CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Derick Antwon Hutchinson pleaded no contest to two counts of robbery and admitted the allegation as to one of the robbery counts that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. He was sentenced to a 12-year prison term.
Defendant asserts that the court erred in calculating the amount of presentence custody credits. The court calculated that defendant was entitled to 151 days of credits; it did so by determining that defendant completed serving his sentence in an unrelated case (Docket No. CC649420; the prior case) on December 3, 2008, and used December 4, 2008, as the beginning of defendant's confinement to calculate the credits in the present case. Defendant contends that this was error, because the court, in determining the date defendant completed serving the sentence in the prior case, failed to calculate postsentence worktime credits on a one-for-one basis. He claims that he is entitled to an additional 91 days. We reject that challenge. It appears, however, that the court's determination of the date defendant completed serving his sentence in the prior case is inaccurate. We will therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of recalculating presentence custody credits in the present case after redetermining the date upon which defendant completed serving his sentence in the prior case.

Defendant Carlos Cervantes has an extensive history of criminal conduct, and he has been â€

Defendant Elsa Roxana Martinez-Garcia appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found her guilty of sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years on condition, among other things, that she serve six months in county jail. Court affirm.

After a negotiated plea on several offenses, defendant Vong P. Lee appeals from a conviction under former Penal Code section 12091 (presumption that the possessor of a firearm with an altered serial number is the person who altered the serial number), on the ground that the statute was repealed, without a savings clause, before his conviction. The People concede the point, but the parties disagree on the remedy. court shall reverse the judgment and vacate the nolo contendere plea due to repeal of the statute making possession of an altered firearm a felony. Upon remand, the People may reinstate dismissed charges. Since the plea bargain was void ab initio, greater punishment is not precluded upon remand.

In the 2008 dependency action brought by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), the juvenile court ordered a permanent plan of guardianship over G.T. (the minor). Father and mother appeal separately.
The minor's father, O.T., contends the juvenile court did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), improperly delegated visitation to the guardian, and abused its discretion in terminating the dependency action. The minor's mother, G.S., joins these claims, and also contends the court erred by denying her reunification services, and the court's order contains clerical errors.
Court shall reverse and remand with directions to the juvenile court to ensure proper ICWA inquiry and notice is performed and to modify the visitation order.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jeffrey Allen Pate was convicted of possession of cocaine for sale and receiving stolen property. It was also found true that defendant was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of the drug offense. In bifurcated proceedings, the jury found defendant had two prior strike convictions. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 29 years to life and appealed the conviction to this court, contending the evidence was insufficient to support the personally armed allegation, and the court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury regarding the personally armed allegation, failed to give a unanimity instruction regarding the stolen property charge and abused its discretion in denying his Romero[1] motion. We affirmed the convictions on December 4, 2007.
On November 3, 2009, defendant sought modification of his sentence in the trial court, requesting the court lower the restitution fund fine from $10,000 to $200. The court denied the motion. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion.[2]
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

On June 25, 2008, defendant (a minor) and several of his classmates stole his substitute teacher's purse and removed $1.25 in cash from it before he discarded it in the boy's bathroom. Defendant then went home and spent the rest of the day with his family.
The victim's car and apartment keys were in the purse when it was stolen, and she never recovered them. When the victim went to the school parking lot after the theft, she discovered that her car was missing.
The victim received a ride to her apartment, where she found that it had been ransacked even though there were no signs of forced entry. Various items of jewelry and electronics were missing.
In December 2008, a petition was filed in the juvenile court under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which alleged that defendant committed one count of felony grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a).
In July 2009, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing during which defendant admitted the charged offense as a misdemeanor. The court found defendant to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Accordingly, the court adjudged defendant a ward of the court and committed him to the care and custody of his mother under the supervision of probation. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in an amount to be determined at a contested restitution hearing.

In July 2007, in case No. 09F059 (the first case), defendant Frank Thomas Manfredonia unlawfully took money or personal property from victim Timothy Cuny.
In September 2008, in case No. 08F0111 (the second case), a probation search of defendant's place of business revealed crystalline powder and residue that were suspected of being methamphetamine.
In September 2009, in case No. 09F134 (the third case), defendant possessed a personal use amount of methamphetamine.
In December 2009, defendant pled guilty to grand theft of personal property and two counts of possession of methamphetamine. In exchange, several counts were dismissed.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen the defense case to allow the proffered witness to provide the name of a man who was present during the altercation and participated in it, and who claimed that she did not see Thornton with the group that got into the fight that night. The jury had seen security video evidence and had heard witness testimony concerning that man's involvement in the incident. Testimony identifying the man by name would have added nothing of significance to the evidence that was already before the jury. Further, Thornton did not dispute videotape evidence that clearly showed that Thornton was among the group of men involved in the altercation.
Court further conclude that the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on self-defense because self-defense was inconsistent with Thornton's defense theory that someone else stabbed the victim, and because the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
This appeal arises from a postjudgment turnover order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 708.205.[1] Defendant Ana Luisa Nevarez[2] contends that the turnover order should be reversed because the trial court did not grant a hearing regarding the turnover order. Nevarez also contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the turnover order.
We conclude that section 708.205 does not require that a trial court hold a hearing to determine any possible exemptions before issuing a turnover order. Rather, section 708.205 permits the trial court, at the conclusion of an examination, to order the turnover of the debtor's nonexempt property to satisfy the money judgment. (§ 708.205, subd. (a).)

Samuel received a citation, which he contested, for misdemeanor vandalism in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2)(A).[1] The prosecution's witness, Crawford, did not appear at the June 30, 2008 trial of that misdemeanor charge. However, San Diego County Deputy Sheriff Anthony Abutin, one of the officers to whom Samuel admitted responsibility for the egg throwing, did appear at that proceeding. Although the certified court reporter's transcript of the proceeding shows Deputy Abutin was not sworn in as a witness, the juvenile court's minute order indicates he was sworn in.[2] The court[3] asked him whether he observed Samuel "doing any graffiti." When Deputy Abutin answered, "No," Judge Kapiloff dismissed the case.

Arenas was arrested as a result of an incident in which he assaulted his girlfriend and her sister-in-law, and had an ensuing confrontation with police, at a Shakey's Pizza Parlor restaurant. Based on the incident, he was charged with the following crimes:
(1) possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (count 1); (2) exhibiting a loaded firearm in a rude, angry or threatening manner (count 2); (3) misdemeanor battery (count 3); (4) assault with a semiautomatic firearm (count 4); (5) exhibiting a firearm in the presence of an officer (count 5); (6) exhibiting a deadly weapon to an officer to resist arrest (count 6); (7) resisting an officer (count 7); (8) assault on an officer with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 8-10); and (9) discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (count 11). (The facts underlying the incident and Arenas's prosecution are set forth more fully in People v. Arenas (Dec. 18, 2007, D050417) [nonpub. opn.] (Arenas).)

W.V. and Daniel (together, the children) first came to the attention of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) in July 2004 because of domestic violence between Mercedes and the children's father, Alejandro V. W.V. was seven years old and Daniel was six at the time. Mercedes minimized the violence and allowed Alejandro to return to the family home. In March 2005 the Agency petitioned under section 300, subdivision (b), on the children's behalf on the basis of the domestic violence. The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, ordered services and ordered the children placed with Mercedes. In October it granted Mercedes sole physical custody, ordered supervised visits for Alejandro and terminated jurisdiction.

Plaintiff and appellant Leigh Investments, LLC appeals after the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant and respondent City of Adelanto (the City). Plaintiff filed an action against the City for inverse condemnation, asserting that the City's decision denying plaintiff's request to approve its location and development plan effected a taking of the property; plaintiff was completely unable to use the property for any purpose as long as the existing building remained in place. The City argued that plaintiff filed its action untimely, as Government Code section 65009[1] provides a 90-day statute of limitations on actions seeking review of planning decisions. Plaintiff opposed, contending that it was not seeking review of the planning decision, as such, but rather its cause of action sounded in inverse condemnation. The trial court determined that the triggering event and the primary right sued upon was the denial of plaintiff's proposed location and development plan. Thus, it agreed that plaintiff's action was untimely, and granted judgment on the pleadings. Court affirm the trial court judgment.