CA Unpub Decisions

Following a jury trial, defendant Mark Edward Paulson was found guilty of committing a theft after having been previously convicted of a theft-related crime (Pen. Code, 484, subd. (a)/666)[1](count 3).[2] In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had sustained five prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (c) & (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)) and five prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 30 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends (1) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior strike convictions; and (3) the manner in which the three strikes law was applied in his case violates the state and federal equal protection guarantees. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jose Molina-Nunez guilty of one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a), count 1), and nine counts of annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, 647.6, subd. (a)(1), counts 2-10). The trial court found true the allegation that defendant had one prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) The court sentenced him to a total term of 24 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior sex offense under Evidence Code section 1108. Court disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant John Alan Crawford pled guilty to five counts of forcible sexual penetration of a person under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)(1).)1 Defendant contends there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea. Court affirm.

Defendant and respondent Gerardo Sanchez Gonzales was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia by an inmate. (Pen. Code, 4573.6.)[1] It was also alleged that he had served two prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and had two prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). Defendant pled guilty and admitted all of the prior strike convictions and prison prior allegations. The trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 10 years.
The People appeal, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to strike one of defendants strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Court agree with the People and will reverse the ruling and remand the matter to the trial court to resentence defendant.

A jury found defendant and appellant Donald Wayne Hass guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol with four prior convictions within the meaning of Vehicle Code sections 23550 and 23550.5[1] ( 23152, subd. (a), count 1), driving while having a .08 percent or higher blood alcohol content with four prior convictions within the meaning of sections 23550 and 23550.5 ( 23152, subd. (b), count 2), and driving when his license has been suspended for a prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction ( 14601.2, subd. (a), count 3). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant had four prior DUI convictions, and that he had served one prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced him to a total of four years in state prison. Defendant apparently was out on bail and subsequently committed another section 23152, subdivision (a) offense, to which he pled guilty. The court then vacated the original sentence in the instant case, imposed a three year term, and ran it consecutive to the sentence in the subsequent case, for a total term of five years eight months. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Court affirm.

A jury found appellant Richard Ray Hernandez guilty of one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187) and five counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)), with findings he personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life for the murder in count one, plus 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. On the remaining counts, appellant received a total consecutive term of 29 years four months. At trial, appellant did not dispute he shot and killed the victim of count one but claimed he acted in self-defense. Appellant now argues the court erroneously excluded evidence relevant to self-defense. Appellant also asserts the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement to count one violates the multiple punishment bar of section 654 and principles of double jeopardy. We affirm.

Plaintiff suffered injuries to her neck and back in a single vehicle automobile accident. In her action against the driver of the vehicle, she was awarded $1,747,801.30 in damages. Defendant appeals, contending plaintiff presented no substantial evidence to support the award of certain categories of damages. We agree that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the reasonable value of her past medical care and modify the judgment accordingly.

This is an appeal from the denial of plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction, by which plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from executing on certain real property against which defendant has a judgment lien. Plaintiff claims it is subrogated to the interests of prior lien holders and encumbrancers whose interests in the property predated defendants judgment lien, and therefore plaintiffs interest takes priority. Plaintiff contends it will suffer irreparable injury through the loss of its security if defendant is permitted to sell the property at an execution sale. Court conclude the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the law of equitable subrogation and therefore reverse.

On July 17, 2008, appellant Steven Arthur Dedmon pled guilty in case No. MCR029298 to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)). In case No. MCR031194, Dedmon pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted an on-bail enhancement (Pen. Code, 12022.1).[1] In each case Dedmon admitted allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On appeal, Dedmon contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Court affirm.

This is an appeal from temporary orders entered in a contempt proceeding instituted by appellant Terry L. Bearden against respondent Juliet I. Bearden. Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the temporary orders. In any event, as to the orders in question, the appeal has been rendered moot by the 18th birthday of the parties child. Accordingly, Court affirm the orders.

A jury found defendant Robert David Johnson guilty of first degree residential robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless indicated), two counts of felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)), false impersonation ( 529, subd. 3), possession of counterfeit bills ( 476), and two counts of dissuading a witness ( 136.1, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found to be true the allegation a principal used a firearm during commission of the robbery ( 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)) and that defendant committed the crimes of robbery and dissuading a witness to benefit a criminal street gang. The trial court found defendant previously suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and had served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain one of the counts of witness dissuasion and its accompanying gang enhancement. He also contends the trial court erred by admitting a nontestifying victims pretrial statement to a police detective, and argues the trial court committed various sentencing errors. Court reverse in part as explained below.

Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian, its medical executive committee (MEC), and its board of directors (collectively Hoag), all of whom were involved in a review of the petitioner physicians[1] professional competency, appeal from the trial courts issuance of a writ of mandate setting aside Hoags letter of censure and imposition of probation in connection with the physicians medical staff privileges. Hoag argues the court lacked jurisdiction to review the decision because no hearing was required at the hospital level, and because its decision to issue the writ was contrary to law. Court are not persuaded.

Defendant and cross-complainant Alex Kodnegah appeals from the trial courts order granting the motion to strike his cross-complaint. Plaintiffs and cross-defendants Matthew M. Bovee and Linda T. Bovee, Trustees of the Bovee Family Trust Dated March 28, 1997, contend that the motion was properly granted under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti SLAPP statute; all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure). Court agree with plaintiffs and affirm the order. Defendant requests we take judicial notice of certain documents filed in connection with earlier litigation between the parties. These documents were not before the trial court in this action and we therefore deny the request.

This employment action was filed 10 years agoin October 1999. In around 2002, the parties engaged in formal settlement efforts, as a result of which they entered into what defendants perceived to be a binding settlement agreement that plaintiff Mars Rodriguez refused to sign. Defendants then made numerous efforts over the next five years to enter a judgment in conformance with the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.
In August 2007, on defendants ex parte application, the court directed the clerk, on Rodriguezs behalf, to sign the settlement agreement, which had been modified over the years with the courts input to address some of Rodriguezs stated concerns about its content. Immediately after the agreement was so executed, Rodriguez exercised her right to revoke it according to its terms under a revocation provision inserted under the federal Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Amendments of 1990 (29 U.S.C. 626 (f)(1) & (2)). This left the matter at large, nearly eight years after its filing. Defendants moved to dismiss the action under the mandatory and, alternatively discretionary, provisions for delay in prosecution. ( 583.310 & 583.410.) The trial court granted the discretionary motion to dismiss under section 583.410 and Rodriguez appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, Court affirm.