CA Unpub Decisions

The minor C.G. appeals from the juvenile courts orders that she remain a ward of the court and be suitably placed after finding she assaulted Yureza Sanchez with a caustic chemical in violation of Penal Code section 244. Court agree with the minors contention the evidence is insufficient to support the finding and reverse.

H.L. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over his three children, K.L. (born October 1994), H.L., Jr. (born November 1995), and N.L. (born June 2002) and ordering monitored visitation between father and the children. Court affirm the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

Defendant Michael Ortega was charged by felony complaint with one count each of possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351),[1] possession of cocaine base for sale ( 11351.5), possession of cocaine (powder) for sale ( 11351) and possession of methamphetamine for sale ( 11378).[2] He pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Ortega filed a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5), which was heard and denied. According to the hearing evidence, undercover narcotics officers of the Glendale Police Department watched Ortega and codefendants repeatedly enter and leave an apartment, before engaging in illegal drug sales to drivers stopping in an alley behind the apartment. The officers testified that they feared Ortega and codefendants might have been alerted to their presence, and forcibly entered the apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence. Inside the apartment, officers saw an assortment of illegal drugs on a table. They detained Ortega inside the apartment and subsequently arrested him.
The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding no exigent circumstances, but also finding that Ortega failed to establish he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Following the denial of the motion, Ortega entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possession of cocaine base for sale. Imposition of sentence was suspended and Ortega was placed on three years formal probation. The remaining charges were dismissed on the Peoples motion, pursuant to the plea agreement.

In this appeal, minors J.F., A.C., and A.A. (collectively, the siblings), siblings of the subject minor M.F. (minor), challenge the juvenile courts determination, at a March 4, 2009 review hearing concerning minor, that they were not entitled to notice of that hearing or of any future hearings concerning minor. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 295 requires that such notice be provided, Court reverse the juvenile courts March 4, 2009 order finding that the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) is not required to provide the siblings with notice of future hearings.

J.S. (Father), the father of minors E.S., E.D., and J.D., appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to follow section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Court affirm.

Kenneth Brooks was arrested after he sold rock cocaine to an undercover police officer. On December 11, 2008, Brooks was charged by information with one count of offering to sell cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). The information further alleged Brooks had suffered four prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served four separate prison terms for felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Brooks agreed to enter a negotiated plea of no contest to offering to sell cocaine base and to admit one prior strike allegation. In return, the remaining special allegations were to be dismissed, and Brooks would be sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of six years.

On September 29, 2008, defendant Wilfred Atlas was charged by information with two counts of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, 69),[1] with an allegation as to both counts the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A). The information also specially alleged as to both counts that defendant had suffered a serious or violent felony conviction on September 28, 2006 for attempted grand theft of a firearm ( 487, subd. (d)(2)) in case No. BA308588,[2] within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had previously served two separate prison sentences for felonies ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charged offenses and denied the special allegations. He was represented by appointed counsel throughout the proceedings.

Returning to us after remand to the Placer County Superior Court, this case involves a dispute between two neighbors whose property is divided by a fence. For many years, the parties believed the fence constituted the legal boundary between the parcels, until a survey commissioned by plaintiff David C. Taylor showed the fence actually stands inside the legal boundary of Taylors land. Taylor filed a complaint for declaratory relief and to quiet title to the property. Taylors neighbors, Dennis W. and Patricia A. Brown, who use the widest part of the disputed triangular section[1] as a paved driveway, cross-complained for declaratory relief and to quiet title on theories of adverse possession, agreed-upon boundary, estoppel, general equitable principles, good faith improver, and prescriptive easement.

A. T., father of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights as to two of his girls. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] 366.26, 395.) Appellant contends the court erred in finding he was an alleged, rather than a presumed, father. He further asserts that he was denied due process because he did not have proper notice of the proceedings or timely appointment of counsel and that the evidence does not support the courts finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. did not apply. Court reverse for compliance with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act.

Appellant J.S., mother of A.E. (the minor), appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights.[2] (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395.) Appellant contends the juvenile courts denial of her request to modify the court order ( 388) was an abuse of discretion and, as a result thereof, the courts subsequent order terminating her parental rights was invalid. Court will affirm.

Kevin Andres appeals from a judgment convicting him of the sale of cocaine base. He asserts the trial court erred (1) by giving a flight instruction without evidentiary support for flight, and (2) by giving several standard instructions that lessened the prosecution's burden of proof. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Justin Jiang filed this action against Beijing Sihitech Co., Ltd. (Sihitech), China Unistone Acquisition Corporation (CUAQ), and CUAQ's chairman, Chih T. Cheung. The trial court granted CUAQ's motion to quash service of the summons on the ground that CUAQ no longer existed as a corporation, having merged with Yucheng Technologies Limited (Yucheng). Jiang amended his complaint to name Yucheng as the successor in interest to CUAQ. Thereafter, Sihitech, Cheung, and Yucheng (collectively respondents) moved to quash service of the summonses on the ground that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The trial court granted the motions to quash. On appeal, Jiang claims that the trial court erred in granting respondents' motions to quash. Court affirm the trial court's order.

Appellant Leon James Page appeals from a judgment in favor of respondents MiraCosta Community College District (District) and Victoria Richart, District's former president and superintendent of MiraCosta Community College (the college). Page filed a multi-count petition for writ of mandate challenging the District Board of Trustee's actions in approving a settlement between Richart and District, contending in part that District violated the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, 54950.5 et seq.,[1] the Brown Act or Act), made an unconstitutional gift (Cal. Const., art. XVI, 6) and also illegally expended and wasted public funds (Code Civ. Proc., 526a) by authorizing a settlement in violation of Government Code sections 53260 and 53261. The trial court sustained respondents' demurrers to one of Page's Brown Act causes of action, and on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment/adjudication, denied Page's motion and granted summary judgment in District and Richart's favor on Page's remaining causes of action. On appeal, Page contends (1) the trial court erred in its interpretation of sections 53260 and 53261, which limit the "maximum cash settlement" in contract termination cases; (2) for purposes of his causes of action for waste of public funds and unjust enrichment, the court misapplied the law and ignored admissible evidence raising triable issues of material fact as to whether District settled in good faith with Richart; and (3) the court erred by sustaining the demurrers to his second cause of action for violation of the Brown Act.

Plaintiff AMCOBeauty Corporation (AMCO) appeals from two orders of the trial court. AMCO challenges the trial court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction against defendant and cross-complainant Armstrong McCall, L.P. (Armstrong McCall) and defendant SD Hair, Ltd. (SD Hair), and also challenges the trial court's granting of Armstrong McCall's motion for a preliminary injunction against AMCO.