CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion addressed to all four of causes of action in plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court granted it, and dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Appellant Jason Littlefield contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination that loan proceeds received during the parties’ marriage were his separate property. Because he has not provided this court an adequate record on appeal, we reject his claim.

The juvenile court denied O.T.’s (the minor) motion to suppress, and he admitted misdemeanor possession of metal knuckles (Pen. Code, § 21810).[1] The court declared the minor a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placed him on probation with various conditions.
The minor appeals. He contends: (1) the court violated his constitutional due process rights by “assum[ing] the role of the prosecutor” and questioning the prosecution witness at the suppression hearing; (2) the court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and (3) certain probation conditions are vague and overbroad. We modify one probation condition. As modified, we affirm.

Defendant Jose Juan Luna appeals from his judgment of conviction after a remand for resentencing (case No. H043296) and from the trial court’s subsequent order correcting the judgment of conviction for errors related to fines and fees (case No. H044111).[1] In both cases, counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Defendant was notified of his right to submit written arguments in both appeals within 30 days. Thirty days have elapsed, and we have not received any letter briefs from defendant. Pursuant to Wende, we have conducted a review of the record in both case Nos. H043296 and H044111 and find no arguable issues. We affirm the judgments.

A jury convicted defendant Kenneth Gary Mendenhall of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §245, subd. (a)(1)); counts 3, 4, and 6), one count of domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 5), two counts of dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(2); counts 7 and 8), one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 9), one count of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a); count 11), and four counts of violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 12, 13, 14, and 15). The jury acquitted defendant of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2). The jury found true an allegation that defendant had a prior conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23540). The trial court found two prior prison term allegations to be true (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Defendant David Wayne Ashford was convicted by jury of grand theft auto (Pen. Code[1] §§ 484, 487, subd. (d)(1), a felony); theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), a felony); possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), a misdemeanor); and possession of drug paraphernalia (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1, a misdemeanor). The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant three years’ formal probation. The conditions of defendant’s probation included that he not use controlled substances, including marijuana, and that he serve eight months in jail.

Defendant Ralph Edward Baldenegro was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after a jury convicted him of first degree murder of Julie Bucalo (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found true two special circumstance allegations under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17): that the murder was committed while defendant was committing or attempting to commit a first degree burglary and a rape.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) restricting his cross-examination of the prosecution’s DNA expert; (2) admitting hearsay statements made by Bucalo; (3) admitting evidence of uncharged offenses; (4) admitting evidence of uncharged offenses during the prosecution’s rebuttal case; and (5) excluding evidence of third party culpability involving Bucalo’s boyfriend and her dog. Defendant also contends the prosecutor violated his due process rights by failing to turn over exculpatory evidence. Finally, he contends there was cumulative prejudice.

At a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared A.G. a dependent child, removed her from M.G.’s (Mother) custody, placed A.G. with her father (Father), gave Father sole legal custody, and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother appeals from only the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding Father sole legal custody. She argues this ruling was an abuse of discretion because it was premature and the evidence demonstrated jurisdiction was necessary to protect A.G. We affirm the judgment.

It is well established that the primary function of an appellate court is to review the record of the trial court for errors of law. (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262.) Consequently, we generally review “the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.” (In re James V. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 300, 304.)
Here, Jack Hinds III sued Danny Nguyen for injuries arising from a traffic collision. Before trial, the trial court excluded a recorded statement Hinds had made to his own insurance carrier. The court found Hinds’ statement was protected under the attorney-client privilege and the privilege had not been waived. The jury later found Nguyen negligent and awarded Hinds damages.
On appeal, Nguyen contends that the trial court erroneously excluded Hinds’ statement. But Nguyen’s arguments, as well as the recorded statement

Bonnie Kent (Bonnie) sued several entities she believed helped facilitate her now-deceased husband’s decision to obtain a reverse mortgage on their residence in Yorba Linda (the Property) without her knowledge or consent. In 2012 James Kyle Kent Jr. (James), acting as the trustee of the James Kyle Kent, Jr., One Way Trust dated November 9, 2008 (One Way Trust), obtained a reverse mortgage loan and forged Bonnie’s name on several loan-related documents.Bonnie and James’s daughter, Teri Sue Kent Love (Love), filed the lawsuit in their individual capacities and as the One Way Trust’s successor co-trustees (hereafter, Bonnie and Love will be referred to jointly as the co-trustees unless the context requires otherwise). Jacob Kent, a minor and the sole beneficiary of the One Way Trust was later added to the lawsuit via his guardian ad litem James K. Kent III (collectively they will be referred to in the singular as Jacob).

Plaintiff and appellant Rogene Clark took a medical leave of absence from her job with defendant and respondent Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian (Hoag) to recover from severe stress, anxiety, and depression. While Clark was on leave, Hoag sent her a letter explaining she had exhausted Hoag’s six-month leave of absence policy, and gave Clark a deadline to return to work or lose her position. In response, Clark’s psychologist sent Hoag a letter stating Clark was “totally and temporarily disabled” for the next five weeks, at which point she would be reevaluated. Hoag’s human resources representatives who received this letter interpreted it as a request to extend Clark’s leave for that five-week period. Hoagnonetheless terminated Clark’s employment because she had exhausted the maximum amount of leave allowed under Hoag’s leave of absence policy and failed to return to work by Hoag’s deadline. Hoag never contacted Clark or her psychologist to discuss the psycholog

Saddleback Inn, LLC (Saddleback) sued its insurer, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, Syndicate 570 and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, Subscribing to Certificate No. ATR/C/119559 (collectively referred to as Underwriters), after Underwriters refused to pay a claim for fire loss. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court reformed the insurance policy to include Saddleback as a named insured. Underwriters paid Saddleback $2,884,583 after the ruling. In the second phase of trial, the jury found Underwriters liable for bad faith and awarded $50,000 in punitive damages. The trial court then awarded Saddleback its attorney fees and costs. Underwriters appeal the bad faith finding and the award of attorney fees, but do not dispute the reformation cause of action. We find no error and affirm the judgment in all aspects.

Based on incidents on April 27, 2014, and May 9, 2014, Billy Eugene Childers, Jr., was convicted of robbery, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. In this appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and being a felon in possession of ammunition. We agree with Childers about the ammunition possession charge but not the firearm possession charge.

In October 2014, six children (J.M., D.M., S.C., G.M., B.C., and B.M.), came to the attention of the San Bernardino Children and Family Services (CFS) following an incident in which mother’s significant other, the father of the youngest child, fired shots in the back yard of the family residence, resulting in his arrest. CFS filed a dependency petition based on the shooting, with allegations relating to the filthy conditions of the house, which had no running water, as well as the parents’ unsafe lifestyle (with a large marijuana grow in the back yard), excessive corporal punishment, and sexual abuse of the oldest daughter by the incarcerated stepfather.