CA Unpub Decisions

In a prior writ proceeding, we held that the good faith settlement statute (Code Civ. Proc., 877.6) applies to settlements by joint tortfeasors notwithstanding the existence of related criminal proceedings, and directed the trial court to hear and determine the merits of the settling tortfeasors motion. (Bob Parrett Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1180.) The trial court, in turn, found the settlement was made in good faith and dismissed the nonsettling tortfeasors complaint, including its nonindemnity causes of action on the ground that they were nothing more than artfully pleaded claims for indemnity. We affirm.

The minor, D. J. D., appeals from the February 14, 2007 order declaring him to be a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and placing him in a suitable placement. The juvenile court sustained the allegation of a delinquency petition filed May 31, 2006, charging the minor with a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).) The juvenile court declared the offense a felony and set the minors maximum confinement time at eight years. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Richard Bradford was convicted by jury of sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to state prison for the midterm of four years for the controlled substance sale. His sentence was enhanced by three years based upon defendants admission of a prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). In this timely appeal, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument to the jury by comparing defendants conduct to that of a Columbian drug cartel. Defendant also requests this court to conduct an independent review of the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing pertaining to his motion for discovery pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Court hold the prosecutors argument was neither improper nor prejudicial, and there was no error committed in the in camera hearing on the Pitchess motion. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Norberto Medina pled no contest to second degree robbery, pursuant to a plea bargain, and thereafter tried unsuccessfully to withdraw the plea. He appealed. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) raising no issues. Appellant was notified that he could file his own supplemental brief and has done so. He also filed, in propria persona, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, In re Medina, No. B202061 (hereafter the writ petition). We will consider the writ petition along with the appeal. Appellant was charged with carjacking, a serious felony (count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (count 2); and possession of ammunition by a person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm (count 3). A 2001 conviction for robbery was alleged as a prior strike and for the purpose of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 667.5, subdivision (b).
On January 19, 2007, the court heard appellants motion to withdraw the plea. His counsel explained that appellant wanted to have a jury trial because he believed he was guilty of no more than joyriding. After hearing argument, the court found that the plea was valid because it fell within an exception of section 1192.7, as the jury might have convicted appellant of joyriding. It further ruled that appellant did not have the right to change his mind after accepting the plea. Appellant was then sentenced to the nine year prison sentence specified in the plea with credit for time served. The remaining allegations were dismissed. This appeal followed.
The judgment is affirmed.

Keith W. appeals from the April 3, 2007 orders denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights to E.B. He contends the court erred in finding: (1) he was neither E.B.s presumed father nor a Kelsey S. father,and therefore not entitled to reunification services; (2) no changed circumstances warranted granting his section 388 petition to modify the order denying him reunification services; and (3) the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception did not apply. Court affirm.

John C. appeals the orders declaring Tyler C. a dependent of the juvenile court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 300, subdivision (b) and the findings under section 361 that substantial danger existed to the physical and emotional well-being of his son, and no reasonable means existed to protect the minor without their removal from John C.s custody. John C. claims sufficient evidence did not support the courts jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. John C. also claims the case should have been resolved in the family law court rather than the juvenile dependency court. John C.s claims lack merit. The court did not err in concluding John C. had used excessive discipline, abused alcohol and illegally discharged a firearm in a manner that placed Tyler C. at risk. In addition, the court did not err in removing the minor from John C. under section 361. Sufficient evidence existed to support the courts finding John C. still posed a substantial risk of harm to the child. Finally, in view of the allegations in the petition and the evidence supporting them, this matter was properly before the juvenile dependency court. Consequently, Court affirm.

Tammy N. (mother) appeals from the orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]for return of S. K. (Tino) and M. D. (Mark) to her custody and terminating parental rights under section 366.26 to Tino, Mark, and I. S. (Jay). Mother contends the denial of her section 388 petition was an abuse of discretion and notice of the proceedings was not given as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the ICWA) (92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963). Court affirm.

Tammy N. (mother) appeals from the orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]for return of S. K. (Tino) and M. D. (Mark) to her custody and terminating parental rights under section 366.26 to Tino, Mark, and I. S. (Jay). Mother contends the denial of her section 388 petition was an abuse of discretion and notice of the proceedings was not given as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the ICWA) (92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963). Court affirm.

Douglas Densal Brown appeals from the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count of burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460) and one count of resisting an officer ( 69). The trial court sentenced him to two concurrent middle terms of two years for the substantive offenses enhanced by two years for the prior prison terms. The court gave appellant 408 days of presentence credits and imposed restitution fines and drug program and laboratory fees.

Defendant and appellant, Marcelo L. (father), appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights to D.L. and S.L. (the children). Father contends the juvenile court erroneously ruled that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)[1]did not apply to this case, and that the order terminating his parental rights must therefore be reversed because it was entered without compliance with the procedural requirements of the ICWA.
Court hold that the juvenile court did not err in concluding that the ICWA did not apply because the notices sent to the tribes substantially complied with the ICWA requirements. Therefore, any claimed inaccuracies or omissions in the notices were not prejudicial. Accordingly, Court affirm the orders of the juvenile court finding that the ICWA did not apply and terminating fathers parental rights.

In trying to minimize her own culpability, defendant Christina Marie Marten pointed to Oscar Cervantes as the devil because, with a grin on his face, he shot and killed her close friend. Crank, not the smiling shooter, is the devil in this ghastly Halloween tale. Defendant was born addicted to it, set up her best friend to be executed because of it, slept with Norteos as well as Sureos to facilitate the sale of it, and was convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder, attempted murder, and a variety of gang and weapon enhancements for her involvement with those who profited from it. In October 2002 crank (methamphetamine) provided the Woodland criminal street gangs with the financial wherewithal to proliferate, recruit, and control the streets with fear and, as this case demonstrates, to be so disconnected from time, empathy, and even loyalty to each other to shoot and kill for a nonexistent debt.
Like Judas Iscariot, defendant confessed to handing over her brother for execution. Her confession was corroborated by gang members who themselves were regular methamphetamine users by the time they turned 13 years old. Because we reject her contention on appeal that her confession was involuntary, and that confession, corroborated by eyewitness testimony, constitutes overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the various evidentiary and instructional errors that may have tainted this trial do not require reversal of the judgment of conviction. Court affirm.

After a jury trial, defendant Sanbeira Thlang was found guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, 189)[1]and several lesser or related offenses to the murder, as to which sentencing was stayed under section 654. The jury also found true a special circumstances allegation that the murder was committed while actively participating in a criminal street gang ( 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and enhancement allegations that the death was caused by intentional discharge of a firearm ( 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction ( 1170.12), and, as to the stayed offenses, that they were violent felonies committed to benefit a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Sentenced to state prison for life without parole and a consecutive term of 50 years to life, defendant appeals. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting (a) evidence of a confession and (b) details of conduct underlying his prior conviction; (2) failing to remove a juror from the jury for misconduct; (3) failing to strike the prior serious felony conviction allegation; (4) imposing upper terms on some sentences, stayed under section 654; and (5) doubling certain enhancement terms as a result of the prior serious felony conviction. Only the last contention has merit. Court modify the judgment regarding the sentence of doubled enhancement terms and affirm it as so modified.

David Lee Henly appeals a judgment arising out of his conviction of evading an officer with reckless driving and driving with a suspended license. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting unduly prejudicial bad act evidence against him, limiting his impeachment of one of the police officers who testified against him, imposing an upper term sentence and imposing an enhancement twice based on a single prior prison term he served. We conclude that his arguments do not support a reversal of the judgment, although the judgment erroneously reflects that the court imposed two prison prior enhancements based on a single period of incarceration. Because the record is clear that the court intended to impose the enhancements for two separate incarcerations, Court modify the judgment to so provide and affirm the judgment as so modified.

Dylan Moline and Paula Newlin appeal from judgments convicting them of possession of methamphetamine for sale. Moline contends the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to consider evidence acquired in violation of his Miranda[1]rights. We agree, but conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Newlin contends her Crawford[2]confrontation rights were violatedwhen the trial court admitted evidence of laboratory test results. Based on the California Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555 (Geier), her contention fails. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of guilt for both appellants.
As to sentencing, the People concede that a one-year sentence enhancement imposed under Penal Code[3]section 667.5, subdivision (b) was erroneously added to Newlin's sentence. Accordingly, Court modify Newlin's judgment to correct this error.