CA Unpub Decisions

On June 16, 2009, appellant, Richard Eugene Garner, Jr., was charged in a criminal complaint with felony evasion of a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count one) and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a), count two). The complaint alleged six prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).[1]
On January 22, 2010, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit count one, with a prison term of two years, and five prior prison term enhancements for a total prison term of seven years. The court explained and appellant waived his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl.[2] The court advised appellant of the consequences of his plea.[3] The parties stipulated to a factual basis of the plea. Appellant pled no contest to count one and admitted five prior prison term enhancements.
Appellant waived his rights to a probation report and a 20-day delay in sentencing. The court sentenced appellant to prison for two years on count one and to five consecutive one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements for a total prison sentence of seven years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal but failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

On December 6, 2009, Ashley Garcia asked her ex-boyfriend, appellant, Alberto Morales Cabello, for a ride from San Joaquin to Kerman to pick up her son. Cabello agreed but drove Garcia in his pickup to Five Points, which was not en route to Kerman. At Five Points, Cabello stopped at a gas station where Garcia was able to tell the clerk to call the police. Cabello then forced her back into the truck, drove to Interstate Highway 5, and got on the southbound lanes. Garcia grabbed the truck's gear shift several times and asked Cabello to stop the truck, but she was unsuccessful in getting Cabello or the truck to stop. At one point, Cabello reached into the back seat area, pulled out a knife, and told her, â€

C.W. is the mother of two children, a daughter D. and a son M., who have been dependents of the juvenile court since December 2007 and with whom she failed to reunify. At a November 2009 permanency planning hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26),[1] the court denied mother's petition (§ 388) to either reinstitute reunification services or regain custody of her children. The court ordered long term foster care as D.'s permanent plan. With respect to M., the court calendared a further section 366.26 hearing after finding that though he had a probability of adoption, there was as yet no identified or available adoptive home for him. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)( 3).) The court also reduced mother's visitation with the children.
On appeal, the mother challenges (1) the court's denial of her modification petition, (2) the court's finding that section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) applied to M., and (3) the reduction in visitation. As we shall explain, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's modification petition and reducing visitation. With respect to mother's claims of error concerning the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) finding at the further section 366.26 hearing held in July 2010, given that the court ultimately selected legal guardianship as M.'s permanent plan, we conclude those claims are moot and therefore do not decide them.

On the evening of March 9, 2009, appellant Timothy Coronado[1], codefendant Steven Magana and M.E. armed themselves and went to the trailer[2] where Ruben Coronado lived. When Ruben opened the door, they fired multiple gunshots at him. Despite sustaining several gunshot wounds, Ruben survived.

On the evening of March 9, 2009, appellant Steven Magana, codefendant Timothy Coronado and M.E. armed themselves and went to the trailer[1]where Ruben Coronado lived.[2] When Ruben opened the door, they fired multiple gunshots at him. Despite sustaining several gunshot rounds, Ruben survived.
After a joint jury trial, Steven and Timothy were convicted of premeditated attempted murder, discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling and unlawful participation in a criminal street gang (counts 1-3).[3] Street gang and firearm discharge enhancement allegations attached to the attempted murder and firearm discharge counts were found true, as was a personal infliction of great bodily injury allegation attached to the attempted murder count. Steven was also found guilty of two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm; street gang enhancements attached to the firearm possession counts were found true (counts 4 & 5). (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187; 246; 186.22, subds. (a) & (b); 12021, subd. (e); 12022.53, subd. (d); and 12022.7, subd. (a).)[4]

On October 6, 2009, a jury convicted appellant, Santos Reyes, of driving under the influence (count 2/Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), being under the influence of a controlled substance (count 3/Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), and driving with a suspended license (count 4/Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). The jury deadlocked on a count of possession of PCP (count 1/Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and a mistrial was declared as to that count. After Reyes pled no contest to the possession charge in exchange for a maximum term of four years, in a separate proceeding the court found true a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).[1]
On November 4, 2009, the trial court sentenced Reyes to an aggregate four-year term, the upper term of three years on his possession conviction, a one-year prior prison term enhancement, and concurrent 90-day terms on each of his remaining convictions. The court also imposed four separate $30 fees pursuant to Government Code section 70373, for a total of $120.
On appeal, Reyes contends the court erred when it imposed four $30-fees pursuant to Government Code section 70373. We will reject this contention. Additionally, pursuant to this court's â€

Appellant, Essie Patrick Bell, was charged in a criminal complaint filed November 14, 2006, with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).[1] The complaint further alleged that Bell used a knife in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). On February 5, 2007, Bell entered into a plea agreement whereby she pled guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the weapon enhancement for a maximum sentence of 12 years in prison. On May 4, 2007, the trial court sentenced Bell to the upper term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter plus one year for the weapon enhancement, for a total prison term of 12 years. The court imposed a restitution fine and granted applicable custody credits. On June 19, 2007, Bell obtained a certificate of probable cause.

A jury convicted appellant, Mathew Henry Vallez (Vallez), on one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine (count 1/Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and transportation of methamphetamine (count 2/Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and providing false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)).[1]
On August 10, 2009, the court sentenced Vallez to a three-year term on count 1, a stayed three-year term on count 2, and a 45-day term on count 6 with credit for time served. The court also awarded Vallez 45 days of presentence custody credit consisting of 31 days of presentence actual custody credit and 14 days of presentence conduct credit.
On appeal, Vallez contends: 1) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence; and 2) he is entitled to additional conduct credit pursuant to the recent amendment of section 4019. Court will find merit to Vallez's first contention and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. In all other respects, Court affirm.

A jury convicted Israel Abdelaziz III of grand theft of personal property on or about December 28, 2007 (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); count 1),[1] identity theft on or about December 28, 2007 through January 7, 2008 (§ 530.5, subd. (a); count 2), and petty theft as a lesser included offense to second degree robbery, committed on or about February 9, 2008 (§ 488; count 3). Before trial, Abdelaziz admitted he had suffered a previous serious or violent felony conviction under the â€

R.D. (mother) and E.M. (father) appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights to their three-year-old daughter M.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) They contend the evidence failed to establish M.M. was likely to be adopted. For the reasons stated below, Court affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Kyle Dion Gispanski appeals his conviction of attempted murder and other offenses, raising the single contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a defense continuance at sentencing. Court reverse with directions.

Defendant Vilath Xayasomloth appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for possessing a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in a correctional facility. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, count 1.) The court also found true the allegation that defendant had previously been convicted of a prior serious and violent felony. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 2, possessing for sale a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) The court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison.
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) because his trial attorney failed to move to suppress evidence of his confession. We conclude defendant has not met his burden of establishing IAC. Regardless of whether defendant's attorney should have moved to suppress evidence of defendant's confession, such failure was not prejudicial because there was overwhelming evidence, apart from the confession evidence, establishing defendant's guilt. Judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiffs Alesha Blease, Amanda Richards, Chad Gruenewald, and Layne Gruenewald (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant John Osborne (Defendant), entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Defendant to the first amended complaint. The trial court found that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's ruling. Court affirm.

Seahaus La Jolla Owners Association (Association) sued developers, contractors and others for various alleged construction defects at the Seahaus La Jolla condominium project. Association asserted causes of action for strict products liability, negligence and violations of the residential construction standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896 against defendants Weyerhaeuser Company and Weyerhaeuser NR Company (collectively, Weyerhaeuser).