CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Angelo Wingo raises a contention of trial error relating to jury selection, following his conviction of multiple robbery, attempted robbery and illegal use of tear gas charges, with principal armed and personal use of a firearm findings.
For the reasons discussed below, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Bobby Gerome Roston appeals from an order revoking and reinstating his parole (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a)).[1] He contends there is insufficient evidence his parole violations were “willful.” We disagree and affirm.

Defendants Darren Jarrell McFadden and Danny Robert Louis Jeffreys appeal judgments convicting them of first degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of their convictions and assert that the court made prejudicial evidentiary and instructional errors. In addition, defendants contend the case must be remanded to give them the opportunity to make a sufficient record of mitigating evidence in anticipation of their eventual youthful offender parole hearing in the 25th year of incarceration. We shall affirm the judgments and order a limited remand as requested by defendants.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of multiple felonies committed on separate occasions. Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury when it denied his motion to discharge a juror who attended the same church as a law enforcement witness for the prosecution, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm because it was not shown his gun was operable on the day the assaults were committed, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Eugene Blackwell seeks review of a judgment following his conviction by plea to selling methamphetamine. The charges arose on February 13, 2015, when defendant sold .25 grams of “crystal” methamphetamine to an undercover police officer. Defendant was charged by felony complaint with one count of selling a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a). He was twice released on “Supervised Own Recognizance” but on April 11, 2016, after the second reported violation of the conditions of his release, that status was revoked.
On July 13, 2016, after being advised of his trial rights, defendant pleaded no contest to the charge. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years, conditioned on service of four months in county jail and avoidance of specifically defined areas of San Jose during his probation.[1] He was also ordered to refrain from possessing f

Defendant Socorrito Gurolla Franco pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale and driving with a suspended license. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted a three-year term of probation with eight months in county jail. Among other probation conditions, the court imposed conditions making Franco’s cellular phones subject to warrantless searches and requiring her to provide any passwords or access codes to facilitate such searches.
Franco challenges these conditions as overbroad in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. She contends a more narrowly tailored condition would serve the state’s purposes while still protecting valid privacy interests. We find this argument persuasive. Accordingly, we will narrow the probation condition to allow for a warrantless search of Franco’s cell phone limited to text messages, e-mails, voicemails, social media accounts,

A modification decision.

The primary issue on this appeal is what appellant Patricia J. Minkin and respondent Robert A. Minkin intended by the term “annual bonus” when they agreed in 2004 that Robert would pay Patricia 41 percent of his annual bonuses as additional spousal support for the following 10 years.[1] A few years later, Robert switched jobs and his compensation package changed from simply a salary and potential annual bonus to a package that included several different components. Patricia brought a motion to determine support arrearages to resolve a dispute between the parties over which components of Robert’s compensation constituted annual bonuses under their stipulation. As explained below, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation that an annual bonus is a discretionary payment based upon performance, and not, as Patricia argued, all payments above base salary. We therefore affirm the court’s order that Robert underpaid Patricia by approximately $200,000, but not the roughly $7

Narciso Garcia appeals from an order granting defendant Pexco, LLC’s (Pexco) motion to compel arbitration. Garcia opposed the motion on the ground Pexco was not a party to the arbitration agreement. We find Garcia is equitably estopped from denying Pexco’s right to arbitrate and the agency exception applies. We affirm the order of the trial court compelling arbitration between Pexco and Garcia.

A jury convicted defendant Isaac Krivashei of two counts of lewd acts on a child and one count of possession of child pornography. The court imposed a prison term of 10 years and eight months, consisting of the upper term of eight years on count 1, and consecutive two-year term on count 2, and eight months on count 3.
Defendant challenges the court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We agree the court erred in part. Nevertheless, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgment.

In the course of evading police, defendant Cristopher Macario Zuniga crashed into a recreational trailer and van. Defendant pled no contest to felony evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). He was sentenced to three years of formal probation, which included 120 days in the county jail.
In a contested restitution hearing, the owner of the damaged trailer and van testified that he and his family lived in the trailer; and that many items, such as a piano, speakers, projector, mirror, mattress, curtains, typewriter, and a dishwasher, all of which were in good condition, were completely damaged by the impact of the collision. He presented two estimates for repairing the trailer and van and replacing the damaged contents. The first was for $5,695, which included the repair of exterior damage to the trailer and van. The second was for $30,000, which also included a remodel of the kitchen, bathroom, floors, and walls of the trailer. The owner also claimed that he incu

Plaintiff and respondent Kamanchi Enyong filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action[1] under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) against defendant and appellant Westlake Services, LLC d/b/a Westlake Financial Services, and seven other entities (collectively Westlake).[2] The trial court denied Westlake’s petition to compel arbitration, finding the agreement to arbitrate unconscionable. We conclude the arbitration agreement contains only one unconscionable term, which may be severed, and reverse the order denying the petition to compel arbitration.

In 1999, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Ricardo Estrada of evading a peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant was also found to have served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and suffered two prior convictions as defined in the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12 subds. (a)–(d)). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life.[2]
After the 2012 passage of Proposition 36 (the “Three Strikes Reform Act,” hereafter “the Act”), defendant filed a petition under section 1170.126 to recall his indeterminate sentence and to be resentenced as a second strike offender. The trial court denied the petition, finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.