CA Unpub Decisions

Raul Ponce entered a negotiated guilty plea to second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)) and admitted he personally used a knife in the commission of the offense ( 12022, subd. (b)). Under the plea bargain the prosecution agreed to dismiss two special circumstance allegations. The parties stipulated to a prison term of 16 years to life. The trial court sentenced Ponce in accordance with the plea bargain. The trial court denied Ponce's request for a certificate of probable cause.

In December 1995 Berihu H. Fekadu pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two counts of a forcible lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1)) and three counts of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)). In January 1996 the trial court found Fekadu had not recovered his sanity and committed him to the Patton State Hospital for seven years under section 1026.

In connection with their purchase of allegedly contaminated real property, plaintiffs and appellants Adel and Muntaha Somo sued the property seller's attorneys, defendants and respondents Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. (Jones Waldo), John Palmer, Timothy Anderson and Sean Sullivan (at times collectively Jones Waldo or the attorney defendants), for fraud and conspiracy, in part alleging the attorney defendants had agreed to conceal and misrepresent known facts concerning soil and groundwater contamination on and around the property. Applying the "agent-immunity rule," the trial court sustained Jones Waldo's demurrer to plaintiffs' third amended complaint without leave to amend. On appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal, plaintiffs contend in part that they alleged facts demonstrating a civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting the commission of a tort premised on the attorney defendants' violation of independent duties owed to them. As Court shall explain, we conclude that plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action for fraud or conspiracy against the attorney defendants. Nor can plaintiffs amend their pleading to state a cause of action for civil aiding and abetting fraud because such a claim is barred by the agent's immunity rule. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

A complaint charged Paul Frederick Smeltzer with cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf. Code,[1] 11358) and possessing marijuana for sale ( 11359). At the preliminary hearing, the trial court found Smeltzer cultivated and possessed marijuana for personal medical purposes as provided under section 11362.5, subdivision (d) of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) and dismissed both charges.[2] Smeltzer subsequently petitioned under Penal Code section 851.8 to seal and destroy his arrest records on the ground that he was factually innocent of both charges. He also filed a motion for the return of his property. The trial court denied Smeltzer's petition to seal and destroy records, granted his motion for return of property and ordered law enforcement to return all items of property except the marijuana. Court conclude Smeltzer did not carry his burden to show factual innocence. Court also conclude the order denying the return of Smeltzer's medical marijuana is nonappeable and he has not shown exceptional or unusual circumstances that warrant this court treating that portion of his appeal as a writ petition. Court therefore affirm.

After entry of the stipulated judgment, Luce Forward filed a petition in the probate court to enforce its judgment against Ferreira. Specifically, Luce Forward sought an order that its judgment against Ferreira be charged as a lien against his interest as a beneficiary in the Trust assets. Ferreira moved to dismiss the petition, claiming the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because, he argued, Probate Code section 17003 bars a court from exercising jurisdiction over a trust beneficiary if the trust's principal place of administration is outside California.

The juvenile court declared Alvin D. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) after making true findings on allegations he received a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d) and possessed a false vehicle registration card (Pen. Code, 4463). The court placed Alvin on probation for one year and ordered him to complete 10 days of public service work.

Sixteen-year-old S.C. entered a negotiated admission to one count of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459/460). Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss one count of receiving stolen property and another count of burglary with Harvey (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754) waivers. The juvenile court declared S.C. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602), and committed him to the Short Term Offender Program for 90 days, to be followed by 30 days of home supervision. Subsequently, the parties stipulated that restitution to one of the burglary victims was $2,560. As to the other burglary victim, the court, after an evidentiary hearing, ordered S.C. to pay $1,332 in restitution.

The juvenile court adjudged C.F. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 602 based on a true finding that he committed robbery. (Pen. Code, 211.) The court struck counts of grand theft from a person (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (c)), and battery (Pen. Code, 242), and granted C.F. probation. The court also ordered restitution fines in the amounts of $119 ( 730.5) and $100 ( 730.6), and restitution to the victim in the amount of $193.94. C.F. appeals. Court affirm the judgment.

Lorenzo D. Courtney pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to forgery of a financial institution's paper. (Pen. Code, 476.)[1] Courtney also admitted a 1985 prior strike conviction for a violation of section 288, subdivision (a). ( 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) In exchange for the plea, Courtney received a four-year stipulated sentence, and the court dismissed the following charges and allegations: one count of forgery of a seal and handwriting of another ( 470, subd. (b)), one count of forgery for possession of blank or unfinished paper ( 475, subd. (b)), eight probation denial priors ( 1203, subd. (e)(4)) and five prison priors ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court also awarded credits, and imposed restitution, a $20 court security fee ( 1465.8) and a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, 70373). Courtney appeals. Court affirm.

Jeffrey F. and Crystal J. (together the parents) appeal an order designating Nathaniel and Alicia G. as the de facto parents of their daughter, Emily F. They contend the juvenile court erred because at the time of the order they were attempting to reunify with Emily. Court affirm the order.

C.H. appeals an order terminating his reunification services regarding the dependency of his daughter, Alejandra H. He contends the juvenile court erred by finding reasonable reunification services had been provided to him and he had made only minimal progress with the provisions of his case plan. Alejandra's counsel joins his position. Court affirm the order.

Fernando M. appeals findings and orders entered at a 12-month status review hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. The appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff Goodrich Corporation (Goodrich) appeals the judgment and order granting the demurrer to its petition for writ of mandate to compel defendant and respondent City of Rialto (the City) to enforce its own environmental mitigation against real party in Interest and respondent Ken Thompson, Inc. (Thompson). Finding no errors, Court affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Joe John Esparza was convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, 211[1]) and burglary ( 459). He was sentenced to two years in state prison. He appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden[2]motions, and erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on battery as a lesser included offense to robbery and on self defense to excessive force. He also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.