CA Unpub Decisions

The charges were tried to a jury in 1999. The jury found defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter and evading a police officer causing injury.[2] The jury also found true certain enhancement allegations alleged in the information against defendant, namely, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the evading an officer offense (§ 12022.7(c)) and that he had suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12 (commonly referred to as the “Three Strikes law”). The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life in prison.[3]
Years later, in 2013, defendant petitioned for recall of his sentence under section 1170.126, which was enacted in 2012 as part of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act. The District Attorney opposed the petition, arguing defendant was ineligible for relief under section 1170.126, subdivision (b) because the commitment offenses of

Elza Orin Pittman (Pittman) appeals from a judgment finding him to a be sexually violent predator (SVP) (as defined as in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq.) and committing him to the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term of appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility.
In 1958, Pittman pleaded guilty to fondling a nine-year-old boy (Pen. Code, § 288); at the time, Pittman was 19 years old. In 1959, just one year later, Pittman pleaded guilty to fondling two 13-year-old boys (Pen. Code, § 288).
In 2001, more than 30 years after his last molestation conviction, Pittman again pleaded guilty to sexually molesting a male child (Pen. Code, §§ 288, 288.5). In this instance,the molestation continued for approximately six years, from when the victim was 10 until he was 16 years old. The People also charged Pittman with molesting the victim’s younger stepbrother for approximately four years; those charges

Luis C. (Father), a resident of California, and Maria M. (Mother), a resident of Mexico, are the parents of Y.C. Y.C. was born in Mexico in 2006, and she had always lived there with her Mother. When Y.C. was nine, Mother allowed Y.C. to travel to the United States for a several-month-long visit with her paternal grandmother. During that visit, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) learned the grandmother allowed Father—who had a pending dependency case involving other children—to take Y.C. to his home, and that once there, Father refused to return the child to her grandmother. DCFS responded by taking custody of Y.C. and commencing dependency proceedings, which concluded with juvenile court orders awarding custody of Y.C. to Mother, directing the child’s return Mexico, and terminating jurisdiction. We consider whether the orders must be reversed because the juvenile court did not contact the court system in Mexico before making its final cu

Sandra R. (Mother) appeals from a February 2, 2016 juvenile court order declaring her children Vanessa M., Luis M., David M., and Angel M. dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300 and removing them from Mother’s custody.
After Mother filed her opening brief, the juvenile court, in an order dated August 2, 2016, returned Vanessa M., Luis M., and David M. to Mother. On August 18, 2016, the court terminated its jurisdiction of Angel M. The court granted Mother sole legal custody of all four children.[2]
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. We conclude that the issues Mother raises are moot, and we dismiss the appeal.

Edris Issagholian and Richard Avakyan, former business partners who jointly operated two Sprint cellular telephone stores, sued each other after a falling out. Following a three-day bench trial, the court awarded Issagholian $35,000 for damages arising from Avakyan’s misconduct and $18,304 to Avakyan for wrongfully withheld commissions from the business. Avakyan appeals, arguing the court erred in finding him liable for $8,700 in misspent company funds and failing to award him additional profits. We affirm.

Saul Ambriz and Andoreni Lazaro Ocampo were convicted following a jury trial of second degree murder. On appeal Ocampo contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and raises a number of other challenges to his conviction, including improper instructions, evidentiary error, juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Ambriz argues only that the trial court improperly admitted gang expert testimony.[1] We affirm.

The collapse of much of our country’s home lending market over the last decade produced rubble of varying compositions. The debris in this case included an old fashioned Ponzi scheme. When one perpetrator’s bankruptcy and a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation effectively eliminated suit against the schemers, the borrowers here sued their lender on various common law theories, asserting generally the lender had made a loan the lender knew the borrowers could not repay. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding no triable issue of fact existed that the lender was in cahoots with the Ponzi operators, nor was the lender liable under any other theory. We agree with the trial court and affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The superior court denied a criminal defendant’s request for an in camera review of a correctional officer’s personnel files on the ground that the factual scenario suggested by the defendant was not “plausible.”We conclude the superior court employed too restrictive a definition of the word “plausible” and, in effect, required the defendant to speculate about the officer’s motives. We therefore reverse its decision and direct it to conduct the requested in camera review.

Following his conviction for carrying a loaded firearm in violation of Penal Code section 25850(a),[1] defendant Calvin Alexis Garcia was placed on felony probation. He contends the trial court erred by imposing probation conditions that are unconstitutionally vague because they lack an express knowledge requirement. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494(Hall) and we gave the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs discussing its application to this case. Although defendant now concedes that under the doctrine of stare decisis we are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455), he urges us to distinguish that decision. He notes that the weapons condition in Hall applied only to concealable weapons while here, he is barred from possessing any weapons. We disagree that this admittedly “narrow” distinction requires a different result and accord

Ann Drobner Darsky (Drobner) and Aaron Darsky were married in 2005 and separated in 2010. They have two children, who were five and three years old when the couple separated. In December 2010, Drobner petitioned for dissolution of their marriage. Over three years of litigation in San Francisco County family court followed. On August 29, 2014, the court issued findings and an order regarding certain financial disputes between Drobner and Darsky, ruling mostly in Darsky’s favor.
Drobner appeals from these findings and order, contending the family court had previously and finally resolved certain issues in an August 1, 2011 order, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from modifying this previous order except prospectively and even then only by proper notice of motion or order to show cause. Drobner further argues that the parties agreed to bear their own attorney fees and costs as of the date of the August 1, 2011 order and the trial court lacked authority to

J.W., the father of A.W., has filed a petition in propria persona, seeking extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services and setting the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] permanency planning hearing. Petitioner contends that the order was erroneous because he is incarcerated. He also seeks a stay of the order until he can make contact with the attorney who represented him in the proceedings below. As father has shown no grounds for writ relief under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452,[2] the petition will be denied.

Defendant Michael Anthony Rodriguez pleaded no contest to felony resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code § 69)[1] and misdemeanor petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a)). As called for by the plea agreement, the trial court placed defendant on probation for three years subject to various conditions, including gang conditions, to which defense counsel unsuccessfully objected. The court also ordered defendant to pay a $450 restitution fine. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, which indicated that his appeal was based on his sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.
Defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asked this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We notified defendant of his right to submit a written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so.
After independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no ar

J.R. (mother) appeals from the court’s orders taking dependency jurisdiction over her son, 11-year-old E.R., and removing him from her physical custody. She contends the court erred by proceeding with the noticed jurisdiction hearing in her absence. She also challenges the evidentiary support for the court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order removing E.R. from her home. We affirm.

In 2002 defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of discharging a firearm with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 246.3),[1] possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of an assault weapon (former § 12280, subd. (b), now § 30605, subd. (a)). He admitted the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant admitted three prior strike convictions and a prison prior. The minutes reflect defendant was “advised of the possible consequences of plea affecting deportation and citizenship.” Defendant signed a plea form and put his initials inside a box next to the following statement, “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States the conviction for the offense charged will have the consequence of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” On the same form, defen