CA Unpub Decisions

A juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over then-13-year-old Virginia G. because she had been the victim of physical and emotional abuse. Antonio G. (father) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as well as the court’s order allowing Leslie G. (mother) to make educational decisions for Virginia in the first instance subject to father’s input. We conclude there is no error, and affirm.

Roderick Wade (defendant) appeals his convictions for committing various sex crimes against four different girls. He argues that the trial court erred (1) in not severing the counts involving one of his then-wife’s sisters, and (2) in instructing the jury, under Evidence Code section 1108,[1]that it may consider each of the charged offenses as evidence of his propensity to commit the other charged offenses. There was no error. Accordingly, we affirm his 447 year and 4 month prison sentence, but do so with instructions to modify the abstract of judgment to impose the correct amount of fees.

Defendant and appellant Simon Vega appeals his conviction of murder committed in the course of a kidnapping. On appeal, he raises issues of evidentiary and instructional error, which we reject, and uncontested sentencing errors, which we accept. We modify the judgment to resolve the sentencing errors and otherwise affirm.

Kevin Deon Adams (defendant) committed two sets of crimes soon after his 18th birthday—he kidnapped, raped and tried to murder a woman, then a month later opened fire on two other young men. Defendant now complains that he is entitled to a hearing, pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), at which he can create a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth for later use at a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.[1]The People have pointed out that defendant’s aggravated sex crime convictions render him ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, so defendant raises two new arguments in his reply brief—namely, (1) that denying aggravated sex offenders a youth offender parole hearing violates equal protection, and (2) his total combined prison sentence of 18 years and 4 months, plus 120 years to life, plus two life sentences constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the law constraining the length of juvenile sentences. W

Plaintiff Joseph Daneshrad appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing Daneshrad’s case after the court sustained Defendant Marlo Van Oorschot’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm because the statute of limitations bars Daneshrad’s causes of action.

A modification decision.

Following their separation, the juvenile court awarded custody of a couple’s four children to husband. The family court ordered wife to pay husband child support based on her imputed income, declined to award any spousal support, and determined that the family residence was community property to be divided between the spouses; because wife had engaged in a series of unauthorized transactions to get title to the family home in her own name and also never collected rent while she had exclusive possession of the house, the court also awarded attorney’s fees and damages for waste. Wife appeals each of these rulings. Because her arguments lack merit, we affirm with a minor modification to the judgment.

Darryl Mason (defendant) appeals his convictions for possessing two kilograms of cocaine and more than $68,000 in drug proceeds. He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, but instead challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion to acquire law enforcement personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), his motions to dismiss due to the prosecution’s deportation of a material witness and the failure to maintain the cash seized from his house for fingerprinting, his motion to unseal the sealed portion of the affidavit to the search warrant that led to the discovery of the drugs and cash in his house, and his motion to suppress his post-arrest confession. Defendant also argues that the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects the sentence imposed. Only defendant’s final argument has merit. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions and sentence, but order the abstract of judgment to be modified to reflect

Darryl Mason (defendant) appeals his convictions for possessing two kilograms of cocaine and more than $68,000 in drug proceeds. He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, but instead challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion to acquire law enforcement personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), his motions to dismiss due to the prosecution’s deportation of a material witness and the failure to maintain the cash seized from his house for fingerprinting, his motion to unseal the sealed portion of the affidavit to the search warrant that led to the discovery of the drugs and cash in his house, and his motion to suppress his post-arrest confession. Defendant also argues that the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects the sentence imposed. Only defendant’s final argument has merit. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions and sentence, but order the abstract of judgment to be modified to reflect

Defendant and appellant William Arthur Clark appeals from the order denying his post-judgment “motion for resentencing.” Clark was convicted in 2007 of possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a controlled substance (two counts), and manufacturing a controlled substance, with arming in commission of a drug offense, prior prison term, prior serious felony conviction, and prior drug conviction findings. (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, 12022, 667.5, 667, subd. (b)–(i); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11370.2, subd. (b), 11379.6.)[1] He was sentenced to state prison for 30 years. We affirmed his convictions and his sentence. (People v. Clark (May 29, 2008, B199861) [nonpub. opn.].)
On July 29, 2015, Clark filed a motion in the trial court asking to be resentenced (post-judgment motion). The trial court entered an order denying the motion, and it is from this order that Clark now appeals.
As we discuss, we find no error, and thus we affirm.

In this dependency action, the mother (appellant R.M.), half-brother (mother’s son, appellant Paul M.), and presumed father (appellant Jeff P.) of dependent minors L.P. and E.P. appealed from orders terminating parental rights, freeing L.P. and E.P. for adoption, and denying petitions for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 366.26, 388.)[1]
In order to terminate the parental rights of a non-offending, non-custodial presumed father, the law requires a finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to place the children with that parent. We conclude that the order terminating father’s parental rights must be reversed because it is not supported by a proper finding of detriment. The order selecting adoption as the permanent plan also is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
As to mother and Paul, the case is now final. We conclude mother has not demonstrated the existence of reversible error, and

This is the second appeal in a special proceeding for distribution of surplus proceeds of the 2003 trustee’s sale of a condominium. The foreclosure trustee, R.E.F.S., Inc., deposited the proceeds with the superior court under Civil Code section 2924j.[1] At the time of the trustee’s sale, appellants G. Gregory Williams and Plernpit Polpantu lived in the condominium and claimed to own it. Respondent Eli Levi, who bought the property at the trustee’s sale, later obtained a money judgment against appellants and sought release of the surplus funds in the section 2924j proceeding. Appellants challenge two orders — dated April 29, 2014 and September 2, 2015 — that released the funds to Levi.
We conclude that while Levi may have other remedies against appellants based on his 2008 money judgment, he is not entitled to the surplus funds in the section 2924j proceeding, as that proceeding is intended to provide a speedy remedy to holders of junior liens on the property that were

Plaintiff Maria Gale appeals from a judgment entered following an order granting summary judgment. Plaintiff sued her landlord, defendant Masih Hashemi, for negligence. Plaintiff and Richard Seff were defendant’s tenants—plaintiff lived in the main house and Seff in the adjacent guest house.Plaintiff was injured as a result of Seff’s assaultand battery. Plaintiff alleged defendant was responsiblefor her injuries because defendant knew Seff was dangerous and failed to take any action to preventhim from acting out.
Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 437c. Defendant asserted he had no duty to protect plaintiff from unforeseen criminal conduct. We agree with defendant and affirm the judgment.

In case number SCUKCRCR 1684543 (hereinafter case number 1684543), the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant Armando Quiroga with the felony offenses of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), with a related allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
In case number SCUKCRCR 1684971 (hereinafter case number 1684971), the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint charging defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); manufacture of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), with a related allegation that he had suffered a prior felony conviction of Health and Safety Code section 11352 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370, subd. (a)); and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), with related a