CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted David Cummings of first degree murder, attempted murder, escape, and felon in possession of a firearm. Cummings appeals, arguing that the trial judges bias against his trial counsel resulted in evidentiary rulings against him which prejudiced his defense and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Court affirm.

Richard V. Mayes appeals from the judgment following his conviction by a jury of the crime of battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Appellant contends the judgment should be reversed, because the presiding judge had no power to act once appellant had filed a statement of disqualification against him, and because the court erred in denying appellants Marsden motion without an adequate inquiry. Court affirm.

A property owner paid the balance of a loan secured by a trust deed by check. Although the check was written for the full amount due on the loan and there were sufficient funds in the account to cover the check, the property owners bank erroneously processed the check for exactly $50,000 less than its face amount. After learning of the underpayment, the property owner withdrew the remaining funds from his bank without paying the lender the full amount due. When the lender instituted foreclosure proceedings, the property owner filed the instant action against his bank and the lenders bank, along with numerous other defendants not parties to this appeal.
Plaintiff and appellant Anatoli Alexeenko, the property owner, appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of his bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu), and the lenders bank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (Chase), after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on plaintiffs second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiff makes two procedural arguments on appeal.[1] First, he argues Chases demurrer was not filed within ten days of the filing of the SAC, as required by rule 3.1320(j) of the California Rules of Court.[2] Second, he contends Chases demurrer was not timely set for hearing within 35 days as required by rule 3.1320(d).

A jury convicted Lavell Gatewood (defendant) of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664)[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (c)), that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury to the victim ( 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury to the victim under circumstances involving domestic violence ( 12022.7, subd. (e)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole on the attempted murder count, plus an additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and an additional four years for the great bodily injury under section 12022.7, subdivision (e). Defendant received 566 days of actual custody credit and zero days of conduct credit for a total of 566 days of presentence custody credit.

Defendant and appellant Ronald S. Wu, M.D. (defendant) appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff and respondent Cindy Baker (plaintiff). Defendant contends the trial court erred by entering judgment in this medical malpractice action without providing for a periodic payment schedule pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 667.7[1]and by awarding plaintiff her costs pursuant to section 998 and prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3291. Court affirm the judgment and the award of costs and prejudgment interest.

A petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that appellant and three other minors committed robbery (Pen. Code, 211). At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the charge against appellant and dismissed the petition against his three codefendants. Appellant contends the juvenile courts finding against him is not supported by substantial evidence. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment.

Eugene Schneider (appellant) contends the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees in this interpleader action. We conclude that, because appellant failed to deposit the interpled funds with the court, the court properly denied his request for fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6, subdivision (a).

Santos Z. (father) and Sierrah Z. (mother) are the parents of Savannah and Simon Z. (children), who were declared dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] Father appeals from an order adopted by the juvenile court following the 18-month review hearing that, among other things, placed the children with mother and denied father visitation with the children. He contends the juvenile court failed to comply with this courts remand instructions in a previous appeal.[2] We conclude the remand issue is moot because the children have been returned to mothers custody, thus rendering inapplicable the code section referenced in this courts remand instructions. Court affirm the juvenile courts order.

J. T. (Mother) challenges an order of the Alameda County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, made at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, in which the court set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the minor H. T. Mother challenges the juvenile courts denial of reunification services, and objects to certain evidentiary rulings. As discussed below, we conclude there was no prejudicial error and deny Mothers petition on the merits.

Defendant and appellant, Carlos Miguel Iraheta, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction, by jury trial, for second degree murder with firearm use findings (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53). The judgment is reversed.

On March 16, 2007, an information was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court charging appellant Samantha McNeal (McNeal) with one count of grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a)[1](count 1) and two counts of attempt to file a false or forged instrument, in violation of section 115, subdivision (a) (Counts 2 and 3). On December 7, 2007, the trial court granted the Peoples motion to amend the information to allege count 1 as a misdemeanor, pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(4). McNeal then withdrew her initial plea of not guilty and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the first count of the information. The trial court found McNeal guilty of count 1 and dismissed counts 2 and 3 in furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385.

Appellant Albert Campos was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree murder of Christian Gonzalez in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that appellant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c), causing great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The jury found not true the allegation that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22. The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life in state prison for the murder conviction, plus 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm allegation.

Defendant and appellant, Christopher Mathis, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction, by jury trial, for first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, with firearm use and gang enhancement findings (Pen. Code, 187, 12021, 12022.53, 186.22, subd. (b)).[1] Mathis was sentenced to state prison for a term of 50 years to life. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Dr. Harris Newmark III, a Corporation, brought an action against defendants Kirkor Kirkorian, M.D. (Kirkorian) and his wife Snezana Kirkorian, aka Snezana Pavlovic, for fraudulent conveyance based on a transfer from Kirkorian to his wife of his interest in their residence property (real property). The fraudulent conveyance claim pertains to 2002 and 2004 judgments obtained by plaintiff against Kirkorian. The trial court struck the allegation as to the 2002 judgment as being untimely, but after trial, granted plaintiffs motion to amend to conform to proof so as to permit plaintiff to replead the 2002 judgment. Defendants assert that the trial court had no power to allow the amendment and that in any event there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial courts conclusion that plaintiff brought his fraudulent transfer case within the required time. We hold that the trial court had the discretion to permit the amendment and did not abuse that discretion. We also hold there was substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusion that the statute of limitations was not a bar in this case.