CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Jose Galindo of 11 counts of child molestation involving his two daughters, and sustained an allegation that there were multiple victims. Sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term of 30 years to life, defendant argues only that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing the introduction of expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) because the theory of the defense case did not implicate any of the concerns that CSAAS addresses. Court shall affirm.

Mother M.H. appeals from the order of the juvenile court that terminated her parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for minors D.H. and T.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; undesignated section references will be to this code.) The mother argues that the referees failure sua sponte to recuse himself based on extrajudicial circumstances violated her right to due process. Alternately, she claims there is insufficient evidence of D.H.s adoptability ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)), and the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the benefit exception to termination of her parental rights ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Court affirm the order.

R.S., mother of the minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code].) Appellant contends the evidence established several exceptions to the preference for adoption as a permanent plan and argues that, because there was an actual conflict between the siblings, the court should have appointed separate counsel for the minor. Court affirm.

denying his petition for modification and terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395.)[1] Appellant contends: The juvenile court should have applied the parent-child relationship exception to terminating parental rights; denying his petition for modification was an abuse of discretion; and, the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were inadequate. Court shall affirm.

A complaint filed on May 10, 2007, charged defendant Timothy Michael St. Pierre (sometimes spelled Stpierre in the record) with possessing and selling methamphetamine, and possessing drug paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); 11377, subd. (a); 11364.)
Evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that during a parole search, defendant was found in possession of methamphetamine and a methamphetamine pipe, his roommate told an officer defendant gave the roommate methamphetamine, and defendant admitted he had done so.
The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner Connie Ann Rodden seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to grant her application for a certificate of probable cause in her pending criminal appeal. (C062053, consolidated with C062348).[1] After reviewing preliminary opposition and the appellate record, we informed the parties we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) We conclude that respondent superior court abused its discretion in denying petitioners application for a certificate of probable cause. Court further conclude that petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to appeal. Accordingly, we shall order the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance.

A complaint filed on May 10, 2007, charged defendant Timothy Michael St. Pierre (sometimes spelled Stpierre in the record) with possessing and selling methamphetamine, and possessing drug paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); 11377, subd. (a); 11364.)
Evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that during a parole search, defendant was found in possession of methamphetamine and a methamphetamine pipe, his roommate told an officer defendant gave the roommate methamphetamine, and defendant admitted he had done so.
On May 1, 2007, defendant was arrested in a separate case for knowing receipt of stolen property, when a stolen laptop was found in his apartment (case no. 07F04412). The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner Connie Ann Rodden seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to grant her application for a certificate of probable cause in her pending criminal appeal. (C062053, consolidated with C062348).[1] After reviewing preliminary opposition and the appellate record, we informed the parties we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) We conclude that respondent superior court abused its discretion in denying petitioners application for a certificate of probable cause. We further conclude that petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to appeal. Accordingly, Court shall order the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance.

A jury found Teddy Seung Baek guilty of sexually assaulting two women, Stephanie M. (counts 1-6) and Jackie P. (count 7). As to Stephanie M., the jury found Baek guilty of two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code,[1] 289, subd. (a)) (counts 1, 4), two counts of forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)) (counts 2, 3) and two counts of forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)) (counts 5, 6). As to each of these counts, the jury also found true the following One Strike law ( 667.61) special circumstances allegations: committing the offense during a burglary with the intent to commit a forcible sex crime ( 667.61, subd. (d)), committing an offense against multiple victims ( 667.61, subd. (e)), and tying or binding the victim during the commission of the offense ( 667.61, subd. (e)). As to Jackie P., thejury found Baek guilty of sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 289, subd. (a)) (count 7). With respect to count 7, the jury also found true the following One Strike law ( 667.61) special circumstances allegations: committing the offense during a burglary with the intent to commit a forcible sex crime ( 667.61, subd. (d)), committing an offense against multiple victims ( 667.61, subd. (e)), tying or binding the victim during the commission of the offense ( 667.61, subd. (e)), and personally using a dangerous or deadly weapon during the commission of the offense ( 667.61, subd. (e)).[2]

Plaintiff and appellant George E. Wesbey III (plaintiff) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants Toll CA IV, L.P., Toll Bros., Inc. and Toll CA GP Corp. (Toll or Toll Entities), the developer of his residential property, and in favor of defendant Encinitas Ranch Community Association, the homeowners' association at the development, Encinitas Ranch (ERCA or the HOA), on various causes of action. During the development process, an access easement to plaintiff's property was created in a manner that he alleges was violative of two particular schemes of land use law, thereby entitling him to rescission of the contract for the purchase of his home and damages. (Subdivided Lands Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 11000, et seq.; the SLA) and the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, 66410 et seq.; the SMA)). Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the same actions by both Toll and the HOA breached the applicable conditions, covenants and restrictions for the Encinitas Ranch development (the CC&Rs), and further constituted unlawful business acts, in violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.). Plaintiff alleges he, as a homeowner and resident within the development created by defendants, was damaged when Toll failed to create the access easement by conveying, in the manner originally planned, a common area easement lot to the HOA. Toll changed the plan, by retaining ownership for itself, and plaintiff alleges this was done without properly amending the subdivision map or making appropriate disclosures to the state Department of Real Estate (DRE) as required by statute. Plaintiff's related theories also fail. Court affirm.

Carl Jackson appeals from a judgment convicting him of premeditated attempted murder based on his shooting of his former girlfriend. He argues the trial court erred by excluding impeachment evidence concerning the victim's methamphetamine use and alleged fraudulent misconduct. Court find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Francisco Martinez Delatoba appeals from a judgment of the superior court arising from his plea of guilty to possession of marijuana for sale after the court denied his motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing. Delatoba contends that the law enforcement agents who executed a stop of his vehicle as he drove near the U.S. border did not have reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, and that the evidence that agents discovered as a result of that stop should therefore have been suppressed. In the alternative, Delatoba maintains that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to take the necessary procedural steps to preserve Delatoba's right to challenge on appeal the denial of his suppression motion, to which the parties had agreed as part of his plea bargain.

This is an appeal after a remand for resentencing was ordered following the first appeal. On January 29, 2005, Robert Jay Maxwell, together with several other people, committed various crimes during a home invasion robbery at the residence of Ryan Guerrero in Coronado, California. As a result, Maxwell proceeded to trial with codefendants Thomas T. Zingsheim and Michael J. Murphy after codefendants Tuesdae Ditmars and Evan Baltsas pled guilty to various crimes stemming out of the Coronado incident and another residential burglary. As pertinent here, the jury found Maxwell guilty of first degree robbery (Pen. Code,[1] 211, 212.5, subd. (a); count 1); two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm ( 245, subd. (b); counts 2 & 3); residential burglary ( 459, 460; count 4); false imprisonment by violence or menace ( 236, 237, subd. (a); count 5); grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a); count 6); intimidating a witness by malicious use of force or violence ( 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 7); and tampering with the electric alarm system and four telephone and cable television lines ( 591; counts 8-12).

The jury further found true allegations that Maxwell had personally used a firearm in the commission of counts 1 through 6 ( 12022.5, subd. (a)); that he also had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) in the commission of the count 1 robbery; that he was vicariously armed with a firearm for count 7 ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)); and that he committed the burglary while another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence.