CA Unpub Decisions

On May 12, 2006, a jury convicted defendant, Sirlasie Rayshon Curry, of two counts of peace officer assault with a semiautomatic weapon and one count of firearm possession by a felon. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 245, subd. (d)(2); former §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The jury further found true allegations defendant personally used a firearm in committing the assaults. (§§ 2022.5, subds. (a), (d); 12022.53, subd. (b).) We modified and affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v. Curry (Jan. 14, 2008, B194321) [nonpub. opn.].) As modified on appeal, defendant was sentenced to 24 years, 8 months in state prison.
At sentencing on October 4, 2006, the trial court awarded defendant credit for 666 days in presentence custody plus 100 days for good conduct. Ten years later, on April 25, 2016, defendant filed a motion in the trial court to correct his presentence credits. (§ 1237.1.) Defendant argued he was entitled to credit for 675 days in presentence custody plus 101 days

Agneta Dobos appeals from the judgment entered following the trial court’s denial of her petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking reversal of the decision of the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) rejecting her application for a service-connected disability retirement. We affirm.

Defendant Avery Maurice Jones appeals his conviction for sale of a controlled substance, asserting that the trial court’s erroneous admission of hearsay statements resulted in reversible error. Defendant also requests this Court to review the trial court’s ruling on his Pitchess motion. We affirm because admission of the statements, if error, was harmless, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the Pitchess motion.

The mother, C.M., appeals from August 27, 2015 Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) jurisdictional and dispositional orders. The mother is the great paternal aunt and adoptive mother of the child, T.M. The mother contends: the juvenile court erred by refusing to continue the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, which she did not attend; she is entitled to have the jurisdictional order reversed because her counsel, Vincent Davis, acted ineffectively; Mr. Davis acted ineffectively because he failed to present any evidence at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing; and it was error for the juvenile court to find that the mother’s preferred counsel, Joni Saloman, was not competent to provide representation during dependency proceedings. We affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

Plaintiff and appellant Michael Herman (Herman) appeals from the judgment against him after a five-day bench trial. Herman sued defendants and respondents Transcendigital, Inc. (TDI) and Joel Tucker (Tucker) (collectively respondents) seeking dissolution of TDI, an equitable accounting, and breach of fiduciary duty against Tucker. Herman raises numerous challenges to the judgment in his lengthy opening brief. We affirm.

Defendant, Roscoe Williams, appeals from his judgment of conviction. On September 25, 2015, defendant was convicted by jury trial of one count of felony false imprisonment and one count of criminal threats. (Pen. Code[1], §§ 236-237, 422, subd. (a).) The jury also found as to both counts defendant used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) We affirm the judgment, as modified.

Current and former employees of an ambulance service company sued their employer, alleging that its meal and rest period policies violate California law. Their complaint alleges claims on behalf of a proposed class as well as non-class claims concerning those same meal and rest period policies under Labor Code section 2698 et seq., the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).
Before us is plaintiffs’ appeal of the trial court’s denial of their motion for class certification. The appeal raises two issues. First, is the order denying class certification appealable under the “death knell” doctrine, where plaintiffs’ PAGA claims remain pending? Second, did the trial court err in denying class certification? We will exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a writ petition, and therefore we need not decide the first question. We conclude that the trial court’s denial of class certification rests in part on an incorrect legal assumption about the nat

On June 27, 1996, defendant and appellant Jesse Washington was convicted of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459).[1] He is currently serving a 35‑years-to-life Three Strikes sentence arising out of that conviction. Following the enactment of Proposition 47, Washington petitioned on July 8, 2016, for resentencing on this conviction. On August 3, 2016, the trial court denied Washington’s petition, stating that Washington’s burglary conviction rendered him ineligible for Proposition 47 relief. Washington filed a timely notice of appeal.
We appointed counsel to represent Washington on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel filed an opening brief requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441. We directed counsel to send the record on appeal and a copy of the opening brief to Washington, and notified defendant he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or iss

Alajandro Valasquez (also known as Alex Neiman) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one count of forcible rape (count 1 (Elizabeth W.), Pen. Code,[1] § 261, subd. (a)(2)); one count of forcible sodomy (count 2 (Elizabeth W.), § 286, subd. (c)(2)); two counts of aggravated kidnapping (count 3 (Leslie C.), count 10 (Krystle L.), § 209, subd. (b)(1)); four counts of forcible oral copulation (count 4 (Leslie C.), count 9 (Norma G.), count 12 (Krystle L.), count 15 (Elizabeth W.), § 288a, subd. (c)(2)); and one count of assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, and oral copulation (count 16 (Krystle L.), § 220, subd. (a)). The jury further found true the multiple victim allegations as to counts 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, and 15 (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)), the kidnapping allegations as to counts 4 and 12 (§667.61, subds. (a), (d)), and a personal firearm use allegation as to count 9 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Prior to sentencing, appellant mo

In this declaratory relief action concerning the payment of judicial salaries and benefits, defendants and appellants John Chiang, Controller of the State of California (the Controller);[1] the Judges’ Retirement System (JRS); and the Judges’ Retirement System II (JRS II)[2] appeal from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Robert M. Mallano (plaintiff), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons (collectively, plaintiffs), ordering that plaintiffs are entitled to payments and benefits based on the formula set forth in Government Code section 68203[3] for the fiscal years 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016. Defendants also appeal the award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
We affirm the judgment and the attorney fees award.

The father, Daniel M., appeals from the jurisdictional findings and a custody order. The father argues the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it did not comply with the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody and Enforcement Act. (Fam. Code[1], § 3400 et seq.) The father also argues the juvenile court erred by failing to contact a Mexican court after obtaining temporary emergency jurisdiction.
We affirm the jurisdictional findings and custody orders. This includes the order denying the father visitation with the child. Upon remittitur issuance, the juvenile court is to contact and provide notice on an expedited basis to a Mexican court of these proceedings. If the Mexican court does not issue a custody order after contact and notice, the present jurisdictional findings and subsequent custody order will become the final child custody determination. (In re Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 966-967 (Gino C.); In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, 599-

Plaintiff and appellant Payman Emamian appeals a judgment following a grant of a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants and respondents Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Holders of the Bella Vista Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1 (BONY) (collectively, defendants).
Because Emamian failed to meet his burden as the appellant to present an adequate record for review, the judgment must be affirmed.

On March 19, 2015, about 9:00 a.m., Jeffery Deandre Davis (Davis) entered the JS Liquor Store at 1005 West Century Boulevard in Los Angeles and stole a bag of chips. Davis was well-known to the store’s owner, Kevin Choi. Davis had frequented the store for years and shoplifted from the establishment many times.[1] Wayne Berry, a store employee, also knew Davis. Berry had worked at the store for six years before Choi bought it. Berry first noticed Davis back in 2009, when Davis stole beer from the store.[2] At all times in question, Davis had been and remained banned from the store due to his conduct.
On March 20, 2015, at 7:40 a.m., Davis entered the store and once again stole a bag of chips. Berry chased after Davis until Davis reached the other side of Century Boulevard. Berry then returned to the store. About 11:25 a.m. that same day, Davis entered the store yet again, grabbed some items off a shelf, and ran out of the store.[3] Davis ran across Century Boulevar

Appellant Liping Lin was a student at respondent Pepperdine University. Two intoxicated undergraduate students revealed to Pepperdine that there had been a party involving alcohol at the residence where Lin lived. Lin and his housemates were found responsible for violating a section of Pepperdine’s student conduct code that forbade students from hosting, promoting, or assisting any gathering involving underage drinking. Lin appealed through Pepperdine’s internal appeal process, and the findings were upheld. Lin then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, and Pepperdine’s findings were again upheld. Lin appealed.
We affirm. Lin argues that Pepperdine’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. In the light of the whole record, including Lin’s acknowledgment that he knew details about the party beforehand and promoted it on Facebook, and his housemates’ statements that all housemates contributed to certain aspects of the party,