CA Unpub Decisions

John Sanford Golay appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on two counts of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4), two counts of possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a); counts 5 & 7), and count 6 possessing an opium pipe (Health & Saf. Code, 11364, subd. (a)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for two years. Court affirm the judgment.

John Stephenson and James Stephenson, beneficiaries of a trust created in 2002, appeal from a judgment reforming a trust created in 1990. Daniel Carnahan and Mary Jane MacKillop, respondents, are beneficiaries of the 1990 trust. The reformation resulted in the transfer of real property from the 2002 trust to the 1990 trust. Appellants contend: (1) an action to reform the 1990 trust was time-barred; (2) the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction in reforming the 1990 trust because in their pleadings respondents did not ask the court to reform or interpret that trust; and (3) the probate court erred by reforming the 1990 trust. Court reject the first two contentions. However, the third contention has merit. Accordingly, Court reverse.

Jason Antoine Rodriguez appeals from a judgment after conviction by jury of street terrorism (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (a)); second degree robbery ( 211); dissuading a witness by force or threat ( 136.1, subd. (b)(1)); and being a felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The jury found true allegations that the robbery was committed with personal use of a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that the robbery, dissuading of a witness and firearm possession were committed for the benefit of a street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)). With respect to dissuading the witness, the trial court struck the gang enhancement.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based on racial discrimination in jury selection, admitted preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, allowed testimony of a gang expert without proper foundation without which, appellant contends, there was insufficient evidence that any of his crimes were committed for the benefit of a street gang, did not give a jury instruction on corroboration of accomplice testimony and did not stay his prison term for being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to section 654. Court affirm.

Carl Bee appeals from the judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, his no contest plea to possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) and his admission that during the commission of the offense he was personally armed with a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c). Pursuant to his negotiated plea, he was sentenced to prison for the middle term of four years plus four years for the gun use enhancement and a count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and a gang allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) were dismissed.

Javier Medina appeals from the judgment after his conviction by court trial of possession of cocaine base for sale and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5 & 11378); five weapon and ammunition offenses and giving false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12025, subd. (a)(1), 12031, subd. (a)(2)(A), 12316, subd. (b)(1) & 148.9, subd. (a)).[1] The court also found true allegations that appellant had one prior felony strike conviction and that he was personally armed with a firearm ( 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1), 12022, subd. (c)). The court sentenced him to 12 years in state prison, including a 4-year middle term for possession of cocaine base for sale, doubled pursuant to sections 667, subdivision (e)(1) and 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c)(1); and a 4-year enhancement for being personally armed with a firearm, pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (c). It imposed concurrent sentences for the remaining offenses and enhancements. Appellant contends that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and admitting involuntary statements he made to investigating officers. Court affirm.

Plaintiff Stephanie Price appeals from a judgment against her issued after the trial court granted a motion to strike and sustained the demurrers of defendants 7 Eleven, Inc., Gene Jones, Richard OKeefe, and Herb Domeno. Court affirm.

Tyrone Cedrick Fisher appeals his conviction by jury of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), attempted destruction of evidence (Pen. Code, 664/135), and resisting, obstructing and delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant admitted three prior drug convictions (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to 13 years state prison. Court affirm.

This appeal arises from a juvenile dependency proceeding. Father challenges the dependency courts jurisdictional orders adjudging his son, J.C., a dependent child of the court, and the courts dispositional orders to the extent those orders removed J.C. from his fathers custody. Court affirm the dependency courts jurisdictional orders but reverse the courts dispositional orders.

Defendant Gary Ravet appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Personalized Workout of La Jolla, Inc. (PWL) and Nathan Poole on plaintiffs' malicious prosecution action arising from Ravet's underlying lawsuit involving a dispute over health club membership fees. The jury in the malicious prosecution action returned a special verdict awarding PWL and Poole $74,047.59 in compensatory damages and, later, $5 million in punitive damages on a finding that Ravet acted with malice, fraud or oppression. On Ravet's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial court reduced the punitive damages award to $296,190.36. On appeal, Ravet contends (1) his voluntary dismissal of the underlying lawsuit as well as PWL's lack of standing prevents a finding of favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution action and (2) plaintiffs did not meet their burden to present evidence of his positive net worth or ability to pay a punitive damages award. He contends that if this court reinstates the first judgment including the $5 million punitive damages award, we should order a new trial as to the award on grounds it is excessive as a matter of law.

Gregory and Barbara Nelson, individually and as co-trustees of a family trust, appeal a judgment for Steven and Maureen Cade, individually and as co-trustees of a family trust, on the Cades' complaint for breach of a promissory note, and against the Nelsons on their cross-complaint for breach of oral contract, fraud and related counts.[1] The Nelsons contend the trial court improperly granted the Cades' motion in limine to exclude evidence of Steven's alleged oral agreement to nullify a provision of the promissory note requiring the Nelsons to pay the Cades $500,000. The Nelsons also contend the court improperly denied their request for leave to amend their answer to the complaint to allege a defense of mutual mistake of fact, which they made immediately before the jury was to commence deliberations. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Lewis appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendants Pacific Bell Directory (Pacific Bell) and Natalie Malcolm on Lewis's complaint alleging causes of action for cancellation of a written instrument, fraud, and unfair business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Lewis's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue defendants' summary judgment motion by reason of her inability to conduct certain discovery. Court affirm the judgment.

Martin Garza entered a negotiated guilty plea to count 1 of the complaint, driving with a measurable blood alcohol level causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)), and to its corresponding allegation that Garza caused the victim, Cesar Urbano, to become comatose due to brain injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (b)); and to count 3 of the complaint, willfully evading a pursuing peace officer, causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, 2800.3, subd (a)), and its corresponding allegation that Garza personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Urbano (Pen. Code, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). As part of the plea bargain, the prosecution dismissed a count for driving under the influence of alcohol, a hit‑and‑run with injury count, an evading an officer with reckless driving count and various allegations. The parties stipulated to an eight‑year prison term. The trial court sentenced Garza in accordance with the plea bargain. Garza's request for a certificate of probable cause was denied.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Aaron Leroy Montgomery of assaulting a child over whom he had care and custody, by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm, resulting in death (Pen. Code,[1] 273a, subd. (b), count 1), and causing a child under his care and custody to be injured and inflicted unjustifiable pain and suffering ( 273a, subd. (a), count 2). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five, in the commission of count 1 ( 12022.7, subd. (d) and 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison on count 1. The sentences on count 2 and the enhancement were stayed pursuant to section 654. On appeal, defendant contends the admission of his confession statements during a police interview violated his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Court affirm.

The court re-adjudged appellant, A.H., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) after it sustained allegations charging appellant with challenging another to fight (Pen. Code, 415, subd. (1)) and vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a)). On appeal, appellant contends the court erred when it allowed the introduction of gang evidence. Court will affirm.