P. v. Saige
Filed 7/11/12 P. v. Saige CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROBERT RONALD SAIGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
E052098
(Super.Ct.No. FVI021516)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior
Court of
Bernardino County. John
M. Tomberlin, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Steven A. Torres, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney
General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Raquel M. Gonzalez, Lilia E. Garcia, and
Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant guilty on five counts of a
lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)); one count of
(Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)); one count of
Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)(1)); one count of
Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); see now id., § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and one count of unlawful
possession of a billy club (former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1); see
now id., § 22210).
The information had alleged a multiple victim
special circumstance for purposes of the “one strike†law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd.
(e)(4).) Although the jury did not return
a separate verdict on this allegation, it did find defendant guilty of lewd
acts on two named victims. (See
693, 712 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found two “strike†priors true. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12.)
Defendant was sentenced to a total of 240 years
to life, plus the usual fines and fees.
In this appeal, defendant contends:
1. The
trial court erred by admitting evidence that defendant had previously molested
his adopted daughter.
2. The
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s Romero motion.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
On our own motion, we have identified two aspects
in which the sentence was unauthorized.
We will correct these by modifying the sentence. Otherwise, we find no error. Hence, we will affirm the judgment as
modified.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
From August to October 2004, defendant allowed
M.K., accompanied by her son R.K. (then aged 11) and her daughter J.K. (then
aged 9), to live with him in his house.
M.K. had a previous conviction for selling
drugs. When she was in prison, her
children were placed in foster care.
While living with defendant, M.K. was using
drugs. Defendant would give her money
for drugs; she would then go out to get and use drugs, leaving her children
alone with him. She knew he was required
to register as a sex offender. However,
he told her that this was because he had had consensual sex with a minor who
was nearly 18, and he had believed she was an adult.
Defendant’s adult son Robby also lived in the
house. Robby had guns. Robby once pointed a gun at R.K. and
threatened to shoot him. R.K. thought it
was a real gun, though he found out later that it was a BB gun.
Count 1 (lewd act on a child): While R.K. was in defendant’s bedroom, defendant
asked R.K. to touch his penis. Defendant
then held R.K.’s hand and used it to masturbate until he ejaculated.
Count 2 (lewd act on a child): Immediately after the previous incident,
defendant put his hand on R.K.’s penis and masturbated R.K. until R.K.
ejaculated.
Count 3 (lewd act on a child): While defendant was driving a truck in which
R.K. was a passenger, defendant started rubbing R.K.’s inner thigh, over his
clothes. R.K. got out and walked.
Count 4 (exhibiting harmful matter to a
minor): Defendant had R.K. get a
suitcase out of his closet. He then
showed R.K. what was inside, including dildos and Polaroid photos of himself
and his girlfriend having sex. While living
in the house, R.K.’s mother also saw the photos.
Both R.K. and J.K. testified that there were
holes in the walls of the house. J.K.
saw “something red [and] blinking†inside the holes. Defendant told R.K. that, if he ever
disclosed the molestation, defendant would know, because there were cameras in
the holes. Defendant also said that, in
that event, R.K.’s mother would not want R.K. anymore, and he would be sent
back to foster care.
R.K. testified that he did not disclose the
molestation because he was afraid of being sent back to foster care and also
because he was afraid of defendant’s son.
Count 5 (lewd act on a child): While J.K. was in defendant’s bedroom, he put
his hand under her shirt and rubbed her breasts. He said he was “scratching for herâ€; she
replied that she did not itch.
Count 6 (lewd act on a child): Another time, when J.K. was in defendant’s
bedroom, he put his finger in her vagina and moved it around.
Defendant told J.K. that, if she told anyone
about the molestation, he would shoot her mother.
Around December 2004, a month or two after moving
out of defendant’s house, the children told their mother about the
molestation. At first, she did not go to
the police, because she was using drugs and she was afraid the children would
be taken away from her again. In March
2005, however, she did finally report the molestation to the police.
In April 2005, the police searched defendant’s
house. In most of the rooms, they found
holes drilled in the walls. The holes
were at shoulder height and about the size of a straw or a pencil. However, there were no cameras inside.
In defendant’s bedroom, they found a suitcase
containing pornographic magazines, a dildo, and Polaroid photos “depicting
people in sex acts.â€
In defendant’s son’s bedroom, they found two
rifles.
Count 7 (unlawful possession of a firearm): In a storage shed behind the house, the
police found two shotguns. The shed was
locked; defendant gave them the key to the shed.
Count 8 (unlawful possession of a deadly
weapon): In defendant’s bedroom, the
police found a billy club.
Count 9 (possession of child pornography): In the same suitcase, the police also found
several compact discs (CD’s). On the
CD’s, there were two videos of underage girls having sex with adult men. There was also an image of an underage girl
displaying her genitalia.
R.K. testified that defendant showed him pictures
on his computer of “young and old people,†including prepubescent boys and
girls, having sex.
J.K. testified similarly that defendant used his
computer to show her both videos and still pictures of “little kids†having sex,
as well as of adults having sex.
II
SECTION 1108 EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence that defendant had committed prior sexual offenses against
his adopted daughter.
A. Evidence of Other
Sexual Offenses.
The prosecution called M.D. She was defendant’s adopted daughter;
defendant married M.D.’s mother, and then, when M.D. was about nine years old,
he adopted her.
M.D. testified that her earliest memory of
defendant molesting her dated back to when she was five or six. She added, “From the slight memory I have, I
would say that I was giving him oral copulation.†She remembered lying naked on a bed. When her mother walked in, defendant “jumped
up,†pulled up his pants, and buttoned them.
She specifically remembered seeing his penis go back inside his pants.
The next incident she remembered was when she was
eight or nine years old. Her mother was
“in the military in Maryland or Germany at the time.†Defendant played a pornographic video of
people having intercourse. She then
straddled defendant and “rubb[ed] [her] clitoris against his penis[,]
simulating sex . . . .â€
On several occasions, when M.D. was between the
ages of five and eleven, she and defendant slept together naked. If defendant got an erection, he told M.D.
that she needed to “fix†it. This meant
that she had to masturbate or orally copulate him to orgasm. “Occasionally†he would try to penetrate her,
but as far as she remembered, he never succeeded.
When she was nine or ten, defendant got her a subscription
to Playgirl.
Defendant told M.D. that, if she ever told anyone
about the molestation, nobody would believe her, her family would hate her, and
she would be taken away and put in foster care.
When she finally did disclose, her family “disowned†her, and she was,
in fact, placed in foster care.
In 1986, based on his molestation of M.D.,
defendant pleaded guilty to a lewd act on a child.
B. Additional Procedural
Background.
Actually, defendant had two prior convictions,
both in 1986, for lewd acts on a child.
In addition to the one related to his adopted daughter, M.D., he had one
related to the forcible rape of her friend F.
Defendant filed a written motion in limine to
exclude evidence of the conduct underlying both convictions, arguing that it was
more prejudicial than probative and that its admission would violate due
process and equal protection.
The prosecutor indicated that she was not going
to introduce any evidence regarding F.
She argued, however, that the evidence regarding M.D. was not unduly
prejudicial.
The trial court excluded the evidence regarding
F. However, it admitted the evidence
regarding M.D. It explained: “[L]ooking at the similarities
. . . , and that’s mutual masturbation, and the fact that it
starts off with one thing and . . . leads to other things,
. . . while certainly prejudicial, it’s not unduly inflammatory and
it’s really highly probative. The fact
that it’s only one witness, the fact that it’s not going to be unduly
consumptive of Court time, I don’t think there’s a probability of confusion in
this case.
“[O]r that the jury is going to want to punish
Mr. Saige more harshly for crimes committed in the past
. . . . I just don’t see
that as having much likelihood under the circumstances . . . .â€
C. Analysis.
“Character or disposition evidence is generally
inadmissible to prove a defendant’s conduct on a specified occasion. [Citation.]
Section 1108 creates an exception:
‘In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or
offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.’
[Citations.] In enacting section
1108 the Legislature recognized the ‘“serious and secretive nature of sex
crimes and the often resulting credibility contest at trial,â€â€™ and intended in
sex offense cases to relax the evidentiary restraints imposed by section 1101
‘to assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other
sex offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Hernandez (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 953, 965.)
“By its terms, section 1108 requires a trial
court to engage in a section 352 analysis before admitting evidence of prior
sex offenses.†(People v. Hernandez, supra,
200 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.)
“Several factors are particularly significant in a section 1108
case. They are: ‘(1) whether the
propensity evidence has probative value, e.g., whether the uncharged conduct is
similar enough to the charged behavior to tend to show defendant did in fact
commit the charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger and
more inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts; (3) whether
the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether the propensity evidence
is likely to confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry, e.g.,
whether the jury might be tempted to punish the defendant for his uncharged,
unpunished conduct; and (5) whether admission of the
consumption of time. [Citation.] A trial court balances this first factor,
i.e., the propensity evidence’s probative value, against the evidence’s prejudicial
and time-consuming effects, as measured by the second through fifth
factors.’ [Citation.]†(Id.
at pp. 965-966.)
“The ‘determination of whether the probative
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the possibility of
. . . unfair prejudice or misleading the jury is “entrusted to the
sound discretion of the trial judge who is the best position to evaluate the
evidence.†[Citation.]’ [Citation.]
We review rulings under section 352 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]
‘A trial court’s exercise of its discretion under section 352 “‘must not
be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.Չۉ۪
[Citation.]†(
Here, there were significant similarities between
the charged crimes and the prior bad acts.
First, and most obviously, they involved a sexual attraction to
children. Second, the children were of
elementary-school age. Third, the
children were living in defendant’s household.
Fourth, defendant opportunistically took advantage of the mother’s
absence — in the case of M.D., her mother’s absence in the military; in the
case of R.K. and J.K., their mother’s absence while using drugs (for which
defendant gave her money). Fifth, the
sex acts consisted of foreplay or mutual masturbation (or, in M.D.’s case, oral
copulation); defendant never had penetrative intercourse with any of the
children. Sixth, defendant showed the
children pornography. Seventh, defendant
told the children that, if they disclosed, their parents would reject them and
they would be placed in foster care.
These similarities made the prior bad acts
strongly probative. Defense counsel took
the position that M.K., the victims’ mother, had coached them to make false
accusations.
title="">[3] M.D’s testimony — that she was roughly the
same age as the victims, that defendant committed similar sex acts, that
defendant showed her pornography, and that defendant threatened her with foster
care — was crucial evidence that the victims were not just making things up.
Defendant points to various dissimilarities. For example, M.D. was a member of defendant’s
family, the molestation of M.D. went on longer, and defendant had M.D. orally
copulate him. However, these do not
detract from the probative value of the evidence. It still tended to corroborate the victims’
story.
Defendant argues that the prior bad acts were
inflammatory. Admittedly, they were somewhat
more aggravated than the charged crimes — again, because M.D. was a member of
defendant’s family and they went on longer.
However, M.D. never claimed that she did not consent to the sex acts. In addition, her presentation on the stand
seems to have been clinical and unemotional.
Finally, the conduct in this case was fairly inflammatory to begin
with. The trial court made a careful and
reasoned decision to limit the inflammatory tendency of the prior bad acts by
excluding the evidence of defendant’s forcible rape of F. Given the substantial probative value of the
prior bad acts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
Defendant also argues that the jury was not
specifically told that he had served prison time for his crimes against M.D.,
and thus it would be tempted to punish him for those crimes. It was
told, however, that he had pleaded guilty.
Thus, it knew that he had received punishment of some sort. If defendant believed that evidence of the
actual sentence would mitigate the prejudicial effect of the evidence, he was
free to introduce it.
Next, defendant argues that the prior bad acts
were remote. However, “the passage of a
substantial length of time does not automatically render . . . prior
incidents prejudicial.†(
966, 991.) “No specific time limits have
been established for determining when an uncharged offense is so remote as to
be inadmissible.†(People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284.) Here, it is reasonable to suppose that a
propensity to commit sexual offenses against children could persist for at
least 18 years. Moreover, as the
prosecutor pointed out below, defendant had spent at least six of the
intervening 18 years in prison, where he “had little or no opportunity to
commit sexual crimes . . . .â€
(People v. Loy (2011) 52
Cal.4th 46, 62.)
Defendant relies heavily on People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727. The facts in Harris, however, are drastically different from the facts in this
case. In Harris, the defendant, a nurse, was accused of sexually touching
(including orally copulating and manually masturbating) two patients in his
care, with some force but without threats or violence. (Id.
at pp. 731-732.) By contrast, in
the prior offense, the defendant had attacked a stranger, leaving her
unconscious and bleeding from the crotch; he was found, shortly afterward, with
blood all over his crotch, shorts, and pants.
(Id. at pp. 733-735.)
The appellate court noted that the evidence of
the prior offense “was inflammatory in
the extreme.†(People v. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.) It had little similarity to the current
offenses, aside from the fact that the victims were all Caucasian (as was the
defendant) and “in their 20’s or 30’s.â€
(Id. at p. 740.) The jury was told that, in connection with
the prior offense, the defendant had been convicted of burglary with great
bodily injury, leading it to believe that he had “escaped appropriate rape
charges . . . .†(
occurred 23 years before the current offense.
(Id. at p. 739.) The appellate court concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the prior offense under Evidence Code
section 1108. (Harris, at p. 741.)
Here, all of these factors were absent. The prior bad acts were not bloody or
violent. There were a number of
significant similarities between the current offense and the prior bad acts. The jury was told that the prior bad acts had
resulted in a conviction for a sexual offense.
And the prior bad acts, while somewhat remote, were not as remote as the
prior offense in Harris; in any
event, as already discussed, this
factor deserved little weight in light of defendant’s intervening
incarceration.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of defendant’s prior sexual
offense against M.D. And “[h]aving
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 352,
we must also reject defendant’s argument that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial.†(
155, 180.)
III
ROMERO MOTION
Defendant contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his Romero
motion. This contention is frivolous.
A. Additional Factual and
Procedural Background.
When the crimes were committed, defendant was 48
or 49. At sentencing, he was 55. He had the following criminal record:
1. In
1986, he was convicted on two counts of a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code,
§ 288, subd. (a)), involving two different victims (i.e., his adopted
daughter M.D. and her friend F.). He was
sentenced to eight years in prison. He
was paroled in 1990. (These were the two
strike priors.)
2. In
1993, he was convicted on one count of statutory
rape (Pen. Code, § 261.5) and sentenced to two years in prison. He was paroled in 1994.
Defendant filed a written Romero motion. In it, he
argued that both of the strike priors arose out of the same case. He also argued that he had “family and
friends who care about him . . . .†(Capitalization omitted.) The prosecution filed an opposition.
The trial court denied the motion. It observed:
“ . . . I think it would be an abuse of discretion
for me to grant the motion to strike the strike . . . . [¶] This is the type of case that . . .
typifies the reason that the three strikes law was passed.â€
B. Analysis.
In Romero,
the Supreme Court held that a trial court has discretion to dismiss a three-strikes
prior felony conviction allegation under Penal Code section 1385. (People
v. Superior Court (Romero),
pp. 529-530.) The focus of the
analysis must be on “‘whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.’
[Citation.]†(
33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
“Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary
. . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the
spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a
strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of
which the law was meant to attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no
reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of
the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.†(People
v. Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
“[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss
or strike a prior conviction
allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.†(People v. Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 375.)
We are at a loss to perceive any extraordinary
circumstances in this case.
Defendant argues that striking a strike would
give him some possibility of being released on parole.
to that possibility. He could have
avoided spending his sunset years in prison simply by not committing
of the one misdemeanor).
He also argues that he “clearly had prospects for
the futureâ€: he was gainfully employed,
he did not abuse alcohol or drugs,
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] and he had no gang ties. This overlooks the fact that he evidently
just could not stop devastating children’s lives for his own sexual gratification. According to the probation report, his score
on the STATIC-99 test was 4, which indicated a moderate to high risk of
committing another sexual offense.
Moreover, he had sufficient disregard for the law that, despite having
not merely a felony conviction, but two strike priors, he possessed a shotgun
and a billy club.
We heartily endorse the trial court’s conclusion
that it would have been an abuse of discretion to strike a strike.
IV
UNAUTHORIZED SENTENCE
On our
own motion, we raised an issue as to whether the sentences on the five lewd act
counts (counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) were legally correct. We allowed the parties to file further
briefing on this issue. Having considered
that further briefing, we conclude that the sentences on two of these five counts
were unauthorized and must be corrected.
Under the
“one strike law,†Penal Code section 667.61, as it stood in 2004 when the
crimes were committed, the penalty for forcible lewd acts committed against
multiple victims was ordinarily 15 years to life. (Pen. Code, former § 667.61, subds. (b),
(c)(4), (e)(5), Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 9, pp. 6874, 6875.) However, a term of 15 years to life could be
imposed only “once for any offense or offenses committed against a single
victim during a single occasion.†(Pen.
Code, former § 667.61, subd. (g), Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 9,
p. 6876.) “Terms for other offenses
committed during a single occasion†were to be determined under any other
applicable law. (Ibid.)
Finally,
because defendant was a “three striker,†if the sentence on any term was
otherwise 15 years to life, it had to be tripled, to 45 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i),
1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(i); People v.
Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 118-128.)
If, however, the sentence was otherwise a relatively short term of
years, it became 25 years to life. (Pen.
Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii).)
Accordingly,
in this case, the sentence on the lewd act counts should be 45 years to life,
except that, if any two or more lewd act counts were committed against a single
victim on a single occasion, then the sentence on only one of those counts
should be 45 years to life, and the sentence on the others should be 25 years
to life. Defendant concurs with this.
On counts
1 and 5, the trial court sentenced defendant to 45 years to life. On counts 2, 3, and 6, however, it sentenced
him to 25 years to life. We must treat
this as an implied finding that counts 2, 3, and 6 were committed against the
same victim and on the same occasion as either count 1 or count 5. Moreover, we must uphold this implied finding
if it is supported by substantial evidence.
(See People v. Solis (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1210, ____ [22012 Cal. LEXIS 685, *1, *2] [Pen. Code,
§ 667.6, subd. (d)]; People v.
Sanchez (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1310 [Pen. Code, § 654] [Fourth
Dist., Div. Two].)
Counts 1,
2, and 3 had the same victim, R.K.
Counts 1 and 2 indisputably occurred on the same occasion; while in
defendant’s bedroom, defendant made R.K. masturbate him, then immediately
afterward, defendant masturbated R.K.
(See People v. Jones (2001) 25
Cal.4th 98, 100-101 [“multiple sex offenses occurred on a ‘single occasion’
within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (g), if there was
a close temporal and spatial proximity between offensesâ€].) However, count 3 indisputably occurred on a
different occasion — when defendant and R.K. were in a truck. Thus, as defendant concedes, the trial court
erred by imposing a sentence of 25 years to life on count 3. We will modify this sentence to 45 years to
life.
Counts 5
and 6 likewise had the same victim, J.K.
Defendant argues that there is sufficient evidence that these counts
occurred on the same occasion (or, at least, insufficient evidence that they
occurred on different occasions).
Alternatively, he asks us to remand for an express finding. However, while it takes a careful reading of
the record, we are convinced that these, too, occurred on different occasions.
First,
J.K. testified that defendant “put his finger in [her] vagina†and moved it
around (count 6). The prosecutor asked:
“Q Was this during the time that you lived in
his house?
“A Yes.â€
J.K. also
testified that this occurred in defendant’s bedroom. Then the prosecutor asked:
“Q . . . [D]id Mr. Saige, the
defendant, ever touch you any other places?
“A Yes.
“Q Where?
“A My boobs.
“Q Okay.
And was that during the same time that you lived there?
“A Yes.
“Q Where were you?
“A In his room.
“Q In the defendant’s room?
“A Yes.â€
J.K. went
on to testify that defendant put his hand under her shirt and rubbed her
breasts (count 5). He claimed that he
was scratching an itch for her.
Because
J.K. was responding as to whether defendant “ever†touched her in any other
places, she appears to have been describing two separate occasions. Also, in connection with count 5, defendant
had to put his hand under her clothing to accomplish the touching, and he
offered a supposedly innocent explanation.
By contrast, in connection with count 6, there was no mention of any
clothing or any explanation. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine what innocent explanation he could have offered. Thus, once again, these appear to be two
separate occasions.
We
recognize that additional evidence might have shown that both touchings
occurred on a single occasion. In the
absence of such evidence, however, the record, as it stands, does not support
such a finding. Rather, the only
reasonable reading of the record is that they occurred on separate occasions.
Thus, the
trial court also erred by imposing a sentence of 25 years to life on count
6. We will modify this sentence to 45
years to life.
V
DISPOSITION
The
sentences on count 3 and count 6 are modified to 45 years to life. This makes the total sentence 280 years to
life. The trial court is directed to
amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the modification and to send a copy
of the amended abstract to the Department
of Corrections. The judgment, as
thus modified, is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We
concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
KING
J.
motion is a motion to dismiss a strike prior in the interest of justice. (People
v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497.)
complicated.
M.K. was in a relationship with a
female partner. Defendant, in turn, was
in a relationship with the mother of M.K.’s partner. Thus, M.K. regarded defendant’s girlfriend as
her mother-in-law, and the children regarded her as their grandmother.
Initially, both M.K. and her partner
moved in with defendant. Sometime during
M.K.’s stay, however, her partner left.
