CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Betsy Stansell (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court’s judgment dismissing her first amended complaint, which judgment was based on the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer of defendants and respondents (defendants)[1] without leave to amend. According to plaintiff, the trial court erred when it sustained the demurrer because the operative complaint stated viable causes of action and the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant her leave to amend.
We hold that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue all of the claims in her pleading based on events and conduct that occurred prior to the filing of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. As for plaintiff’s claims based upon the postpetition events and conduct, we hold that because the distinction between prepetition and postpetition claims was not raised or discussed in the trial court, plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend her complaint to state such claims. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer and granting plaintiff leave to amend her pleading to state claims based only on postpetition events and conduct.

Joann H. (Mother) and P.M. (appellant) are the parents of Amanda M. (born 1996) and C.M. (born 1998). Mother has two other children with a different father, Jason G., who are not parties to these proceedings. Appellant appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying his Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition contending he was not given adequate notice of the dependency proceedings.

A jury convicted defendant, Adam Delgado, of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a)).[1] The jury further found true criminal street gang, knife use and handgun use enhancements. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life in state prison plus a determinate term of one year. We affirm the judgment.

Bruce T. Mulhearn, individually and as trustee of the Grasmere Trust dated August 18, 1978, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants Lawyers Title Insurance Co. (Lawyers Title) and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (Fidelity) after the trial court sustained their demurrers without leave to amend to all causes of action. We conclude that Mulhearn stated some causes of action as trustee but none as an individual, and that as trustee he is entitled to leave to amend other causes of action. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part with directions.

Nilton Nochez, convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subdivision (a)(1)) and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)(1)), appeals his assault conviction on the ground that the court committed reversible error when it admitted prior out-of-court statements made by two witnesses. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Brian Terry (Terry), who is in propria persona, appeals from the default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo).[1] We affirm on the ground that Terry has failed to meet his burden on appeal to affirmatively show trial court error.
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)
Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court requires all appellate briefs to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” It is well-established that “‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) The opening brief contains only a single citation to the record. Because Terry has failed to provide the necessary citations to support his arguments, we deem his arguments to be forfeited.

Alexis Trinidad Rodriguez appeals a judgment of conviction of sale or transportation of methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Ventura County Superior Court Case No. 2012003514). (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11378.) We affirm.
Rodriguez also appeals an order revoking probation and imposing sentence following his conviction by guilty plea to second degree robbery, and misdemeanor disobeying a court order regarding a gang injunction, including his admission that he committed the robbery to benefit a criminal street gang (Ventura County Case No. 2009022351). (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 166, subd. (a)(4), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)[1] We affirm.

Edward Plummer, Jr. sued the Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) and one of its employees, and the trial court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Plummer appeals, and we affirm.

Roy Chaney, a parole administrator with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on Chaney’s claims for discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).[1] Chaney’s FEHA claims all relate to his administrative transfer following disagreements regarding his handling of housing restrictions on paroled sex offenders with disabilities. We affirm.

On May 11, 1998 A. Todd Hindin, Hindin’s professional corporation, David Greenberg, Greenberg’s professional corporations and Joginder Shah (collectively the Hindin parties) sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), several State Farm senior executives and its in-house and outside counsel for malicious prosecution. In mid-2004 we reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of State Farm and remanded the matter for further proceedings. (Hindin v. Rust (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1247.)[1] More than seven and one-half years later, on April 11, 2012, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss for delay in prosecution pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.320, subdivision (a)(3),[2] which establishes a mandatory three-year period for bringing a case to trial following an order on appeal granting a new trial. The Hindin parties contend they have diligently prosecuted the action and three years had not yet elapsed when the court dismissed the case against State Farm if one excludes the time during which the action was stayed or it was “impossible, impracticable, or futile” to bring it to trial, as provided in section 583.340, subdivisions (b) and (c). We affirm.

Jose Ortiz was convicted of multiple sexual offenses for sexually abusing two children. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and because his counsel improperly conceded his guilt at closing argument. We correct Ortiz’s presentence custody credits but otherwise affirm.

A jury convicted Justin Tyler Flores of one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, and found true an allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a handgun, causing great bodily injury to the victim. On appeal, Flores contends: (1) insufficient evidence supported a jury finding that he was the shooter; (2) the prosecutor engaged in numerous instances of prejudicial misconduct; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting supplemental argument on reasonable doubt in response to a jury request; (4) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on how to use evidence of uncharged offenses; (5) the court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm; (6) the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by limiting the defense to two character witnesses; (7) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (8) the trial court committed multiple sentencing errors; (9) the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment; and (10) the clerk’s transcript contains an error and must be amended to properly reflect a parole revocation fine. We modify the judgment to reflect a parole revocation fine and otherwise affirm.

A modification decision.

This appeal concerns ownership of a parking lot property known as Lot 20, which is adjacent to an apartment building on Lot 22 that is now owned by a non-profit entity for use as low-income housing. The owners of the apartment building and their predecessors believed that they held title to the parking lot since they acquired the apartment building by foreclosure in 1992.
But no. It turns out that title to the two properties diverged in the 1980’s, apparently arising from the previous owners’ inadvertent seven-year delay in recording one of the lots’ inclusion in an earlier transfer of the properties. As a result, owners of the affordable-housing apartments on Lot 22 have believed since 1992 that they owned the adjacent Lot 20 parking lot as well. Unaware of the defect in their title, they paid taxes on Lot 20, they have paid and discharged a loan that was secured by a trust deed on both properties, and they have improved, maintained, and continued to use the parking lot for the exclusive use and benefit of the apartment building’s tenants.
In 2002, however, the plaintiff foreclosed on a 1988 encumbrance on Lot 20 (which due to the earlier recording delay had been omitted from a Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) foreclosure on the Lot 22 parcel). In 2009, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to Lot 20.
The defendants appeal from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, and from its judgment rejecting their claims to title to Lot 20 by adverse possession or for an implied easement for its use as a parking lot for the benefit of the tenants of the Lot 22 apartments. We affirm the judgment with respect to adverse possession, but the judgment to the extent it rejects the claim of an implied easement is reversed.