CA Unpub Decisions

Jairo Ortiz appeals from a judgment after conviction by jury of two counts of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) The jury found true an allegation that he personally used a knife. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced Ortiz to two years in state prison.
We appointed counsel to represent Ortiz in this appeal. After examining the record and researching potential issues, counsel advised us she could not find any arguable issues to raise on Ortiz’s behalf.
Ortiz submitted a supplemental brief in which he asserts that he was incorrectly identified by witnesses at trial. He argues that witness testimony was inconsistent, implausible, and unreliable and points out the absence of fingerprint evidence. We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses. Those are matters exclusively for the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
We have considered Ortiz’s brief and reviewed the entire record. We are satisfied that Ortiz’s attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)

This appeal arises out of an employment discrimination case brought by plaintiff Maria Martinez against her former employer, defendant Rite Aid Corporation, and her former supervisor, defendant Kien Chau. Martinez alleged that, during her employment with Rite Aid, she was subjected to unlawful discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on her disability, age, medical leave of absence, and complaint about sexual harassment. Following a lengthy trial, the jury found in favor of Martinez on her claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy, and awarded Martinez $3.4 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. In their appeal, Rite Aid and Chau assert numerous legal errors, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s special verdicts as to both liability and damages. In her cross-appeal, Martinez argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to further amend her complaint to add statutory claims for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts in favor of Martinez on her causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not on her cause of action for invasion of privacy. We further conclude that the verdicts awarding compensatory damages to Martinez must be reversed because they were impermissibly ambiguous, and the verdict awarding punitive damages to Martinez must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the imposition of punitive damages liability against Rite Aid for the acts of its employees. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez leave to file a third amended complaint. We accordingly reverse and remand the matter for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages as to Martinez’s causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

After participating in a gang-related attack and being found in possession of marijuana, defendant was re-adjudged a ward of the juvenile court. Various probation violations followed, and the court authorized, prior to his 18th birthday, the prospect of incarceration in adult jail. On appeal, defendant challenges the adult jail authorization and the length of his commitment. He also claims the court failed to correctly calculate his maximum term of confinement and his custody credits. We modify the judgment to strike the portion of the order relating to an adult jail commitment. We also modify it to correct defendant’s presentence custody credits, and affirm the judgment as modified.

When the natural mother (Mother) of J.G. (the minor) found herself incapable of caring for him, she consented to a probate guardianship, turning over responsibility for the minor’s care to her own mother (Guardian). During the first years of the guardianship, Mother maintained contact with the minor, but her continued drug use rendered her incapable of resuming his care. As Mother eventually overcame her problems, seeking unsupervised visitation and playing a greater role in his life, she and Guardian proved incapable of cooperating in the minor’s care. The probate court eventually terminated the guardianship, concluding the continuing conflict between Mother and Guardian was harmful to the minor. Guardian contends the probate court abused its discretion for a variety of reasons, but we find no error and affirm.

A jury convicted defendants Kosal Kim Khek and Christopher Lee of first degree murder and found true criminal-street-gang allegations and, as to Khek, a personal-use-of-deadly-weapon allegation, for purposes of sentence enhancements.[1] The trial court sentenced Khek to 26 years to life and Lee to 32 years to life. On appeal, defendants contend that (1) the trial court erred by denying their motions to suppress evidence seized from their homes without a warrant, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a gruesome photograph of the murder victim, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence Robert DeJong’s police statements to the effect that the perpetrators intended only to hurt or injure the victim,[2] (4) the trial court erred by denying their motions for mistrial grounded on jury misconduct, and (5) the abstract of judgment erroneously fails to denote that the imposed restitution fines are joint and several. Khek additionally contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence DeJong’s police statements to the effect that DeJong drove to the murder scene. Lee additionally contends that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury in the language of CALCRIM No. 400 (aider and abettor is equally guilty with perpetrator), and (2) failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. We agree that Khek’s abstract does not conform to the judgment. But we otherwise disagree with defendants. We therefore affirm the judgment and modify Khek’s abstract to conform to the judgment.

Melinda Julie LaMere and Gary Alan Wiles were married in April 2012. They did not, either before or after their marriage ceremony, obtain a marriage license. LaMere died less than a month after the wedding ceremony. Wiles filed a petition to establish the fact, date, and place of the marriage. The trial court denied the petition, and Wiles appeals.
We conclude California law mandates issuance of a marriage license, as well as consent of the parties and solemnization, in order to have a valid marriage. Lacking a marriage license, the marriage of LaMere and Wiles was not valid. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code.) The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in state prison. Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1110. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lundar Yuh appeals from a default judgment entered after the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against him for misuse of the discovery process. Following a default prove‑up hearing, the court awarded plaintiffs Lance Sylvester and Elena Sylvester (together, the Sylvesters) $60,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions against Yuh for misuse of the discovery process or by denying Yuh’s motion to vacate the default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). We affirm the award of compensatory damages in favor of both Elena Sylvester and Lance Sylvester. We conclude, however, the Sylvesters failed to present admissible evidence of Yuh’s financial condition sufficient for us to make a well‑informed decision whether the amount of punitive damages is excessive, as Yuh contends. We lack jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the postjudgment order denying the motion to vacate the judgment.
We therefore strike the award of punitive damages and remand for a new default prove‑up hearing only on the issue of the amount of punitive damages. In all other respects, and with one modification, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a restraining order issued by the court against appellant Heather Rooney in January 2011. Rooney argues that the court did not have substantial evidence to support issuing the order and that her due process rights were violated because she did not receive a fair trial. We conclude that Rooney has failed to establish error and therefore affirm.

Defendant Alvaro Flores was convicted of assault with a firearm and participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code §§ 245, subd. (a)(2), 186.22, subd. (a))[1] in relation to a shooting that occurred outside a home where a party was taking place. On appeal, he argues the sentence on the gang count should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. The Attorney General concedes the point, and we concur.

Defendant Meghan Victoria Livingston pleaded guilty to arson of an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)) and sentenced to three years in state prison. After she violated parole, she was committed to the State Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disturbed offender. (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) In December 2011, the court granted the district attorney’s petition to extend defendant’s commitment for another year based on the opinion of an appointed psychologist. Defendant appeals, contending the case should not have proceeded to trial after the prosecutor was advised her current treating psychiatrist had opined her mental disorder was in remission and she no longer posed a substantial risk to others. She also argues no substantial evidence supports the extended commitment order.
While this appeal was pending, defendant was discharged from the state hospital and we requested informal letter briefs “explaining why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.” The Attorney General argues the case is moot because defendant “has already received the relief which she sought through reversal of the 2011 judgment . . . .” We agree. “‘“[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.”’” (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321.) Because defendant “has already received the relief [s]he seeks from us” (ibid.), the appeal is moot.

A jury convicted defendant Donald Ray Kendrick of 14 counts of second degree robbery arising out of six bank robberies. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); all further statutory references are to this code.) The trial court thereafter found true allegations defendant had three serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that also served as strike priors (§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A)), and five prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It struck the prison priors for sentencing purposes only, denied defendant’s motion to strike the other priors, and sentenced defendant to 165 years to life, consisting of consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 13, plus additional five year terms for each of the three prior serious felonies.
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of necessity and abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior serious felony convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Darcy Demone Green, pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), admitted a great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.7), and was sentenced to a seven-year term. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.

On September 13, 2006, an information charged defendant and appellant Thomas Edward McGill with possession of a firearm having been previously convicted of a felony (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 1);[1] possession of an assault weapon (§ 12280, subd. (b), count 2); possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), count 3); and actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 4). The information also charged that counts 1, 2, and 3 had been committed for the benefit of a street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Moreover, the information alleged two prior offenses (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), as well as one strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).[2]
On May 7, 2009, defendant entered a guilty plea as to counts 1, 3, and 4, and admitted the gang allegations and the priors. The trial court indicated that, if defendant returned to court for sentencing, it would strike his strike prior and sentence him to a term of nine years in state prison, accruing 50 percent credits, and avoiding the maximum term of 15 years eight months in state prison, during which he would accrue credit at 85 percent.
At the sentencing hearing on February 19, 2010, the court reiterated that it had struck the strike prior and imposed a nine-year state prison sentence.