CA Unpub Decisions

Joseph Lazor appeals the trial courts order requiring him to pay legal fees in the amount of $14,503.75 to the attorney appointed by the court to represent his three minor children in conjunction with his divorce proceedings. He claims that the order is void because the local rule purporting to authorize payment to the minors attorney is inconsistent with provisions of the Family Code. Because he has waived his right to appeal the order, Court affirm.

We dismiss as untimely this appeal by Global Reach Investment Corporation (Global Reach) following the dismissal of its lawsuit against Burlingame Investment Corporation (BIC). Global Reachs lawsuit was dismissed for its failure to file an undertaking pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1030 as ordered by the trial court. The appeal is dismissed.

Appellant Orlando Raymond Griffin, Jr. (appellant) appeals from an agreed sentence of seven years in state prison he received as a result of his plea of no contest to one count of second degree robbery, and his admission of a firearm use enhancement. Appellants counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant was notified that no issues are being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead is being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this courts attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant law firm, Tuttle & Taylor (hereinafter, the Law Corporation), appeals following a court trial and judgment in favor of plaintiffs, four attorneys and former shareholders in the Law Corporation (J. Dean Heller, C. Stephen Howard, A. James Roberts III, and Mark Schaffer; hereinafter, the complaining shareholders). The lawsuit alleged breach of written employment agreements, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and related causes of action. The essence of the suit involved the interpretation of written employment agreements and the correct method of allocating deferred compensation distributions to former shareholders after the Law Corporation ceased practicing law in 2000. Court find that the trial court correctly interpreted the written employment agreements and properly increased the distributions to the complaining shareholders. The provisions in the employment agreements indicate that the Law Corporation improperly divided its assets by including 40 former shareholders who had accepted a discounted lump sum payment, instead of the deferred compensation, when it calculated the deferred compensation for the remaining attorneys who did not accept the buyout offer.

Plaintiff and appellant Dr. Jack L. Segal brought a medical malpractice action against defendants and respondents Dr. Duncan Q. McBride and the Regents of the University of California[1](defendants) arising from back surgery Dr. McBride performed on Dr. Segal at the UCLA medical facility in Santa Monica.[2] At trial, Dr. Segal proceeded under the theories that Dr. McBride was negligent in using a morphine paste at the surgical site to reduce Dr. Segals postsurgical pain, and that Dr. McBride failed to obtain Dr. Segals informed consent to the surgery because Dr. McBride did not inform Dr. Segal that he would use the morphine paste. The trial court granted defendants motion for a directed verdict. On the issue of informed consent, the trial court held that the duty to inform a patient of the use of morphine paste to establish a lack of informed consent must be proved through expert witness testimony, which Dr. Segal failed to present at trial. On appeal, Dr. Segal contends that the trial court erred in holding that informed consent must be proved through expert witness testimony. Alternatively, Dr. Segal contends that even if the trial court correctly ruled on the issue of informed consent, it erred when it ruled that he could not testify as an expert witness on that issue. Dr. Segal does not contest the trial courts directed verdict on the issue of the alleged negligent use of the morphine paste. Court affirm.

The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant and appellant James Collier (defendant) with the first degree murder of Joseph Swift (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a); count 1); the attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murders of Fred Bigbee ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2), Christine Kjellesvig ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3), Asa Price ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 4), Giovanni Jones ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 5), Stanley Barlow ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 6),[2]Charisma Johnson ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 7), Shada Lofton ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 8), and Shanae Lofton ( 664, 187, subd. (a); count 9); and shooting into an inhabited dwelling ( 246; count 10).[3] As to count 1, the information alleged that defendant killed Swift while defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang ( 190.2, subd. (a)(22)); that the murder was perpetrated by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury ( 190, subd. (d)); that defendant personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)); that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (c)); that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily injury and death ( 12022.53, subd. (d)); and that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death ( 190.2, subd. (a)(21)). As to counts 2 through 11, the information alleged that defendant personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b) and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (c)). As to all counts, the information alleged that defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)); that defendant had suffered a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)(d)), and that defendant had served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Danny O., a minor (appellant), contends that the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in setting his maximum confinement time as required by former Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (b). Court affirm and modify the dispositional order to provide for the actual maximum term of confinement.

On May 5, 1999, in case number BA178225, defendant and appellant Rene Covarrubias (defendant) pleaded nolo contendere to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)[1].) The trial court placed defendant on formal probation for a period of five years under various terms and conditions, including the condition that he pay a restitution fine of $200 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b). On April 5, 2002, in case number BA223209, defendant again pleaded nolo contendere to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. ( 245, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court placed defendant on formal probation for a period of three years under various terms and conditions, including the condition that he pay a restitution fine of $200 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b).
The judgment is affirmed.

The plaintiff asked the trial court to strike a cross-claim for breach of fiduciary duty, on the grounds that it violates the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding that the cross complainant is likely to prevail on her claim. Court affirm.

Jesus Chuy Sanchez (appellant), appeals from the judgment entered following a wjury trial that resulted in his conviction of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211.[1] The trial court found true the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). On September 12, 2006, appellant hit Bruce Tesillo on the back of his head as he was napping in a park. Appellant threatened Tesillo, reached into Tesillos pockets, and demanded his cellphone. Tesillo refused to hand the cellphone over. Appellant grabbed Tesillos sunglasses and ran. Appellant was sentenced to the low term of two years, which was doubled as a second strike. The trial court imposed an additional five years for the prior conviction and added one year for being in violation of probation for a total of 10 years in state prison. Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Tressa Morrison, a 52-year-old mother and grandmother, went on a shooting spree outside her apartment, killing her 17 year old neighbor and wounding his girlfriend, who was also a neighbor, so seriously that she remained in a coma for four to five days and was not initially expected to survive. Defendant also fired several shots at three people who came to assist the shooting victims. Court affirm the judgment and direct modification of the abstract of judgment to correct uncontested technical errors.

Defendant James ORourke was a pretty scary neighbor. Four people living on his street testified he often shined a high intensity beam flashlight into their windows, yelled and cursed at them, gave them the middle finger, displayed a gun, threatened them, ran through their yard, sprayed one with a hose, and vandalized their property. A jury convicted him of four counts of stalking -- one count for each victim. (Pen. Code, 646.9, subd. (a).)[1] On appeal, he contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give a unanimity instruction. (CALCRIM No. 3500.) We agree with the courts in the Second and Fourth Appellate Districts that a unanimity instruction is unnecessary where, as here, the stalking statute contemplates a continuing course of conduct. (People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1292 (Jantz); People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758, 768 (Zavala).) Court affirm.

In this action seeking damages for breach of contract and declaratory relief, plaintiff Dimension One Spas, Inc. (plaintiff) appeals the order of the trial court that granted the motion by plaintiff's former sales representative, defendant Marc Van Eetvelde (defendant) to stay this action on an inconvenient forum basis, pending resolution of a later-filed, separate action brought by defendant in Belgium on the same basic contract issues. (Code Civ. Proc., 410.30.)[1] On appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to recognize that when defendant, a Belgian citizen, signed plaintiff's independent sales representative agreement (the agreement) that contained a mandatory forum selection clause designating California law and courts for resolution of disputes, he voluntarily consented to the jurisdiction of California courts in litigation against him pertaining to the agreement. The agreement was executed in California, governed by California law, to allow defendant to distribute California manufactured products overseas.
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions that the trial court vacate the order staying plaintiff's action and issue a new order denying defendant's motion in its entirety, and allowing further appropriate proceedings.

Sergio J. Davalos was found guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, leaving the scene of an accident, driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior conviction for driving under the influence, and driving while his driver's license was suspended. Davalos was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. He appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of second degree murder and the trial court erred in allowing his prior conviction for driving under the influence to be offered as evidence of malice.
The judgment is affirmed.