Kristina T. v. Super. Ct.
Filed 1/9/14
Kristina T. v. Super. Ct. CA5
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
KRISTINA T.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY,
Respondent;
MERCED
COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.
F068337
(Super. Ct. No. JP000880)
O P I N I
O N
THE COURT
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition
for extraordinary writ review.
Brian L. McCabe, Judge.
Kristina
T., in pro per., for Petitioner.
No
appearance for Respondent.
James
N. Fincher, County Counsel, and Sheri
L. Damon, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Kristina
T. in propria persona seeks extraordinary
writ relief from the juvenile court’s orders denying her
Welfare and Institutions Code
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)
setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her four-month-old son, Justin. We deny the petition.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In
August 2013, the Merced County Human
Services Agency (agency) took then newborn Justin into protective custody out
of concern his mother, Kristina, could not take care of him. According to the hospital staff, Kristina appeared
mentally unstable and delusional.
Kristina’s mother told the staff Kristina was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and refused medication and treatment because she did not believe
there was anything wrong with her. The
previous March, the agency removed Kristina’s other three minor children
because of neglect and placed them with their fathers.
The
agency filed a dependency petition on Justin’s behalf and identified Jason as
his father. Jason’s whereabouts were
unknown.
The
juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for Kristina and ordered Justin
detained. The juvenile court also
adjudged Justin a dependent child and ordered Kristina to undergo a
psychological evaluation to determine if she could benefit from reunification
services. If the result of the first
psychological evaluation was that Kristina would not benefit from services,
then the court’s order included a second evaluation. The agency placed Justin in foster care.
In
October 2013, Kristina was evaluated by two clinical psychologists who
confirmed a diagnosis of schizophrenia and opined she had a mental disability
that rendered her incapable of benefiting from reunification services. One of the psychologists stated Kristina was
experiencing a thought disorder manifested by unusual perceptual experiences,
inappropriate and constricted affect and odd, eccentric, and unusual
behavior. Kristina, however, denied
having any psychological disturbance and refused psychological treatment. Both psychologists believed that Kristina had
been suffering from psychological problems for some time, possibly years.
In
light of the psychologists’ reports, the agency recommended the juvenile court
deny Kristina reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)
because of her mental disability.
In
November 2013, the juvenile court convened the dispositional hearing. Kristina’s attorney informed the court that Kristina
had been taking psychotropic medication for almost a week and asked for a
six-week continuance so that she could be reevaluated after the medication had
taken effect. The juvenile court
declined to do so, ordered Justin removed from Kristina’s custody, denied her
reunification services as recommended, and set a section 366.26 hearing for
March 2014. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Kristina contends the juvenile court
erred in removing Justin from her custody and denying her reunification services
under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).
juvenile court to order reunification services for her and/or to return Justin to
her custody. We decline to provide
relief for the reasons we now explain.
finds “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health,
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s
parent’s ... physical custody.†(§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) The court must also
determine whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need
for the child’s removal. (§ 361, subd.
(d).)
The juvenile court can also deny a
parent reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent is described by any of the exceptions set forth in section 361.5,
subdivision (b). (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1)-(16).)
We review the juvenile court’s orders for substantial
evidence, bearing in mind that clear and convincing evidence requires a
heightened burden of proof. (In re
Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) Further, we confine our review to the record
that was before the juvenile court for consideration. (In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
Kristina in essence contends there was no
need to remove Justin from her custody because he was never in danger of being
physically, verbally or sexually abused.
Instead, she argues, he was removed because her house was dirty and she
neglected him. Further, she argues, it
was safe to return him to her custody because she was living with her mother
and her mental state had improved with medication. She included with her
writ petition a letter from her physician dated December 11, 2013, stating her
thoughts were “much more clear†since she began taking medication.
As we stated above, this court can only
review evidence considered by the juvenile court. Since the physician’s progress letter was not
before the juvenile court, we will not review it. Further, in reviewing the record, we
determine whether substantial evidence supports the order the juvenile court
made, not whether it supports a contrary order.
Here, there was compelling evidence that
Justin could not be safely returned to Kristina’s custody. According to the psychologists, she was so
delusional that she was unable to care for herself much less Justin. Further, the juvenile court was aware that
Kristina was living with her mother yet determined that placing Justin with
Kristina was not an alternative to removal.
Given the severity of Kristina’s illness at that time, the juvenile
court could reasonably conclude Justin would not be safe living with Kristina
even if the grandmother were there.
Further, substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s order denying Kristina reunification services. The juvenile court may deny a parent reunification
services under section 361.
parent suffers “from a mental disability that is described in Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the Family Code and
that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services.†(§ 361.
section 7827, subdivision (a) defines the “mentally disabled†parent as one
suffering a mental incapacity or mental disorder that renders the parent unable
to adequately care for and control the child.
A finding of mental disability must be supported by the opinion of two
mental health experts who meet the qualifications set forth in Family Code
section 7827, subdivision (c).
In this case, the juvenile court had
the expert opinion of two psychologists that Kristina suffers from a mental
disability that renders her incapable of adequately caring for Justin.
Kristina does not dispute the substance of
the psychologists’ opinions. Instead,
she offers medical information that her mental state subsequently improved with
medication. Based on that information,
she contends, the juvenile court should reevaluate whether she has a mental
disability and whether with time and proper treatment she could properly care
for Justin.
For the reason stated above, we cannot
consider the physician’s letter. Nevertheless,
Kristina may petition the juvenile court under section 388 to modify its order
denying her reunification services on the grounds that her improved mental
health constitutes a change in circumstances subsequent to the juvenile court’s
denial order. In doing so, Kristina
would also have to show that reunification services would serve Justin’s best
interests.
title="">[3]
We conclude substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s orders removing Justin from Kristina’s custody and denying her
reunification services under subdivision (b)(2) of section 361.5 and deny the
petition.
DISPOSITION
The petition for
extraordinary writ is denied. This
opinion is final forthwith as to this court.
and Detjen, J.
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
