughter 2 for adoption. Mother does not contest the courts concurrent order placing her oldest daughter, daughter 1, in a legal guardianship with daughter 2s adoptive parents.
Daughter 1 was age 12 at the time of the hearings and repeatedly said she did not want to be adopted. Daughter 2 was age seven at the time of the hearings and wanted to be adopted. Mother claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition; insufficient evidence supports the finding that daughter 2 was adoptable; and insufficient evidence supports the finding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply to daughter 2. Court find no error and affirm the orders.

Following a denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Alden Gene Johnson was convicted by jury trial of possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine base for sale and resisting arrest. On appeal, he contends, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. Court agree and reverse.

On February 1, 2003, at approximately 7:00 p.m., 16-year-old appellant, Richard Dewayne Flemming, Jr., was with several juveniles including M.F. and D.M. at a Super 7 store in Tulare. After Antoine Houston, Timmy White, and Roman Davis arrived at the store in a car, one of the juveniles in Flemmings group identified himself as a Crips gang member by saying, [W]hats up, cuz? The group in the car then began identifying themselves as Blood gang members by saying, [W]hats up, blood? After exchanging words, Flemmings group began walking away from the store but M.F. stayed behind. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant, Lee Elton May, of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). In a separate proceeding, the jury found true a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that May had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On appeal, May contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress. Court affirm.

Defendant Anthony Wright pleaded no contest to the felony offense of hit and run accident resulting in injury (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)) and the misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601, subd. (a)). The trial court placed defendant on felony probation for three years, with probation conditions that included serving one year in county jail and paying victim restitution.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. The period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record. Based on our review, we have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal. Following the California Supreme Courts direction in People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 110, we provide a brief description of the . . . procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.