CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Samuel, Lee Hughes, of cultivation of marijuana (count 1/Health & Saf. Code, 11358) and possession for sale of marijuana (count 2/Health & Saf. Code, 11359). In a separate proceeding, Hughes admitted a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).
On April 30, 2009, the trial court sentenced Hughes to an aggregate term of four years eight months the aggravated term of three years on his cultivation conviction, an eight-month term on his possession conviction, a one-year prior prison term enhancement, and a stayed two-year term on the on-bail enhancement.

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule 8.452)) from respondent courts orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26hearing as to her son A. We conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, Court will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

A jury convicted Joseph James Sawicki of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of attempted murder (Pen. Code 664/192(a)),[1] and found true enhancement allegations for the use of a deadly weapon and the infliction of great bodily injury. ( 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court found true allegations Sawicki had served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)), and that he had a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The court imposed a total term of 11 years, consisting of the mid-term sentence of three years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, which was then doubled to a term of six years by the Three Strikes law, plus consecutive terms of one year for the use of a deadly weapon, three years for the infliction of great bodily injury, and a one year for serving a prior prison term.

A jury convicted defendant Aukusitino Jesus Afamasaga of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The jury also found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. ( 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 30 years to life for the second degree murder and imposed a consecutive, determinate term of eight years, comprised of three years for the assault and five years for the prior conviction enhancement. Defendant raises numerous claims on appeal, including instructional and evidentiary errors, as well as prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing error. Defendant further claims that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial by authorizing a bailiff to stand near him during his testimony. Finding no reversible error, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Felix Lee Jackson, a 27-year-old probation officer with no criminal history, was charged with multiple felony counts, including assaulting a peace officer with a semiautomatic weapon and resisting an executive officer. The charges stemmed from an incident in which defendant inexplicably tackled a neighbor, and then engaged in a physical struggle with two police officers and three firefighters who had responded to the scene. A jury convicted defendant of one count of assaulting a peace officer (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (d)(2)) and three counts of resisting an executive officer ( 69), and found true the allegations that he personally used a firearm in committing these offenses ( 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 17 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of his mental state at the time of the offenses; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the fire captain met the statutory requirements of an executive officer performing a duty. Court affirm.

Following the denial of his motions to suppress evidence and to set aside the information on the ground that he had been subjected to an illegal search and seizure, defendant Darrell Washington entered a plea of guilty to the single count of being a past‑convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of Penal Code section 12021. Defendant also admitted an allegation that he had a prior felony conviction that qualified as a strike in accordance with the Three Strikes Law. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, additional charges and enhancement allegations were to be dismissed, with the understanding that defendant would be sentenced to a term of 44 months in state prison. After it denied his motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon term of 44 months in state prison.
On this timely appeal, defendant contends that his motions were erroneously denied. Court conclude that these contentions are without merit, and affirm.

Charles E. Lawyer (appellant) was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession of cocaine, being under the influence of a controlled substance, and driving with a suspended or revoked drivers license. On appeal, he contends the trial courts refusal to grant immunity to a potential defense witness violated his rights to compulsory process and due process under both the California and federal Constitutions. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant Donald S. (Donald) appeals from the trial courts finding that he is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), in that he did commit the offense alleged in a juvenile petition; to wit, second degree robbery. His sole contention on appeal is that the true finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)),[1] as charged in an information filed on February 5, 2009. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, appellant received a fixed prison sentence of the low term of 16 months in state prison, and the prosecution moved to dismiss the remaining counts charging him with: carrying a firearm as a convicted felon ( 12020, subd. (a)(1)); illegally possessing ammunition as a convicted felon ( 12316, subd. (b)(1)); possession of stolen checks ( 496, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor violations of possession of fraudulent documents ( 476), giving false information to a police officer ( 148.9, subd. (a)), driving without a valid drivers license (Veh. Code, 12500, subd. (a)), and possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (a)). Also dismissed was an allegation, pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), that appellant served a prior prison term for two felony convictions.
Appellant appeals denial of his pre-plea motion to suppress the evidence against him. Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende[2] brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that appellant has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the courts attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109110.)
Court find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Following a diagnosis of mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer, Charles J. Johnson filed a complaint against CertainTeed Corporation (CertainTeed) and other defendants for, among other claims, negligence and strict liability for product defect. With regard to CertainTeed, Johnson asserted that in the early 1960s he was a longshoreman at San Francisco piers and was injured while unpacking sacks of asbestos purchased by CertainTeed from an overseas company. The sacks of asbestos fiber were shipped F.O.B.[1] at the South African port and CertainTeed was to pay for the freight and insurance on the shipments of asbestos from South Africa.
CertainTeed moved for summary judgment against Johnsons pleading, and the trial court granted the motion. The lower courts order included a finding that Johnson presented no evidence that CertainTeed controlled or participated in any decision about the shipping and packaging of the asbestos and therefore he had no claim in tort against CertainTeed. Johnson appeals and contends that CertainTeed purchased the asbestos and was the owner of it when it was placed into the stream of commerce and, since the product had inadequate packages and warnings, CertainTeed is liable to him in negligence and under the doctrine of strict liability for product defect. Court are not persuaded by his arguments and affirm the judgment.

After a court trial, appellant was convicted of one count of second-degree robbery and, subsequently, sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years for an armed robbery committed in the early morning hours of June 23, 2008, on a street in Vallejo. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, appellant has filed a brief requesting that this court review the record and determine if there are any issues deserving of further briefing. Court have done so, find no such issues, and hence affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant Juan Ortiz was convicted of insurance fraud and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud after the hotel he owned was burned in an obvious arson fire. We find that the prosecution failed to establish the prerequisites to the admissibility of an alleged coconspirators lengthy testimonial statement taken by two law enforcement officers without affording the defendant a contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine the coconspirator. Undisputed evidence showed that the conspiracy had been thwarted by the time of the interrogation, and the coconspirators statements were not made in furtherance of a charged conspiracy to deceive law enforcement. Court conclude for that reason that the admission of a recorded police interrogation of one of the alleged but uncharged coconspirators violated appellants right to confrontation under the United States Constitution. As respondent has failed to show the error was harmless under the correct standard of review, we reverse the judgment. Court do not reach appellants remaining contentions.

A modification decision.

Edna Santos filed a wrongful death action against Scott Villa Apartments, L.P. (Scott Villa) and Francis Property Management, Inc. (collectively respondents), after the murder of her daughter, Sharon Santos.[1] Appellant alleged respondents maintenance worker killed Santos and respondents negligence as his employer made them liable for Santoss death. A jury returned a verdict for appellant. The trial court denied respondents motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), but granted their motion for a new trial. Appellant challenges the order granting the motion for a new trial. Respondents cross-appeal to challenge the order denying the JNOV, and further protectively cross appeal on the grounds that insufficient evidence supported the jurys verdict, the damages award was unsupported by the record, and the jury improperly apportioned damages. Court affirm the trial courts orders.