CA Unpub Decisions

Rodolfo Sandoval appeals a judgment after his conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, 189),[1] with special findings that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang, was an active participant in the gang, and that he personally discharged a firearm to cause the death of Ryan Briner ( 190.2, subd. (a)(22), 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). We conclude, among other things: 1) the trial court did not err by admitting gang evidence, 2) evidence about a gang edict against drive-by shootings was admissible as modus operandi evidence, 3) the admission of testimony that mentioned Sandoval's custody status was not reversible error, 4) Sandoval's jail conversations and phone calls were properly admitted, 5) the source material used by the gang expert was sufficiently reliable, 6) evidence that Sandoval was involved in a prior assault on Shawn Mickelson one day before the murder was properly admitted, 7) the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of a witness's testimony about a conversation between Sandoval and his accomplice, 8) the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution in the amount of $51,000, but 9) the court erred by imposing a 10-year gang enhancement. Court strike the gang enhancement. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Stuart D. Katsh (Plaintiff) seeks to recover possession of leased premises from his tenants, Laura L. Murphy and Steve Kravac (Defendants). He has served a series of notices and commenced several actions in his effort to recover possession. He commenced the present action as a limited civil action for unlawful detainer, and later filed an amended complaint reclassifying the action as an unlimited civil action. He appeals a judgment of dismissal after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, and also challenges several postjudgment orders. Court conclude that the sustaining of the demurrer was proper, but Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend the complaint to allege counts for unlawful detainer and ejectment based on the alleged violation of a use restriction in the lease.

Defendants and appellants Leatrace F. Baptiste and Ada M. Bradford (defendants) appeal from orders denying motions to set aside defaults and denying reconsideration of those previous orders. Court affirm.

Yavneh Hebrew Academy is the grantee of a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a religious day school for orthodox Jewish students. The CUP allowed Yavneh to hold indoor Sabbath prayer services, which are not open to the general public, as part of its religious education program. Yavneh requested permission from the City of Los Angeles Central Area Planning Commission (CAPC or the City) to expand the hours of operation and the list of those allowed to participate in Sabbath prayer services. After the CAPC partially approved the modification request, the Concerned Residents of Hancock Park (Concerned Residents) and its three members filed a petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5) challenging the CAPCs decision. The trial court denied the writ petition and Concerned Residents appeal. They raise jurisdictional and notice errors, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA)), and California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq. (CEQA)). For reasons we explain herein, Court affirm the judgment.

Walter Jose Cordon appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of three counts: second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, 459, count 1);[1]grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a), count 2); and grand theft auto ( 487, subd. (d)(1), count 3). He waived trial on the allegations that he had served four prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and admitted them as true. He was sentenced to state prison for six years as follows: The court selected the midterm of two years on count 1; imposed the midterm of two years each on counts 2 and 3 to run concurrently to count 1; and added four consecutive one-year terms for the four prison term enhancements. Appellant contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence of his statements made to a police officer because he claims the statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to warnings under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda),[2]and (2) imposing punishments on both the burglary and grand theft counts in violation of section 654. Court disagree that the statements were inadmissible, but agree that multiple punishments were precluded under section 654.

Jorge Humberto Vega appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of four counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211),[1] during the commission of each of which he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)); two counts of attempted second degree robbery ( 664/211), during each of which he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)); one count of assault, during which he personally used a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2), 12022.5, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and the trial courts findings he previously had suffered convictions for two serious felonies within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Vega to an aggregate term of 25 years to life plus 20 years in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

This is the fourth appeal in long-running litigation between Angela Cameron and Winnie Doeman (collectively, Cameron or appellants) and the foreclosing lender, U.S. Bank Home Mortgage (the Bank) over nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings that culminated in the sale of Camerons home. Cameron appeals from a grant of summary judgment to the Bank on her claims for declaratory relief, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for breach of contract, and challenges the trial courts ruling on a discovery motion. She also appeals from a judgment entered on a cross-complaint in interpleader filed by the trustee under the deed of trust with respect to excess funds generated by the foreclosure sale, and she challenges the attorney fees awarded to the trustee in the interpleader action. Court reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Bank, but find no abuse of discretion in the trial courts discovery rulings. We affirm the judgment on the cross-complaint in interpleader.

Rory Caraway appeals from the judgment imposed following his conviction by jury of transporting, selling, furnishing, or giving away cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), with admissions that he suffered two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)) and served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). Sentenced to a term of 11 years, he contends that substantial evidence does not support his conviction.Court find this contention unsupported and affirm the judgment.

Gearlean Williams appeals from an order denying with prejudice her petition to be appointed conservator over the person and estate of Jessie Allen. The record on appeal is sparse. It includes two minute orders, the notice of appeal and designation of the record, and the reporters transcript for the hearing at which the petition at issue was denied.[1] The petition at issue in this appeal is not included in the record. As far as we can determine, Ms. Williams filed a series of petitions seeking to be appointed conservator over the person and estate of Mr. Allen, each of which was denied. The fourth petition the one at issue in this appeal was denied with prejudice. According to Ms. Williams opening brief, Mr. Allen is an 87 year old paraplegic with no living family. Ms. Williams met him in 1984, and provided daily care for him. She claims that she filed the petition at issue because Mr. Allen asked her to get a letter of conservatorship to allow her to take responsibility over his estate and personal needs. She also asserts that Mr. Allen is being abused at the nursing home at which he now resides. She contends the probate court was wrong to deny her petition.

Following his June 2000 no contest plea to first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459),[1]defendant and appellant Kennon Lavelle Duronte was granted probation. After numerous revocations, extensions, and reinstatements, probation was eventually terminated in July 2008 and the trial court imposed the upper term of six years in prison. Duronte contends imposition of the upper term was improper because: (1) the trial court violated California Rules of Court, rule 4.435 when it based his sentence on events that occurred subsequent to the original grant of probation, i.e., his poor performance on probation; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigating factors as they existed at the time of the original grant of probation; (3) the trial court committed Cunningham[2]error by imposing an upper term sentence based on facts that were not found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) application of the 2007 amendments to the Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) to his sentence violated ex post facto principles; and (5) application of the 2007 amendments to the DSL violated his contract clause rights. Discerning no reversible error, Court affirm.

Jennifer L. appeals from the order of the juvenile court that suspended her visitation with her children, Bentley G. (born in 2003) and J.K. (born in 2005). While the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) has not opposed this appeal, the children have, through their court appointed attorney. Mother contends that the courts order is not supported by substantial evidence that continued visits with the children would be detrimental to them. Court affirm.

Alvin Jerrod Collins, also known as Tiny Peewee, appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of two counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, counts 1 & 3)[1]and one count of grand theft ( 487, subd. (a), count 2).[2] As to each count, the jury found to be true the allegation that the offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B). The trial court found to be true the prior felony strike allegation within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), the prior serious felony conviction allegation within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the prior prison term allegation within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). It sentenced appellant to an aggregate state prison term of 60 years to life.
Appellant contends that (1) there is insufficient evidence to justify convictions of two burglaries, (2) if the evidence is sufficient to support both burglaries, then one must be stayed pursuant to section 654, and (3) because appellant received an indeterminate life sentence on count 1, the trial court erred in imposing the five year gang enhancement on that count.
Court modify the judgment and affirm.

Minor and appellant A.R. was placed home on probation after the juvenile court sustained a petition declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on a finding that appellant was in possession of metal knuckles in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1).[1] In his timely appeal, appellant contends as follows: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of possession of metal knuckles; (2) the trial court failed to expressly declare whether the offense was a felony or misdemeanor; and (3) the maximum period of confinement of three years, reflected in the minute order, must be stricken because (a) the juvenile court did not have the authority to set a maximum as appellant was placed home on probation and (b) the minute order does not reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment. Court reject the sufficiency of the evidence argument and affirm the wardship order, but remand to the trial court to correct the errors in appellants second and third contentions.

Defendant and appellant Edmond Estudillo was convicted by jury of attempted robbery, in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 211,[1]and attempted carjacking, in violation of sections 664 and 215, subdivision (a). Defendant admitted suffering three prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), three serious or violent felony convictions ( 667, subd. (a)),[2]and serving two prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck two of the prior convictions under the three strikes law. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 16 years 4 months, consisting of 9 years in state prison for attempted carjacking, 16 months for attempted robbery, 5 years for the serious felony conviction, and one year for the prior prison term. In this timely appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by not staying the attempted robbery conviction pursuant to section 654. He also points out the abstract of judgment contains an error in the allocation of time for the recidivist allegations, although the total sentence reflected is accurate. Court order the abstract corrected and in all other respects affirm the judgment.