CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

Plaintiffs and appellants Stanley J. Kramer, individually, and as trustee of Stanley J. Kramer Trust, and Susan M. Kramer (the Kramers), appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents the City of Los Angeles (the City), the Los Angeles County Tax Collector (the County), and the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (the Agency), (sometimes collectively referred to herein as respondents). The Kramers sued respondents, contending that they were required to give the Kramers notice and an opportunity to vote in an election regarding creation of a Business Improvement District involving real property owned by the Kramers, citing California Constitution Article XIII D, section 6; Government Code section 53753; and Streets and Highways Code section 36623. Approval of the Business Improvement District would result in an increase in property related fees payable by property owners in the affected geographic area. Prior to the election at issue, however, the Agency had initiated eminent domain proceedings to acquire three parcels of the Kramers property within the proposed Business Improvement District. The trial court concluded that, because the court in the eminent domain action had issued an order granting the Agency the right to take possession of the Kramers property prior to the election, thus extinguishing the Kramers legal obligation to pay any special or general taxes on the property at issue, the respondents were not required to provide the Kramers with notice and an opportunity to vote in the election as to the property taken by the Agency. Court conclude that the trial courts interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions was correct, and that respondents were not required to give the Kramers the notice and an opportunity to vote as they allege. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

A.O. (mother) appeals from a jurisdictional order of the juvenile court, by which the court found true an allegation that mothers son, B.M.O., was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). After issuing the order, the court immediately terminated its jurisdiction in the case. Mother contends the sustained allegation was insufficient to support the courts jurisdictional findings, and there was no substantial evidence to support the courts factual findings.

Justin Ringgold-Lockhart (plaintiff) appeals from an October 1, 2008 order. The probate court ruled he lacked standing to participate in the probate proceeding. Court affirm the order.

Jennifer L. appeals from the order of the juvenile court that terminated her parental rights to Bentley G. (age 6) and J. K. (age 4). She contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the parent relationship exception to adoption found in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. Court affirm the order.

George Allen Hodges appeals a judgment entered following his nolo contendere plea to inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant, with an admission that he inflicted great bodily injury during domestic violence. (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (e).) Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hodges a grant of probation, and affirm.

Plaintiff Danielle Cook appeals the dismissal of her survival action in this toxic tort lawsuit brought, after Mr. Cook's death, against defendants Bostik, Inc., Findley Adhesives, Inc., Henkel Corporation, Exxon Mobil Corp., Shell Chemicals, Inc., Mallincrkrodt Baker, Inc., Gallade Chemical, Inc., CITGI Petroleum Corporation, Tauber Petrochemical Company, PPG Industries, Inc., and The Sherwin Williams Company. Plaintiff maintains that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the facts of this case, and thus the trial court's erred in ruling that the lawsuit was time barred. Court agree in part, and so reverse the order of dismissal as to all defendants save PPG Industries, Inc. and The Sherwin Williams Company.

The trial court denied appellants ex parte application for a temporary restraining order barring respondent Screen Actors Guild (SAG) from acting on a so called written assent SAGs Board of Directors approved in January 2009. Court dismiss the appeal from the denial as moot.

Mother appeals dispositional orders of the juvenile court directing her to participate in random, weekly drug testing and participate in a rehabilitation program if she had any missed or dirty tests. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the courts orders. Court hold that mother forfeited the issue and, in any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its disposition orders as to mother. Court therefore affirm.

Mother appeals dispositional orders of the juvenile court directing her to participate in random, weekly drug testing and participate in a rehabilitation program if she had any missed or dirty tests. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the courts orders. Court hold that mother forfeited the issue and, in any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its disposition orders as to mother. Court therefore affirm.

In this Petition for Writ of Mandate, Bryan Harper and Mark Salzwedel ask this Court to direct the trial court to reverse its order striking their challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) and to order this matter reassigned to a new judge. Our prior decision in this matter reversed an order by the trial court that neither terminated the action nor made a determination on the merits. As a result, petitioners were not entitled to exercise a challenge under the statute, and Court deny the petition.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300 et seq.),[1] Priscilla S., the mother of the subject minor child (Mother), appeals from an order that terminated her parental rights. Mother contends the order should be reversed because (1) the childs caretaker only agreed to adopt him because the dependency court stated the caretaker did not qualify as a relative caretaker for purposes of permitting him to be the childs legal guardian and therefore the caretaker was forced into adopting the minor; (2) the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights applies in this case; and (3) the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights also applies here. Our review of the evidence and relevant law convinces us that none of Mothers contentions has merit. Therefore we will affirm the order terminating her parental rights.

L.P. (mother) appeals from the judgment of March 18, 2009, denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]for a change of order and terminating parental rights under section 366.26 to her daughter, L. She contends the order denying her petition was an abuse of discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, Court affirm.

A one-count information charged Gibson with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and alleged that he had inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a).) The information further alleged that Gibson had suffered two drug related convictions for which he had served prison terms. (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b).) The court granted Gibsons request to represent himself. Shortly before trial, Gibson moved in limine to suppress evidence of the victims field showup identification, for a live lineup, and to suppress physical evidence that police found during a patdown search. The trial court denied the motions, finding that the officers had probable cause to detain him and thus to conduct a patdown search for weapons, and that the field showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive. Gibson continued to represent