CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal arises from a September 23, 2010 order of the family law department of the Los Angeles Superior Court (the Order) in a dissolution proceeding between petitioner Kathrin Saadian (Kathrin) and respondent George Saadian (George), along with a number of entities joined as parties, including Landmark West Enterprises, LLC (Landmark West); Shenanwood Development, Inc. (Shenanwood); Branmark Trust; and David Pasternak, temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust (Pasternak).[1] The challenged portions of the Order awarded substantial attorney fees and costs to be paid to Kathrin’s attorneys.

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
A complaint was filed alleging that defendant Bruce Doyle Buchmiller possessed methamphetamine for sale (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possessed methamphetamine (count 2; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and possessed controlled substance paraphernalia (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). It was also alleged that defendant had served three prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b); undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.)
Defendant subsequently entered a plea of no contest to count 1 in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations and a stipulated three-year term to be served in county jail. (§ 1170, subd. (h).) According to the parties’ statements at the sentencing hearing on February 25, 2013, in West Sacramento, defendant was found in possession of 1.7 grams of methamphetamine, a digital scale, a pay-owe sheet, and packaging materials.

A jury found defendant John Howell Dawson guilty of attempted child molestation and misdemeanor indecent exposure. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years of probation, subject to various conditions (including a 240-day jail term).
In his appeal, defendant asserts the prosecutor committed several instances of irremediable misconduct during closing argument, and trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make any objection to them. He also identifies several errors in the probation order’s imposition of fees and fines, which the People concede. We shall affirm the order granting probation as modified.

S&B Services, Inc. (S&B), and San Joaquin Safety Council (Safety Council) operate programs licensed by the State of California (the State) and have provided services for many years to driving under the influence (DUI) offenders on behalf of San Joaquin County (the County). After the County recommended that the State license an additional DUI program for County offenders, S&B and Safety Council (and their principals—collectively, plaintiffs) unsuccessfully sued the County and some of its personnel on various tort and contract theories, seeking to enjoin and overturn this license recommendation.
In these consolidated appeals, we shall affirm the judgments in favor of the County against plaintiffs.[1]

Dennis R. Hicks appeals from a final judgment determining that he qualifies as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and recommitting him to Napa State Hospital for a period of one year. (Pen. Code, §§ 2790, 2792.)[1] His court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and requesting this court independently review the record pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
Appellant’s counsel acknowledges that, pursuant to People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304 (Taylor), judicial review pursuant to Anders and Wende is not required in appeals from civil commitments under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDOA). (§ 2962.) Counsel believes, however, “that the California Supreme Court would, and should, reach a different result [from Taylor] in MDO cases.” Counsel also maintains that “even if Wende/Anders procedures are not required because of the similarities between MDO and criminal cases, they are required under the due process clause of the State and federal constitution.” As counsel sees it, Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 (Ben C.) and In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, which are the bases of the holding in Taylor, involve appeals in proceedings in which the risk of an erroneous result that would result from the elimination of Wende review is far less than that which would result from the elimination of such review in MDOA cases. Counsel argues, in other words, that Taylor’s analysis of the procedural protections afforded an MDO in section 2962 proceedings “overstates their significance.”
Finally, appellant argues that even if we agree with Taylor that Wende/Anders review is not required in MDO cases, we nevertheless retain discretion to conduct such review (see Ben C., at p. 553, fn. 7), and should do so.

A modification decision.

Plaintiff and appellant Jamshid Aryeh sued the Law Offices of Joseph Daneshrad (Daneshrad) for legal malpractice. Aryeh appeals after the trial court sustained a demurrer to Aryeh’s seconded amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Michael S. Cruz and Rebecca J. Cruz appeal from an order enforcing a mediation settlement agreement to dismiss their fraud action against Bank of America, N.A., Bank of American Home Loans, BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., Reconstruct Company, N.A., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-J11 (erroneously sued as C. Walt, Inc.), and Bank of New York Mellon. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) Appellants contend that the trial court erred in not rescinding the settlement agreement based on fraud, mistake, or public policy grounds. We affirm.
On May 23, 2011, appellants sued respondents for contract and fraud damages after defaulting on a $486,000 deed of trust. The complaint alleged that Bank of America, N.A. (BoA) breached its agreement to suspend the foreclosure sale, accepted mortgage payments, and fraudulently represented that appellants' home loan would be modified. Appellants claimed the foreclosure was based on a "securitized" promissory note and that respondents "no longer hold legal title to the securitized property" and were conducting a fraudulent foreclosure.
On April 19, 2012, the parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement providing that appellants would be paid $10,000 and could remain on the property until August 31, 2012, at which time it would be sold at a trustee's sale. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the trial court dismissed the action on June 7, 2012, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)
On December 27, 2012, respondents filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement after appellants refused to vacate the property. Appellants filed a cross motion to set aside the settlement agreement on the ground that the mediator and their attorney told them that the trial court had already decided the case against them.[1] Appellants also claimed that respondents breached a duty to advise them that a mortgage modification fraud action (the Mackler Qui tam action) was pending against BoA in New York.

Mahnoosh and Mehdi Maleki filed suit after colliding with a sheriff’s car in an intersection, when the deputy drove through a red light while responding to a radio call. Relying on provisions in the Vehicle Code, the trial court granted nonsuit at the close of plaintiffs’ case against the County of Los Angeles and Deputy David Waishwile.[1] We reverse. The trial court improperly weighed conflicting evidence and judged witness credibility, functions reserved to the jury. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence could support a jury verdict for plaintiffs.

Atom Petrosyan appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted a second mistrial and dismissed without prejudice his appeal of a Labor Commission unpaid wages award. We reverse because the second mistrial should not have been granted and remand for further proceedings.

Anthony Bova and Lorinda LeBlanc (plaintiffs) filed suit against Matthew and Chi Wicks (defendants). Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to disclose material facts when selling plaintiffs a duplex. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment against defendants. On appeal, defendants contend substantial evidence did not support the judgment. We affirm.

Dwight A. Trihn appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle with findings he personally used a firearm and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 246, 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c); count 1),[1] assault with a semiautomatic firearm with a finding he personally used a firearm (§§ 245, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a); count 2) and felon possessing a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury made findings each offense was committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(4)(B).) Appellant admitted that he had a prior conviction for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) that was a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and for which he had served a separate prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 55 years to life in state prison. For count 1, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, the trial court imposed a doubled base term of 15 years to life, or 30 years to life, with a consecutive determinate term of five years for the prior violent felony conviction and of 20 years for the use of a firearm, a term of 55 years to life. For count 3, felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of seven years. The term imposed for count 2 was imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654.

William Frazee made two motions to disqualify defense counsel, Bert Deixler. Both motions were denied. Frazee did not appeal the denial of his first motion, which became final and binding. Frazee is barred by res judicata from litigating the same issue. We affirm the trial court’s order rejecting Frazee’s second attempt to disqualify defense counsel.

Plaintiff Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock Co. LLC sued defendants John and Maureen Redmond in Ventura County Superior Court, and obtained a sizable judgment against them. When plaintiff attempted to enforce its judgment, defendants sought bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy, defendants claimed the California homestead exemption to protect a portion of the equity in their Los Angeles home from the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, to make fewer funds available to pay plaintiff’s judgment. Defendants’ debts were not discharged by the bankruptcy court, and ultimately, plaintiff sought to execute its judgment on defendants’ home by filing this action for the sale of their home, contending defendants could not again avail themselves of the homestead exemption. The trial court agreed, finding “there is no homeowners exemption because it was used by the judgment debtor” in bankruptcy. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff’s lien attached in 2002, giving it priority over all but the mortgage lien.
Defendants appeal the order approving the sale of their home, contending the sale order deprived them of their homestead exemption. We agree, finding no merit to plaintiff’s contention that the homestead exemption evaporates after it has been claimed in bankruptcy. Plaintiff’s novel theory that the homestead exemption may be claimed only once has no support in the homestead law. The California homestead exemption protects defendants’ equity up to the amount of the exemption even if the home is sold. The homestead exemption is not like a retail discount coupon that can only be used once. We also find that plaintiff’s lien was effective as of October 2002. We reverse the sale order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.