CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
Defendant Ruby Ann Goodman appeals from the two-year state prison sentence she received after pleading no contest to transporting methamphetamine. On appeal, she contends the trial court erred in refusing to award her presentence custody credits for 90 days spent in a drug treatment program following her plea and before her probation was revoked. Court agree that the trial court erred in concluding defendant is categorically ineligible for custody credit. Court remand to the trial court for a determination consistent with this opinion of the time credits to which defendant may be entitled for days spent in drug rehabilitation.
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Defendant Wesley James Stone appeals from an order revoking his Proposition 36 probation (Pen. Code, 1210.1 et seq.)[1]and sentencing him to state prison for possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)).Relying on this courts decision in People v. Esparza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 691 (Esparza), the trial court revoked defendants probation after his first drug-related violation, owing to defendants impending incarceration on an unrelated parole violation. He contends that the judgment should be reversed because his impending imprisonment did not make him unamenable to treatment. Court disagree and affirm.
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Defendant Russell Adrian Bruch pleaded no contest to distribution or exhibition of lewd material to a minor over the Internet in violation of Penal Code section 288.2, subdivision (b), for which he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and five years probation on specified terms and conditions, including the requirement that he register as a sex offender. After expiration of the probationary period, defendant filed a motion seeking relief from the registration requirement. Defendant appeals the trial courts denial of that motion on the ground that the mandatory registration requirement violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Court affirm the judgment.
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Ishmael Mwesigwa appeals from a judgment convicting him of corporal injury to a cohabitant and other offenses arising from his assault on his girlfriend. He contends (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a photograph of a cleaver, (2) the trial court erred when it refused to instruct regarding the defense of accident, (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (4) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument to the jury, and (5) the trial court erred in denying probation. Court reject his contentions, except Court agree the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding his accident defense. However, we find the instructional error harmless. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.
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Felipe Sanchez, who has also been known as Luis Mendoza, was convicted of two counts of committing lewd acts upon a child. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Sanchez to prison for 10 years for the sex offenses and imposed a one year sentence for a prior drug conviction for which Sanchez was on probation at the time he was arrested for the instant offenses. Sanchez argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury during Sanchez's testimony that it had already ruled Sanchez's admissions to police were admissible and that police had not violated Sanchez's Miranda[2] rights. Sanchez also argues that the trial court's imposition of an upper term sentence violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. As Court explain, we conclude (1) that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury; and (2) that the trial court's imposition of an upper term sentence violated Sanchez's constitutional right to a jury trial. Accordingly, Court affirm in part, and Court reverse in part and remand for further sentencing proceedings.
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Appellant Amber Jackson appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence. Jackson was convicted of aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, 205; count 1) and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The jury also found true the allegation that Jackson personally inflicted great bodily injury in violation of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The allegations arose from an incident in which Jackson threw scalding oil on her sister, Stephanie. Court are not called on in this case to examine the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception as it applies to recidivist sentencing factors, thus the analysis of the potential scope of the recidivist exception to the right to jury trial on factors which increase punishment beyond that prescribed by legislatures is unnecessary and unwarranted.
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In December 2005, a jury found Andrew Dang Warren was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et. seq., the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP act). Accordingly, Warren was committed to the State Department of Mental Health at Atascadero, California, to be confined there for a two-year term. Warren appeals, contending the evidence does not support the finding he is a sexually violent predator (SVP). In particular, he argues that he is not likely to commit predatory sexually violent behavior in the future. Court affirm the judgment.
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The defendant in this malicious prosecution action appeals from an order denying a motion to strike under the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 et seq. Court affirm. The defendant's underlying antitrust action had not only been dismissed, but the claims raised in that action had themselves been the subject of still earlier unsuccessful litigation. Given these circumstances, in which the defendant filed a complaint based on claims which had been previously rejected, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of favorable termination, lack of probable cause and malice. Thus, although the plaintiff's malicious prosecution action is covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff met its burden of demonstrating a probability it will prevail in this action.
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A jury convicted Lisa Dione Marshall of burglary (Pen. Code, 459), petty theft ( 484), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and falsely identifying herself to a law enforcement officer ( 148.9, subd. (a)). Marshall waived jury on allegations of prior convictions and in a bifurcated hearing the court found she had a prior theft conviction ( 666), a prior strike ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served four prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced her to prison for eight years: double the two-year middle term for burglary with a prior strike, enhanced by four 1-year terms for the prior prison terms. It stayed sentence for conviction of petty theft with a prior theft conviction and imposed concurrent terms for possessing a controlled substance and falsely identifying herself to a law enforcement officer. While Marshall's appeal was pending before this court, the Supreme Court requested the file be transferred to that court. The file was transferred as requested and has been returned. The record does not indicate why the Supreme Court requested the file be transferred or the outcome of the matter underlying the transfer.
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Plaintiffs Jimmie Melton and Julia Hernandez Melton filed an action for damages for injuries and property damage they sustained when Mrs. Melton lost control of their Freightliner tractor truck. The original complaint alleged only strict products liability. Plaintiffs first amended complaint added a second cause of action for negligence. Plaintiffs insurer, Great American Insurance Company, filed a complaint in intervention. A settlement was reached as to the products liability cause of action. The negligence cause of action was tried to a jury. Marten Transport, Ltd. (hereafter sometimes Marten) was the sole defendant. After plaintiffs rested, subject to the admission of exhibits, Marten made an oral motion for nonsuit. After argument, the court granted the motion. Judgment was entered for Marten, and plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
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Arrowhead Country Club (ACC) appeals after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Kenneth Patterson in Pattersons lawsuit for breach of contract and related causes of action. Court agree with ACC that a triable issue of material fact exists so as to preclude summary judgment and therefore reverse the judgment.
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The County of Riverside, the real party in interest, appeals from a judgment by the superior court reversing the arbitrators award imposing an 80-day suspension, instead of a 40-day suspension, on Krasney. The arbitrator had also reversed the Countys decision to terminate Krasneys employment. That reversal is not challenged on appeal. The County argues the superior courts judgment was an abuse of discretion because the arbitrator could properly award an 80-day suspension. Krasney contends the arbitrator could award only a 40-day suspension.
Court are not persuaded that the governing memorandum of understanding (MOU) affords the arbitrator power to impose greater discipline than it gives the County. We affirm the judgment of the superior court reversing the 80-day suspension. |
The trial court found defendant, Riley Wayne Noonkester, to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (the Sexually Violent Predators Act; all unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) and ordered that he be recommitted to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment for an additional two years. He appeals, contending the evidence is insufficient to support the order. Finding the evidence sufficient, Court affirm the judgment.
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Vincent S. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts order on his Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 388 petition with respect to his daughter, M., declaring him M.s presumed father but denying his request for sole legal and physical custody of her. Father contends the order must be reversed because due diligence was not exercised in attempting to locate him in the early stages of the dependency proceedings, which deprived him of due process. As Court explain, Court find no merit in fathers contention and consequently affirm the order.
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