CA Unpub Decisions

Commonwealth Land Title Company appeals from the trial court's judgment confirming the damages portion of an arbitration award against it. Tom Trembley and TMc Wireless, LLC, cross-appeal from the portion of the trial court's judgment vacating their recovery of attorney fees from the arbitration. Court affirm that part of the judgment confirming the damages portion of the arbitration award and reverse that part of the judgment vacating the attorney fee award.

Plaintiff, Neil R. Vyas, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, Bank of America, NA (the bank) and Thomas Tiboni. Plaintiff's complaint contained causes of action for, among other claims, wrongful termination in violation of the federal and California medical leave acts. (29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; Gov. Code,[1] §12945.2.) Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Carlos Galvan appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of two counts of carjacking, one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count of evading a peace officer and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 20 years 8 months.
Galvan argues his firearm assault conviction must be reversed because the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that guilt under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (b) required their finding that the firearm was a semiautomatic, as alleged in the information, and in failing to define the term â€

A jury convicted Kephren Thomas of second degree burglary and simple assault. On appeal Thomas contends there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction. He also contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted evidence of his criminal street gang moniker, denied his request for a continuance and sentenced him for both the burglary and the assault. Court modify the judgment to correct the sentencing error and otherwise affirm.

Defendant Frank Williams appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of two counts of first degree murder; two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder; mayhem; and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with special circumstance, gang, great bodily injury, and personal firearm-use findings. Defendant raises numerous claims of error, including several contentions regarding the trial court's admission of evidence discovered late in the trial that a defense alibi witness was arrested in possession of one of two guns used in the charged offenses. Court conclude that the trial court should have excluded this evidence under Evidence Code section 352 and that its admission was prejudicial. Accordingly, court reverse.

After altercations at a night club in Hollywood, a security guard at the club was fatally shot and a patron wounded in the leg. A jury convicted appellant David Suen of the first degree murder of Ron Emerick (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and assault with a firearm on Kevin Wong (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), but found not true several enhancement allegations of the personal use of a firearm.[2] Appellant was sentenced to a total prison term of 25 years to life, plus four years.
Contrary to appellant's contentions: (1) substantial evidence supports his convictions of murder and assault; (2) the admission of DNA test results and cell tower records did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, because the evidence was not testimonial; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting limited evidence of appellant's admission of his gang affiliation, because such evidence was relevant to support the credibility of the prosecution's main witness (former codefendant Milton Do); and (4) the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss for alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Court thus affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Manfred Schockner appeals his murder conviction resulting in a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Before this court appellant complains the trial court erred in (a) denying a motion to suppress evidence collected by the police while executing a search warrant and (b) in sustaining certain hearsay objections. He also claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting overly prejudicial evidence from a prosecution witnesses and by misstating evidence during the closing argument. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence and did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the hearsay objections. In addition, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct. Accordingly, Court affirm appellant's conviction.

After denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person (Pen. Code, § 1538.5),[1] Nathan Wright, Jr. (Wright) entered a plea of no contest to section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on formal probation for a term of three years, with a condition that he serve a term of 150 days in county jail.
Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende[2] brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that Wright has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court's attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.)
court find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Appellant Fred A. Whitaker, appearing in propria persona, appeals following the dismissal of his first amended petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus after the superior court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrers of respondents California Department of Social Services and John Wagner (collectively, the State) and County of Alameda, Alameda County Social Services Agency and Yolanda Baldovinos (collectively, the County). Appellant's petition sought a writ of mandamus overturning the denial of his request for a credit against the $20,004 he claims was unlawfully taken out of his retroactive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) as reimbursement to the County for interim public assistance appellant received while his application for SSI was pending.[1] Appellant claims he should have received compensation in the form of a credit for hours he worked in the County's Social Services Workfare Program (workfare program) as a condition of receiving interim assistance. Appellant also claims that welfare recipients who participate in workfare programs are entitled to minimum wage protections. Court conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining respondents' demurrers without leave to amend and therefore Court will affirm the judgment of dismissal.

The California Department of Social Services (the Department) administers the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care (AFDC-FC) program, which provides financial assistance on behalf of needy children in foster care. Every eligible foster child may receive AFDC-FC benefits until age 18. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11401.[1]) However, an eligible foster child may continue to receive benefits for up to an additional year until the age of 19, if before the age of 18 the child is attending high school or the equivalent level of vocational or technical training on a full-time basis, or is in the process of pursuing a high school equivalency certificate, and the child may reasonably be expected to complete the educational or training program or to receive the high school equivalency certificate, before the age of 19. (§ 11403; hereinafter also referred to as the graduation by 19 requirement.)
Plaintiff Joshua Leonard, as a taxpayer, sought a writ of mandate, and declaratory and injunctive relief, on the ground the Department's enforcement of section 11403 discriminated against certain 18-year-old foster children, who, by reason of their disabilities, cannot reasonably be expected to meet the graduation by 19 requirement. The trial court agreed, declaring that the graduation by 19 requirement â€

Petitioner Marco Abundiz requests the issuance of a writ of mandate and/or prohibition directing the trial court to â€

In this appeal, the City of San Jose challenges the confirmation of a labor arbitrator's award, which ordered reinstatement of Michael Baldwin. The City had discharged Baldwin from his job as a fire inspector for sexually harassing co-workers. Baldwin grieved his discharge with the aid of his union, International Association of Firefighters, Local 230. The matter was arbitrated as provided in the labor agreement between the City and the Union. The arbitrator found the sexual harassment allegations true, but he nevertheless ordered Baldwin's reinstatement, based in part on the City's failure to impose progressive discipline as contractually required.
For reasons explained below, we reject the City's argument that Baldwin's reinstatement violates public policy. Court therefore affirm the judgment confirming the arbitration award.

Jennifer Parent was severely injured when she was hit by a car, driven by Harold Stulberg, while she was in a crosswalk on a state highway. Parent and her husband (individually and as her guardian ad litem), sued Stulberg and the State of California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), alleging the crosswalk constituted a dangerous condition of public property.[1] A jury returned a special verdict finding the crosswalk was not a dangerous condition, and Stulberg alone was responsible for the accident. It awarded Parent $13,313,046, and awarded her husband $5,000,000, against Stulberg.