CA Unpub Decisions

Following a jury trial, Marcos Alberto Cayado (appellant) was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that appellant had a prior strike ( 1170.12) and served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of three years eight months in state prison: the low term of 16 months, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law, plus one year consecutive for the prior prison term. On appeal, appellant contends the trial courts voir dire lightened and shifted the prosecutions burden of proof and that it erred when it denied his Batson/Wheeler motion. Court disagree and affirm.

Following a jury trial, Marcos Alberto Cayado (appellant) was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that appellant had a prior strike ( 1170.12) and served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of three years eight months in state prison: the low term of 16 months, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law, plus one year consecutive for the prior prison term. On appeal, appellant contends the trial courts voir dire lightened and shifted the prosecutions burden of proof and that it erred when it denied his Batson/Wheeler motion. Court disagree and affirm.

Christopher G. appeals from a trial court order restraining him from allowing his child contact with Mr. Gs grandfather. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow oral testimony of a witness at the hearing on the order. Court disagree and affirm the order.

Appellant, Daniel S., was charged in a seventh supplemental petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 on September 28, 2006, with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 460, subd. (b), count one), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a), count two), and with violating probation ( 777, subd. (a)(2), count three). On November 9, 2006, appellant admitted counts two and three. Count one was dismissed. Appellant admitted count two as a felony. Appellant was charged in an eighth supplemental petition filed on November 21, 2006, pursuant to section 602, with felony possession of phencyclidine (Health & Saf. Code, 11378.5, count one), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378, count two), and violating probation ( 777, subd. (a)(2), count three). There was an allegation that counts one and two were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). On December 5, 2006, appellant admitted count two as a felony and count three. The remaining allegations were dismissed.
At the disposition hearing on December 27, 2006, the juvenile court committed appellant to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice for a maximum term of six years eight months. In setting the maximum term of confinement, the juvenile court aggregated terms from prior petitions. The court granted appellant custody credits of 501 days. On appeal, appellant contends the record is vague and incomplete as to how his custody credit was calculated. The case is remanded to the juvenile court for a hearing on how many additional days of custody credits, if any, appellant may be entitled to receive.

A juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 777, subdivision (a)(2) was filed against Shawn H. (appellant) on December 27, 2006. Appellant was charged in count 1 with assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[1] It was further alleged that the assault was a serious felony ( 1192.7, subd. (c)) and was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Count 2 stated that (a) appellant had already been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation; (b) that the previous dispositions had not been effective in rehabilitating appellant in that he had violated the terms of his probation; (c) that the aggregate confinement time on six separate prior petitions totaled four years four months, less 371 days credit for time served; (d) that the petitioner intended to aggregate available confinement time; and (e) that appellant was in violation of his probation by committing the current offense.On appeal, appellant contends the court erred (1) by taking judicial notice of two prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes; (2) by allowing impeachment of appellant through introduction of prior juvenile adjudications; (3) by admitting evidence of gang affiliation; and (4) by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine appellant on his right not to incriminate himself. Appellant further contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and asserts cumulative error. Court find no prejudicial error and affirm.

Melissa C. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her son. She contends the court erred in 2005 when it determined the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; ICWA) did not apply to the childs dependency. On review, Court affirm.

Police officers arrested defendant Marc Quarles after a quantity of marijuana was found in a safe in his home. He was charged with possessing marijuana for sale. While defendant was out on bail, additional marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and a loaded firearm were found in the trunk of a car associated with him. Defendant was charged, among other things, with possessing the drugs for sale and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The two cases were consolidated for trial. The jury found defendant guilty of possessing marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine for sale, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. It also found true an allegation defendant was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of a narcotics offense. By agreement, a court trial was held on allegations defendant had prior narcotics-related convictions, committed the offenses while out on bail, and had four prior prison term convictions. Based on certified documentation, the court found the prior conviction allegations and on bail enhancements to be true.
Defendant contends the court erred by consolidating his two cases, denying his motion for a mistrial after a detective testified to information excluded in an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, denying access to identifying juror information without holding a hearing, and denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing to allow him to pursue information for a new trial based on jury misconduct and newly discovered evidence. He also argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed any of the items found in the car. Court find no merit to these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs Kim Lien Thi Tran and Minh Tran (collectively plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Amex Assurance Company (Amex). Plaintiffs sued Amex for breach of contract based on allegations Amex refused to pay claims on an automobile insurance policy it issued to plaintiffs on the ground they misrepresented the identity of the registered owner of the subject vehicle. Plaintiffs and Amex each moved for judgment based on stipulated facts. The trial court concluded plaintiffs had concealed a material fact on the insurance application by failing to disclose that their niece was the registered owner of the vehicle. Judgment was entered accordingly. Court affirm.

Marcelino M. appeals from the juvenile courts order sustaining the allegations of a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified) and declaring his two children, Brenda M. and Brandon M., dependents of the court. He contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error by precluding him from presenting evidence or cross examining witnesses as a sanction for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Court do not reverse the juvenile courts order placing the children in the mothers custody, and that custody order remain in effect.

Appellant contends the juvenile court erred when it found sufficient evidence to conclude the minor is adoptable and terminated parental rights. Court affirm.

Christopher S. appeals from the termination of parental rights to his biological son, J. C., claiming the juvenile court erred in denying a hearing on his petition to receive reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388.)[1] He also claims the juvenile court erred in failing to grant de facto parent status to the maternal grandparents. Liv L., J.s mother, also appeals from the termination of her parental rights, joining in Christophers arguments. Additionally, she claims the juvenile court erred in removing J. from the maternal grandparents home without a noticed hearing. Court find the juvenile court erred in failing to provide Christopher with reunification services and reverse.

Defendant Joseph Alvarez was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of forced oral copulation (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (c)(2)), one count of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)), one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)), and one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422), all of which crimes occurred over the course of an approximate 18-hour period at a residence where defendant was living. The victim of these crimes was Tracy Doe, who lived with defendant at the residence and was his girlfriend at the time. At trial, in addition to the testimony of Tracy Doe concerning the charged crimes, there was testimony from three different women with whom defendant had previously been involved concerning past incidents of domestic violence he had inflicted on them. There was also testimony from a police officer who described having once observed defendant engage in violent behavior towards a fourth woman while the officer was pursuing a drug investigation involving the woman. Evidence concerning these past incidents was admitted at trial under Evidence Code section 1109, which makes other acts of domestic violence admissible where the charged crime also involves domestic violence, as long as the court determines that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( 352.) Court reject defendants claims and accordingly affirm the judgment.

Appellant David Smith challenges the trial courts order granting the County of Santa Cruz (the County) a permanent injunction, which enjoins Smith from further lumber milling activity on his property in violation of county zoning regulations. Although Smith stipulated to the permanent injunction, he challenges the portions of the courts order awarding the County its administrative enforcement costs, a civil penalty, and attorney fees. Smith also contends the court denied him his right to a jury trial. Court find no error and affirm the order.

Appellant Chiaho Wu was convicted of one count of possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, 12280, subd. (b)), following a plea of no contest. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to traverse the search warrant and to suppress evidence. Court affirm.