CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jerry Fred Hamilton appeals a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. Defendant was charged by information in April 1996 in count 1 with felony manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379.6, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 1203.073, subd. (b)(3)), in count 2 with felony possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11383, subd. (a)), in count 3 with felony possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)), and in count 4 with felony possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11378). The information included allegations that defendant was personally armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022, subd. (c)), an allegation that the substance containing methamphetamine exceeded three gallons (Health & Saf. Code, 11379.8), prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)), and prior conviction allegations (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subds. (b) & (c)).
The judgment is affirmed.

Eduardo Dion Strickland appeals from the judgment following his conviction, after a jury trial, of second degree murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, with one sustained deadly weapon allegation and two sustained great bodily injury allegations. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).)[1] After finding that prior serious felony conviction allegations were true, the court sentenced appellant to 43 years to life in state prison. ( 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a) & (d).) Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his severance motion, admitting the opinion of a lay witness, and refusing to admonish the jury regarding prosecution misconduct. Court direct the trial court to modify the abstracts of judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.

Appellant Emily King, by and through her guardian ad litem, Michele King (King), fell from a bluff to the rocks below. She suffered serious injuries in the fall. The property is owned by the County of Santa Barbara and maintained by the Isla Vista Recreation and Park District (collectively County). The trial court sustained the demurrer of the County, relying on the absolute immunity afforded public entities by Government Code section 831.2. King asserts that "artificial human activities" on and about the bluff make the immunity inapplicable and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Court affirm.

Appellant Nelson Rincon was convicted by jury of assault with a firearm (count 1; Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2))[1]; possession of a firearm by a felon with priors (count 2, 12021, subd. (a)(1)); possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, 11370.1, subd. (a)); and possession of a controlled substance (count 4; Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that appellant had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). He admitted that he served a prior prison term pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for a total term of eight years. It selected count 1 as the base term and imposed the mid term of three years, plus one year on count 3. It did not impose a sentence as to counts 2 and 4, because those offenses contained the same elements as counts 1 and 3. The court added a three year personal firearm use enhancement and one year for the prior prison term. Appellant claims the court erred by refusing to instruct on a lesser-included offense and by denying his motion under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. Court affirm.

Defendant John Rotondo appeals from the trial courts order denying his petition to compel arbitration of an alleged breach of contract claim involving a business loan from plaintiff Arthur Oviedo. Rotondo contends that despite the lack of an arbitration provision in the agreement that is the subject of this lawsuit, the court should have ordered arbitration because another agreement between the parties that does contain an arbitration provision is closely connected to the subject agreement. Court disagree and affirm.

Marc Levine appeals from a judgment convicting him of three counts of grand theft, one count of grand theft from an elder, and one count of conspiracy to defraud another of property. He argues (1) the trial court erred by using an intent to defraud standard rather than an intent to permanently deprive standard when instructing the jury on the offenses of theft by trick and theft by false pretenses, (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict regarding victim Stephen Ahn. Court find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.

Robbye Anderson appeals from a judgment convicting him of furnishing, giving away or offering to sell cocaine base; possession of cocaine base for sale; and possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. He contends the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence of a prior offense, and (2) allowing the prosecution to reopen its case to admit booking photographs from the prior offense. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

Carl N., a ward of the juvenile court, who was born in 1988 and has a long history of juvenile delinquency (including vandalism, gang activity, drug abuse, a felony assault, and multiple violations of probation) and repeated failure to benefit from less restrictive commitments, appeals an order committing him to the California Youth Authority (CYA)[1]after he admitted he had again violated probation. Carl contends the court abused its discretion because there was no evidence demonstrating that he would likely benefit from a CYA commitment or that the commitment would meet his reformatory, educational, discipline or treatment needs or that the public would be safer. Court affirm the CYA commitment.

In superior court case No. SCD176528, Shawn James Allen Woodall pled guilty to one count of evading a police officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Woodall on probation for three years.
In superior court case No. SCD200201, Woodall pled guilty to one count of selling cocaine base and one count of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a) & 11351). The trial court sentenced Woodall to five years in prison, but suspended execution of the sentence for five years. The court placed Woodall on probation for five years, on the condition that he serve 180 days in jail and 180 days in a residential drug rehabilitation facility. The court denied Woodall's request for a certificate of probable cause.

A jury convicted Oscar Rafael Sanchez of the second-degree murder of Carlos Mendoza. He appeals, contending: (1) the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury; (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; (3) his counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (4) cumulative error compels reversal of the judgment. Court find no prejudicial error warranting reversal of the conviction and affirm the judgment.

The People filed a first amended information charging Robert Contreras, Jr. with attempted murder of police officer Matthew Jimenez (Pen. Code[1], 664, subds. (a), (e), (f)/187, subd. (a), count 1); attempted murder of police officer Juan Carlos Garcia ( 664, subds. (a), (e), (f)/187, subd. (a), count 2); assault with a firearm upon Matthew Jimenez ( 245, subd. (d)(1), count 3); assault with a firearm upon Juan Carlos Garcia ( 245, subd. (d)(1), count 4); discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling ( 246, count 5); assault upon Francisco Romero ( 245, subd. (a)(2), count 6); assault upon Omar Garcia ( 245, subd. (a)(2), count 7); discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling ( 246, count 8); discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling ( 246, count 9); and negligent discharge of a firearm ( 246.3, count 10). Contreras contends his convictions for shooting at inhabited dwellings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and, the upper term sentence on count 3 violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Court reverse the sentence on count 3, and affirm in all other respects.

Kenneth B., the biological father of Ty R., appeals a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County terminating his parental rights. Kenneth contends the court erred by finding he is not the presumed father of Ty under Family Code section 7611,[1]and that adoption was in Ty's best interests. In a consolidated proceeding, Kenneth petitions for writ of habeas corpus, contending his counsel was ineffective. Court affirm the judgment and deny the petition.

Patricia D. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor son Eddie R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Patricia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant was charged with a single count of robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1]with personal infliction of great bodily injury upon unnamed victim Jane Doe ( 12022.7, subd. (a)). A jury found him guilty as charged and found the enhancement allegation true. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of six years: the middle term of three years for the robbery, plus three years for the enhancement.
Defendant appeals. He claims the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of grand theft person ( 487, subd. (c)) and petty theft ( 488). He further claims the error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability that the jury, if it had been instructed on the lesser offenses, would have found him guilty of grand theft person or petty theft, but not robbery.
Court reject defendants claim of error. Court conclude there was insufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of grand theft person or petty theft, but not robbery. Hence, the trial court did not have a duty to instruct on these lesser offenses sua sponte. Court therefore affirm the judgment, including defendants robbery conviction and the great bodily injury enhancement.