CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Wayne Anthony Bushore of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1) (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)); making a criminal threat (count 2) (id., 422); vandalism under $400 (count 3) (id., 594, subd. (a), (b)(2)(A)); battery (count 4) (id., 242); and child abuse likely to produce great bodily injury (count 5) (id., 273a, subd. (a)). Bushore was sentenced to three years custody on count 1, which was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. He was sentenced to four years in state prison on count 5, and two years, to run concurrently, on count 2. On count 3, probation was denied, and Bushore was sentenced to one year in custody, with 365 days' credit for time served. On count 4, the court denied probation and sentenced Bushore to 180 days in custody, and gave credit for time served.

Johnny Mamaril pled guilty to numerous acts of sexual abuse to a child. The court imposed a 27-year prison term. At the sentencing hearing, the court continued a protective order, originally issued at the arraignment, which provided that Mamaril was not to contact the victim or one of the witnesses for 10 years from the sentencing date. The court issued the order under Penal Code section 136.2, which permits a court in a criminal case to protect a witness or a victim by issuing a protective order.

Plaintiffs, owners of four apartment complexes in San Diego, sued their property management company, Torrey Pines Property Management, Inc. (Torrey Pines), for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and for an accounting. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Torrey Pines on all claims. Plaintiffs appeal, contending the trial court misconstrued the governing agreement and erroneously concluded that Torrey Pines owed them no fiduciary duty. They also assert the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering an accounting, thereby preventing them from proving their conversion cause of action. Court reject Plaintiffs' contentions and affirm the judgment

Ricardo L., Sr., (Father)[1] appeals orders declaring his minor son, Ricardo L., Jr., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and removing him from his custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings. Hortensia, Ricardo's mother, challenges the court's jurisdictional findings and joins in Father's challenge to the dispositional findings. Court affirm the orders.

A jury convicted defendant, Elonda Cole, of grand theft of a car by false pretenses (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (d)(1)),[1]second degree burglary ( 459), possessing/passing a fictitious check ( 476), identity theft ( 530.5, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359). In bifurcated proceedings, she admitted having suffered three prior convictions for which she served prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). She was sentenced to prison for 9 years, 4 months, and appeals, contending her convictions for theft and burglary were based on an erroneous theory of law and sentencing error occurred. We reject her first contention and agree with portions of the latter. We remand the case to allow the trial court to either state reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on the check, identity theft and drug convictions, and if none exist, to impose concurrent sentences for them. We further order the trial court to stay the sentence for the burglary pursuant to section 654 and to make other changes, as set forth below, in the current minutes of the sentencing hearing and when completing the amended abstract of judgment and minutes of the sentencing hearing upon remand. Otherwise, we affirm.

Majestic Marketing Inc. (Majestic) is a Corona-based company engaged in marketing customized promotional materials to more than 20,000 customers in the United States and Canada. David Nay and his father, Tom Nay, are former employees. After Majestic sued the Nays, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Nays from contacting 3,000 of Majestics customers.
The Nays appeal, contending Majestics customer list is not a trade secret and the Non-Compete Clause in Majestics employment manual is void. Additionally, the Nays challenge the breadth and scope of the preliminary injunction and the adequacy of the $75,000 undertaking.

During the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found defendant, Richard Maturino, guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)),during which he used a knife ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)). During the sanity phase of the trial, the jury determined that defendant was sane at the time he committed the murder. He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life, plus one year. He appeals, claiming the trial court erred in excusing a juror during sanity phase deliberations, therefore the jurys finding in that regard should be reversed. Court reject his contention and affirm

Petitioner U.S. Specialty Insurance Company, plaintiff below, brought a declaratory relief action against real parties in interestits insured, Chino Valley Aviation, Inc. (Chino Valley Aviation)[1]and Michael Horne (Horne), the injured plaintiff in a third party tort action against Chino Valley Aviation. Petitioner sought a declaration that its policy provided Chino Valley Aviation with coverage only under the completed operations coverage (Coverage B), and not under the premises liability coverage (Coverage A). The issue is significant because the latter offers substantially more dollar coverage.

The People appeal from an order dismissing an information charging defendant Charles Alexander Boyd with two misdemeanors, after the court determined there were no courtrooms available to try the case on May 18, 2009, the last day it could have been tried without violating defendants speedy trial rights. (Pen. Code, 1050, subd. (a), 1382.)[1] The People claim the court violated section 1050, subdivision (a) and therefore necessarily abused its discretion in applying an inflexible policy, namely, a written dismissal policy, adopted by the court on October 10, 2008, which provides that the court will not, under any circumstances, assign criminal jury trials to temporary judges designated to conduct civil trials, or to departments designated to hear family law, juvenile, probate, guardianship, and master calendar matters.

A jury convicted appellant Ray Lee Vaughn of two counts of forcibly committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1, 2)[1]and a single count of first degree burglary ( 459, 460, subd. (a)). The jury also found true allegations that appellant committed each of the count 1 and count 2 offenses in the commission of a first degree burglary committed with the intent to commit a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) or section 288, subdivision (b)(1). ( 667.61, subd. (a)) The court imposed a prison term of 25 years to life on count 1 and, on counts 2 and 3, concurrent terms of eight and six years respectively. Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed execution of sentence on counts 2 an 3.

In the early morning hours of November 22, 2007, Thanksgiving Day, defendant Rodeski Edwards (defendant) shot and killed Ralph Westfield (Westfield). There was a dispute between the men as to whether Westfield owed $10 to defendant.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of count I, second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a) with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing death (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d). He pleaded guilty to count II, possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted three prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, and three one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements, for an aggregate term of three years plus 40 years to life. The court imposed a concurrent term of two years for count II, felon in possession.

Defendant Sammy Mai Phommasouk appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to one count of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), admitted he had a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code,[1] 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)), and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta)); (2) the trial courts use of a prior juvenile court adjudication as a strike violated his constitutional rights to due process and jury trial; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction (People v. Superior Court (Romero)(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)). We affirm.

On April 18, 2006, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed alleging that appellant J.G.C., then aged 14, committed the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon and corporal injury to a cohabitant, appellants 19-year-old resident girlfriend. The petition also alleged that appellant committed the crime of corporal injury to a child, the girlfriends 16-month-old toddler. Appellant is not biologically related to the toddler. It was specially alleged in connection with all three crimes that appellant inflicted great bodily injury upon the victims.

In January 2009, appellant A.L.W. admitted an allegation contained in a juvenile Welfare and Institutions Code section 602petition that he committed felony theft (the prior petition). An allegation that he resisted arrest was dismissed with a Harvey waiver (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754). In February, he was granted deferred entry of judgment and placed on probation.
On March 2, probation filed notice for a juvenile delinquency proceeding, alleging appellant committed an assault with a deadly weapon and vandalism.