In re D.C.
Filed 8/16/13 In re D.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
D.C.,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E057908
(Super.Ct.No.
J239666)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of
Bernardino County.
Brian Saunders, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa
Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A
juvenile wardship petition was filed in San Bernardino County alleging that defendant and
appellant D.C. (minor) committed the crime of vandalism with damages under
$400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd.
(B)(2)(A), count 1.) A juvenile court
placed him on informal probation, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 654.2, with certain terms, including the completion of 40 hours of
community service, attendance at a victim’s awareness class, and payment of
victim restitution in the amount of $158.99.
later, it was reported that minor had failed to complete any of the required
terms. The court granted him an
extension to complete the requirements and ordered him to appear on August 20, 2012. Minor failed
to appear on that date. The court issued
a bench warrant, but held it until September
19, 2012, and ordered minor to appear on that date. On September
19, 2012, minor failed to appear again, so the court announced that it would
terminate the informal probation and reinstate the petition. Defense counsel objected, but later withdrew
the objection. The court terminated the
informal probation and reinstated the petition.
Defense
counsel subsequently moved to suppress minor’s statements to police, pursuant
to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). The court held a
hearing and denied the motion.
At a
jurisdictional hearing on October 25, 2012, the court found that minor
met the qualifications of Penal Code 26
submit a dispositional report prior to the next hearing.
The
probation department submitted a report, in which it stated that the parties
stipulated that the restitution amount was $158.99 when minor was granted
informal probation. However, the
victim’s mother was strained financially and could not reimburse the
victim. The victim’s mother did not feel
that probation supervision was needed, and “just want[ed] to pay the
restitution.†However, she could not
reimburse the victim at that time. The
probation officer recommended to the court that it declare minor a ward, impose
restitution terms and conditions, and then “dismiss[] as a terminal
disposition,†with the order that minor pay the victim restitution in the
amount of $158.99, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 730.6 and
730.7.
A
dispositional hearing was held on November
27, 2012. The court stated that it was
inclined to follow the probation officer’s recommendation “to do terminal
disposition with restitution terms,†but just needed confirmation that minor
had completed the community service hours he originally agreed to. The court continued the hearing for the
probation officer to submit a memorandum regarding the completed hours.
The
probation officer submitted a memorandum indicating that minor had provided
proof that he completed 10 hours, but his mother could not find the
documentation regarding the other 30 hours she said minor had also
completed. The probation officer asked
minor to “re-do†the 30 hours at his church and bring documentation to the next
hearing.
At
the continued dispositional hearing on January 8,
2013,
minor appeared with his brother. Minor’s
counsel informed the court that his mother “couldn’t make it,†and stated, “We
have the 20 hours he did at a church.â€
The court stated, “We’ll waive his appearance and terminate his
probation.†The minute order indicates
that the court read and considered the probation officer’s memorandum, and
“declared and discharged [minor] as a ward.â€
It also states that “the orders of victim restitution . . .
and/or any other court ordered fines or fees are to remain in effect until paid
in full pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 730.6/730.7
. . . .â€
Minor
filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 29, 2011, the victim heard a noise and saw that the front
window on her house was broken. She
immediately looked outside and saw three boys standing across the street. They took off running, and the victim got in
her car and followed them to the school yard.
Two of the boys stopped, and one of them kept running. The victim spoke to the two boys and called
the police. The police arrived at the
school with minor in the back seat of the patrol car. The police later brought minor’s mother to
the victim’s house. Minor’s mother
agreed to pay for the window, and the victim agreed to not press charges. Minor’s mother and the victim exchanged
information. The victim attempted to
call the victim’s mother several times, but never received any response or any
payment. The victim contacted the
police, and the police came to her house to take a report.
A
police officer went to minor’s house to speak with him about the incident. He initially spoke to minor’s mother, told
her he was conducting an investigation, and asked if he could speak with
minor. She agreed. Minor told the officer that he was with his
two friends, and they were throwing rocks.
Minor picked up a rock, threw it across the street, and broke a
window. Minor knew what he did was wrong
and was trying to sell candy bars to pay for the window.
ANALYSIS
Minor
appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent
him. Counsel has filed a brief under the
authority of
and Anders v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case
and four potential arguable issues:
(1) whether the court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements made to the police officer, in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) whether the court properly imposed probation
and ordered restitution, as reflected in the minute order, “where such orders
are not specifically set forth in the reporter’s transcriptâ€; (3) whether the
court erred in ordering restitution without considering minor’s and his
mother’s ability to pay; and (4) whether the court erred in failing to
discharge the victim restitution order upon termination of minor’s
wardship. Counsel has also requested
this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We
offered minor an opportunity to file a personal
supplemental brief, which he has not done.
Pursuant
to the mandate of People v. Kelly
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent review of the record
and find no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MILLER
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] The damaged item was a window, which the
victim had repaired at the cost of $158.99.
name="_ftn2" title="">
[2] Penal Code 26 provides that “[a]ll persons
are capable of committing crimes except . . . . [¶]
. . . Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew
its wrongfulness.â€
