CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Isais Urieta Martinez of one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and one count of street terrorism (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)) (further code references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted). The jury found true the special circumstance allegation the murder was committed for a criminal street gang purpose (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), the intentional discharge of a firearm enhancement (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)), and the criminal street gang enhancement (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced Martinez to a term of 40 years to life as an indeterminate sentence and 2 years consecutively as a determinate sentence. The sentence consisted of a determinate middle term of two years for street terrorism, a consecutive term of 15 years to life for murder, and another consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.

A jury convicted Arnoldo Cossio Rivera[1] of one count of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of murder, and one count of street terrorism (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)) (section 186.22(a)) (further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted). The jury found true the allegation the involuntary manslaughter offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1)).[2] The trial court sentenced Appellant Rivera to a total term of eight years eight months in prison.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to petitioner's minor daughter G. Court will deny the petition.

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from respondent court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his son, R. Court will deny the petition.

Appellants Jason Huber (Jason) and Angie Huber (Angie) were charged with one count of forgery (Pen. Code,[1] § 470(d)) and one count of recording a false instrument (§ 115(a)). Following a trial by jury, both appellants were convicted on each count.
Appellants were sentenced on May 1, 2009. With regard to both appellants, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed them on three years formal probation subject to service of 120 days in the county jail.
Appellant Angie Huber filed a timely notice of appeal on May 13, 2009. Appellant Jason Huber filed a timely notice of appeal on June 30, 2009.

A jury found defendant guilty of attempting to willfully commit a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288, subd. (a).)[1] The trial court granted defendant 36 months of formal probation, with the condition that he serve 180 weekend days in the custody of the county sheriff. Defendant raises two contentions. First, defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Second, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the transcripts of his online chats. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff David Falossi and defendant Fritz Koenig are neighbors; they live on opposite sides of Hoot Owl Trail in Yucca Valley. Shortly after Koenig moved in, Falossi and his family decided that they wanted nothing to do with him -- because they suspected him of being a pedophile, or because they disagreed with his plans for Hoot Owl Trail, or for both reasons, or perhaps for neither. They told him to stay away from the Falossi children.
Nevertheless, a long series of interactions between Koenig and the Falossis ensued. Koenig's conduct fell at various points along a continuum from the harmless and reasonable to the annoying and inexcusable. In many (though not all) of these interactions, Koenig's conduct consisted of photographing or videotaping the Falossis against their will.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Koenig from harassing the Falossis. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) The injunction required him to stay at least 50 yards away from them and from their home. It further provided: â€

The trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Fritz Koenig from harassing plaintiff Clairdean V. Moore. Koenig appeals, arguing:
1. The trial court violated due process by terminating the hearing before Koenig could present all of his evidence.
2. The harassment injunction procedure was improperly used to resolve a complex real property dispute.
3. To the extent that Koenig's allegedly harassing conduct consisted of taking photographs, it was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.
We agree that the trial court erred by letting Moore present all of his evidence, while barring Koenig from presenting all of his. This error is reversible per se. Court need not address Koenig's other contentions; he remains free to raise them in the trial court on remand.

Paul C. Hamilton, a state prisoner, appeals from the trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrer to his complaint alleging deliberate indifference to his need for outdoor exercise while the prison was on lockdown status.
As Court will explain, court agree with Hamilton that the trial court erred in concluding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. However, we conclude that another ground for demurrer has merit, namely that Hamilton failed to comply with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Ervin Sommer filed this action against Linda Hawkes, as trustee of the Julia Hawkes Family Trust (the Trust), Mark L. Pierce, and Jane L. Pierce (collectively the Pierces).[1] In his single cause of action complaint, Sommer sought to foreclose on a deed of trust recorded in August 1997 on certain real property in Escondido that the Trust sold to the Pierces in October 2005. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that res judicata barred this action. The defendants argued that a trial court had determined in another action that the August 2007 deed of trust was invalid. (In the Matter of the Julia Jeppesen Hawkes Family Trust (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2005, No. PN22173) (sometimes referred to as "case No. PN22173").) The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal.
On appeal, Sommer contends that the action in case No. PN22173 was an "unrelated case" and that he was not a defendant in that matter. Sommer also claims that the judgment must be reversed for several other reasons, including that the trial court was "prejudiced and biased," and that the trial court improperly permitted Linda Hawkes's attorney "to intrude in [the] court proceeding[s]." We affirm the judgment.
II.

Defendant Southern California Gas Company (SCG) appeals a judgment following a jury verdict finding SCG liable to plaintiffs Peter and Deborah Gonzalez (Plaintiffs) for the wrongful death of their daughter, Tiffany. She died after driving her car off a street and striking an SCG gas meter assembly located 11 feet, 4 inches from the curb. On appeal, SCG contends the trial court erred by denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for new trial because: (1) it did not owe Tiffany a legal duty of care in the circumstances of this case; (2) its conduct was not the proximate cause of her injuries; (3) the court erred in instructing the jury; and (4) the court erred by excluding certain evidence showing Plaintiffs negligently entrusted Tiffany with a vehicle.

Defendant Southern California Gas Company (SCG) appeals a judgment following a jury verdict finding SCG liable to plaintiffs Peter and Deborah Gonzalez (Plaintiffs) for the wrongful death of their daughter, Tiffany. She died after driving her car off a street and striking an SCG gas meter assembly located 11 feet, 4 inches from the curb. On appeal, SCG contends the trial court erred by denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for new trial because: (1) it did not owe Tiffany a legal duty of care in the circumstances of this case; (2) its conduct was not the proximate cause of her injuries; (3) the court erred in instructing the jury; and (4) the court erred by excluding certain evidence showing Plaintiffs negligently entrusted Tiffany with a vehicle.

Defendant Patrick Charles Curtis drove drunk and hit a telephone pole, injuring his passenger. He pled guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol with injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) and to driving on a license suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). He also admitted a great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and a prior drunk driving conviction.
The court ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $77,393.45. On appeal, defendant contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the restitution award by $25,000, the settlement amount recovered by the victim from defendant's insurance carrier.
Court agree with the parties that the victim restitution order in this action should have been reduced by money the victim received in settlement from the defendant's insurance carrier.

Plaintiff Patrick Cottini appeals from two pretrial orders denying his motion to disqualify the law firm of LaFollette, Johnson, De Haas, Fesler & Ames (LaFollette Johnson) from representing defendant Enloe Medical Center (Enloe) in an action alleging negligence and abuse of a dependent adult. Cottini also appeals from a separate pretrial order in which the trial court granted Enloe's motion for discovery sanctions and reserved jurisdiction to set the amount of sanctions at the conclusion of the case.
As we shall explain, Cottini's interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order is not properly before us because the order does not impose monetary sanctions in an amount exceeding $5,000 (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(12); further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified); nor is it appealable as a final judgment on a matter that is collateral to the general subject of the litigation.
While Cottini's interlocutory appeal challenging the court's denial of his motion to disqualify the LaFollette Johnson law firm is properly before us, Court conclude that he has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
Thus, we shall dismiss the purported appeal from the sanctions order and affirm the orders denying Cottini's motion to disqualify the LaFollette Johnson law firm.