CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Conrado Fierros, Jr., appeals from a judgment imposing sentence following revocation of probation. Defendants appointed counsel on appeal reviewed the record of this case, did not identify any trial court errors, and asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable issues exist for review on appeal. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.) Defendant was advised that he could file a supplemental brief with this court raising any issues he wished to call to our attention, and defendant did not file a brief. Court have reviewed the record and, finding no errors or arguable issues for review, affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs AmerisourceBergen Corporation and AmerisourceBergen Services Corporation (collectively, BBC) appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker (Paul, Hastings). Court affirm.

Keith B. Hewitt (appellant), appearing in pro. per., appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion to quash proof of service, which challenged the default judgment in this marital dissolution proceeding for lack of personal jurisdiction. Patricia Shelby Hewitt (respondent) has not filed any opposing brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) Because appellant has not carried his burden of showing error, Court affirm the order.

Arnott appeals from orders entered after judgment and after a probation revocation hearing, first because he contends that the trial court imposed parole and probation revocation fines in excess of those allowed by statute. Second, Arnott contends that the trial court erred in assessing a second restitution fine when it sentenced him for the probation violation. Similarly, Arnott asserts that the trial court had no authority to impose a laboratory analysis fee upon his probation violation in addition to the fee imposed at the sentencing on his conviction. Respondent agrees as to the restitution and parole and probation revocation fines, and does not dispute that the laboratory analysis fee cannot be imposed twice. Court agree as well.

A jury convicted Jeffrey Tyrone Jones of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a); (count 1));[1]assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI) ( 245, subd. (a)(1); (count 2)); and making criminal threats ( 422; (count 3)). The jury also found he personally inflicted GBI within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e). Appellant contends: (1) denial of his request for self-representation violated his right to represent himself (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta); and (2) the trial courts refusal to allow his expert to testify denied him his constitutional right to present a defense. Court affirm the judgment but remand the matter for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Frank William Yniguez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for second degree robbery and attempted grand theft auto. Yniguez was sentenced to a term of 15 years in prison. Yniguez contends the trial court (1) committed Cunningham/ Blakely error by imposing an upper term sentence, and (2) erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 300. Discerning no error, Court affirm.

Defendant Anthony Daniel Garcia appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (d)(1);[1]count 1), kidnapping ( 207, subd. (a); count 2), resisting an executive officer ( 69; count 5), and transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); count 7).[2] The trial court found true the allegations defendant suffered two prior serious felony convictions ( 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12) and one prior conviction for which he served a prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for an indeterminate term of 50 years to life plus a determinate term of 5 years.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of grand theft of an automobile and claims the trial courts instruction as to this crime was erroneous. He also claims sentencing error. Court agree there was instructional and sentencing error, requiring that we modify the judgment to reflect a conviction of unlawful taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) on count 1, and that Court remand for resentencing.

Gary and Cheryl were married on March 3, 1983. Their marriage ended on August 19, 2002, when the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution. The judgment required Gary to pay Cheryl $5,000 per month in spousal support beginning in December 2001. The judgment also determined that Gary owed Cheryl over $150,000 in spousal support arrearages accumulated before December 2001.
On May 10, 2007, Cheryl filed an order to show cause in which she requested an [o]rder [d]istributing [r]espondents IRA to [p]etitioner pursuant to [w]rit of [e]xecution. Cheryl contended that Gary had recently rolled over certain pension funds into an IRA with UBS Financial Services. Cheryl sought an order awarding her the funds in the UBS account as payment for spousal support arrearages. On October 30, 2007, the superior court entered a signed order granting Cheryl the requested relief, directing that all of the funds in the UBS account be distributed to [Cheryl] for payment towards spousal support arrearages. On December 6, 2007, Cheryl filed a motion for clarification of the October 30 order. In her declaration filed in support of the motion, Cheryl stated that her former attorney had asserted a lien on the UBS funds and that, as a result, UBS refused to distribute the funds in the absence of either a written agreement between Cheryl and her attorney or a judicial clarification of the October 30 order.

A jury convicted defendant Marco Antonio Ledezma[1] of 21 counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[2] and found true the special allegation as to 13 counts that a principal in the commission of a felony was armed with a firearm (a handgun) ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and as to one count that defendant had personally used a firearm to commit the offense ( 12022.53, subd. (b)).[3] The jury also convicted defendant of one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant ( 273.5) and found true the special allegation of great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of a felony ( 12022.7, subd. (e)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregated term of 41 years 4 months in state prison.
Defendants sole contention on appeal is the evidence is insufficient to support four of the robbery convictions as a matter of law because there was no showing the employee victims had actual or constructive possession of the money taken during the robbery. In light of People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743 (Scott), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant, Michael Jacquet Daniels, of driving under the influence and causing injury to another (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a)), and driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more and causing injury to another (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)), and found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury within Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (b) on each count.[1] The court found that appellant had suffered three prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)) and four prior serious felony convictions ( 667, subd. (a)), and had served four prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to a term of 45 years to life. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court (1) violated appellants Miranda rights in admitting statements that appellant made to the police in the hospital, and (2) abused its discretion in denying appellants motion to strike his prior strike convictions. Because we find no error, Court affirm.

The minor V.D. appeals from the juvenile courts order continuing wardship after finding he committed second degree robbery against E.R. The minor was ordered into the camp community placement program. He contends the finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence of his identity as one of the robbers. Court affirm.

Isidro Sales Gaspar appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him on two counts each of simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,
245, subd. (a)(1)). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on 36 months felony probation. He contends (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an eyewitness's telephone call to police dispatch; (2) the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with his special instruction on reasonable doubt; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for two separate assaults. Court affirm.

Defendant William Claycomb appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing death (id., 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm use, with defendant to be ineligible for parole for 15 years pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4).
On appeal, defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence obtained from a search, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the gang enhancement, and the gang experts testimony. Court affirm.

The jury in a slip-and-fall premises liability case returned a 10-2 defense verdict. Plaintiff Corine Carmona sought a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct. Carmona presented declarations from the two dissenting jurors, stating that one or two unidentified jurors went to the site, which was in a mall two blocks from the courthouse, to take a look, and reported to the rest of us that it did not appear to them that there was a dangerous condition from what they saw. The defense countered with two juror declarations stating, among other things, that none of the jurors told the others that he or she had inspected the area in question. The trial court found there was no misconduct, and denied Carmonas motion for a new trial. Carmona appeals, arguing there was prejudicial jury misconduct. Court find no merit in Carmonas contentions and affirm the judgment.