CA Unpub Decisions

Beatriz S. and Sean S. appeal an order denying a petition to terminate the biological mother's rights for a stepparent adoption entered at a hearing held pursuant to Family Code section 7822. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, the stepmother and minor ask this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny appellants' requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David M. Gill, Judge. Affirmed.
As part of a plea agreement, Roberto Sotelo, II, entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted robbery (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664 & 211), admitted two serious felony prior convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and admitted one serious/violent felony prior conviction (strike prior) within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The parties stipulated to strike one of the strike priors and agreed to a sentence of 12 years, eight months in prison. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed as were additional charges pending in another case. Sotelo was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible, but not arguable issues. We offered Sotelo the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but Sotelo has failed to respond.

The Attorney General appeals from a superior court order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Joshua Daniel Mills. (Pen. Code, § 1506.)[1] The superior court granted the petition after determining that Mills's 2002 convictions for criminal threats and exhibiting a deadly weapon in Placer Superior Court case No. 62-026161 were the product of an involuntary guilty plea. We reverse.

On June 7, 2004, the court sentenced defendant Jeffrey Stuard (petitioner) to seven years eight months in prison based upon his no contest pleas to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, transportation of a controlled substance, hit and run with injury, evading a police officer by means of a high speed chase, and his admission of a prior narcotics-related offense. The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed petitioner on formal probation for five years.
On October 21, 2008, petitioner admitted violating conditions of his probation; the court revoked his probation and imposed the previously stayed seven-years-eight-months sentence. Although the court awarded petitioner credit for actual time served and for conduct, the calculations are incorrect, a matter we will address at the conclusion of this opinion. At this point it is sufficient to note the court credited petitioner with conduct credits under the formula in existence at the time of sentencing.[1] Petitioner did not appeal.

A jury convicted defendant John Scott Sigle of the continuous sexual abuse of a child. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term of 16 years.
Defendant appeals. He contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting propensity evidence and (2) the trial court improperly imposed a no-contact order. The People concede that the no-contact order was imposed in error. We agree and will order the judgment modified, striking the no-contact order. We reject defendant's remaining contention and will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Dominick West of second degree murder as a lesser included offense; it sustained allegations that in committing the offense defendant personally fired a gun from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury. The jury also convicted him of making a criminal threat against a different victim at another location, sustaining an allegation that he personally used a gun in committing the offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 51 years to life, awarding only custody credits in accordance with the prohibition in Penal Code section 2933.2[1] on presentence conduct credits for defendants convicted of murder.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of third party culpability for the murder. He also argues there is insufficient evidence of a criminal threat. Finally, he asserts there is insufficient evidence to support an award of $10,000 in restitution to the murder victim's family. We shall affirm the judgment, but must vacate the restitution order.

In reversing the first summary judgment we found plaintiff Cletius Rogers's 26-year delay in reinstituting litigation to establish an easement over property owned by defendant Regents of the University of California (University) did not constitute laches as a matter of law. But his victory was short-lived. We affirm the second summary judgment because, while plaintiff dithered, the University extinguished any private, implied, or equitable easement by adverse possession, and plaintiff raises no triable issue of fact that the public had perfected a right-of-way in the late 18th or early 19th century.

Two masked and hooded robbers stole money, credit cards, and cell phones from employees and customers at Taco Bell and NT Hair and Nails. Similarly disguised bandits had burgled and robbed another salon about two weeks earlier. Most of the witnesses to all three events forthrightly admitted they could not identify the perpetrators, and the identifications by those who tried were decimated during cross-examination. Needless to say, identity was the crux of the trial.
Defendant Jeremy Thomas asserts insufficiency of the evidence and instructional error. He also contends he was improperly convicted of receiving the same property he stole. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) As to his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, he parses the evidence too finely. Because, as defendant recognizes, we must review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and give deference to the factual and credibility findings made by the jury, we reject this challenge. We agree with defendant, however, that his convictions of receiving stolen property must be reversed.

The juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] after finding appellant Richard E. committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. The court placed Richard home on probation and fixed his maximum period of confinement at five years. The lone contention on appeal is that the court erred in setting a maximum period of confinement because Richard was not removed from the custody of his parents. We modify the judgment to strike the maximum period of confinement and affirm in all other respects.
The facts may be concisely stated, as there is no claim on appeal of insufficiency of the evidence or evidentiary error. Oscar Quiroga testified he was accosted by a group of four people near the intersection of Florence Avenue and Crenshaw Boulevard on the evening of November 12, 2010. Quiroga was in fear, as one of the assailants threatened him by simulating possession of a gun. Quiroga's backpack was taken from him. Quiroga was taken to a gas station where suspects had been detained. He identified Richard as the person who took his cell phone. Richard and a codefendant testified the reason they were at the gas station was because the car they had been riding in had run out of gas.

K.B. (father) appeals from the orders of November 23, 2010, declaring his sons Jeremiah L. and Jordan L. (the children) dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (d)[1] and ordering the children removed from his custody. Father contends: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to hearsay statements of maternal grandmother; (2) substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings father inflicted domestic violence on mother and father's marijuana use and conviction of sex with a minor placed the children at risk of harm; (3) substantial evidence does not support the order removing the children from father's custody; and (4) substantial evidence does not support the finding that the dependency court had no reason to know the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the ICWA) (92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963) applied. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Christine and Michael Shugart appeal from the entry of summary judgments in favor of defendants Linda Warren, M.D., and The Regents of the University of California (Regents). We conclude the trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of the Regents because plaintiffs' opposition papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact, and we therefore affirm as to the Regents. However, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Warren, finding plaintiffs' expert declaration was admissible and raised triable issues as to Dr. Warren's alleged medical negligence.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jose Luis Cajero guilty of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Jose â€

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied appellant's petition for a writ of mandate on the ground that substantial evidence supported the finding of the Los Angeles Police Department Board of Rights that appellant, a police officer, was guilty of one count of misconduct for making misleading statements during an official investigation. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Gary Powell was charged with two crimes--assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) on Sonny Dhillon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1),[1] with the specific allegation that defendant personally used the weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) on Dustin Latray. It was alleged defendant had two convictions for serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), 667, subd. (a)), and that defendant served four prior prison terms as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The jury found defendant guilty of both counts, with a special finding that defendant personally used a deadly weapon in assaulting Dhillon. Defendant waived his jury trial rights on the recidivist allegations, which the court found to be true. However, the trial court granted defendant's Romero motion[2] and dismissed one of the convictions under the three strikes law.
The trial court imposed a 15-year prison sentence, as discussed more fully below. Defendant received credit for 518 days served in presentence custody, plus 76 days of conduct credit.
In his timely appeal, defendant contends his conviction for assaulting Latray must be reversed because the trial court prejudicially failed to instruct the jurors they must unanimously agree that the same criminal act supported the conviction. He also contends he is entitled to additional days of presentence custody credit because the court erroneously applied the 15 percent credit limitation under section 2933.1, rather than the greater percentage set forth in section 4019. We asked the parties to address various sentencing issues in supplemental letter briefing. Defendant's first contention fails because no unanimity instruction is required where, as here, the prosecution made an election as to the specific act on which the charge was based and, independently, the â€