CA Unpub Decisions

Lawrence Cox appeals his convictions by jury verdict of robbery (Pen. Code., 211),[1]burglary ( 459), criminal threats ( 422), false imprisonment ( 236), assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true the special allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). He contends the court prejudicially erred in admitting the victims preliminary hearing testimony. He also asserts prosecutorial misconduct. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff and appellant Russell Brimer (Brimer) appeals from the trial courts order granting a motion to quash service of summons upon specially appearing defendant and respondent Faygo Beverages, Inc. (Faygo), in a case Brimer brought against Faygo pursuant to Proposition 65, Californias Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code, 25249.5 et seq.). The trial court found no basis for California courts to assert general or specific jurisdiction over Faygo. On appeal, Brimer contends the trial court has specific jurisdiction to hear his case. Court disagree and affirm.

Machond Fields (appellant) and her aunt, Gloria Perkins (respondent), dispute ownership of several real properties that were originally owned by Lamar and Palee Chatman. The Chatmans are appellants grandparents and respondents parents. After a two-day trial on appellants quiet title and cancellation of deed action, judgment was entered in favor of respondent. Appellant appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying her request for a continuance of the trial, thereby requiring her to proceed without counsel, and (2) denying her motion for a new trial. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Leonard Dwayne Holt appeals the judgment and sentence imposed following his felony conviction by bench trial for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subd. (a). Appellant contends: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him for concealing a weapon; and, (2) that the trial court erroneously denied a motion to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Finding both contentions without merit, Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a sentence and judgment of four years eight months after a hearing in which he was found in violation of probation. Counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in which he raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have conducted that review and find no arguable issues to be briefed or argued. Counsel informed defendant that he had the right to file a supplemental brief and none was filed. Court affirm the judgment.

We review this case for the second time. This appeal and habeas corpus petition follow the judgment entered after the trial court found David Jackson had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him to prison.
On April 20, 2005, pursuant to a plea bargain, Jackson pleaded no contest to possessing cocaine base with a maximum potential sentence of three years. (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Jackson on probation for three years on condition, among others, that he obey all laws, orders, rules, and regulations of this court and the probation department. The court ordered Jackson to serve 252 days in custody, credited him with 252 days, and released him after the hearing. The court further ordered Jackson to report to the probation department within 48 hours of his release from custody, and explained: As long as you report to . . . probation within two days, here in this building on the third floor[, i]f you live in a place that is more convenient for you, theyll farm you out to a probation office closer to your house. Jackson agreed to accept all terms and conditions of probation. The judgment is affirmed in case number B190510.

Robert W. Petty, Lynne I. Petty, and Leisa Petty (the Pettys) appeal a judgment awarding damages to Lake Berryessa Enterprises, Inc., II (LBE) in connection with the parties agreement that the Pettys would purchase the Putah Creek Park Resort (the Resort). The Pettys contend the court erred when it determined that the parties agreement was mutually cancelled rather than rescinded and awarded LBE damages in the form of the balance of the Pettys down payment. Court affirm.

Convicted of a number of counts of robbery and burglary, defendants Clarence and Tyron Daniels appeal,[1]arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions of robbing J. C. (count 2); and (2) the trial court erred in imposing the upper term for robbery (count 1) based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by them. Clarence also argues that his conviction for possession of stolen property (count 5) must be reversed because he was convicted of stealing the same property and that his abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect a concurrent sentence on one of his burglary convictions (count 4). Agreeing with Clarences latter two arguments, we will reverse his conviction for possession of stolen property (count 5) and direct the trial court to correct the abstracts of judgment for both defendants to reflect concurrent sentences on count 4. Finding no merit in defendants remaining arguments, Court affirm the judgments in all other respects.

Hosea G. appeals from the dispositional order of the juvenile court. After admitting that he committed battery (Pen. Code, 242), statutory rape by a person not more than three years older than the victim (Pen. Code, 261.5), and possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), he was continued as a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602)[1]and committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, formerly the California Youth Authority (CYA)[2]for a maximum period of four years.
On appeal, Hosea challenges the order of commitment on the grounds it violates due process and lacks evidentiary support. He further contends the juvenile court erred by failing to appoint a responsible adult as his educational representative. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

Daniel Elijah Saddler was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse and felonious assault. As to each conviction it was found true he inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (e). The jury was unable to return a verdict on a charge of torture. It was found true Saddler suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and a prior strike conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Saddler was sentenced to a prison term of 18 years. He appeals, arguing the trial court failed to instruct on all the elements of the crime of spousal abuse and concerning the requirement of jury unanimity, erred in admitting a statement under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, and committed sentencing error. The judgment is affirmed.

Miguel E. appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court after the court sustained a petition filed under Welfare and Institution Code section 602 and continued Miguel as a ward of the court. Miguel contends insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that he committed felony vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). Court affirm.

Kathleen Lanell Johnson pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) and admitted she had three prior convictions for narcotics-related offenses (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)) and that she had served three prior prison sentences (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate prison term of nine years.
In this consolidated proceeding, Johnson appeals the judgment of conviction and petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.

A jury convicted Ricardo Alberto Carignan of inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant (Pen. Code,[1] 273.5, subd. (a), count 1); assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2); making a criminal threat ( 422, count 3); attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime ( 136.1 subd. (b)(1), count 4); and three counts of violating a court protective order involving domestic violence (166, subd. (c)(1), counts 6, 7 & 9). The trial court sentenced Carignan to prison for 14 years four months.
Carignan appeals, asserting that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting references to his parole status and previous assault of a former girlfriend into evidence. In addition, he contends that the trial court violated section 654 by sentencing him both for assault and infliction of corporal injury based on the same conduct. Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Carignan's parole status and previous assault into evidence. We agree, however, that Carignan's sentence violates section 654, and consequently remand for resentencing.

Jesus Bugarin, Jr., entered a negotiated guilty plea to conspiring to commit second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), 211) after the trial court denied his motions to suppress evidence ( 1538.5) and set aside the information ( 995). The court sentenced Bugarin to two years in prison.