CA Unpub Decisions

Irin Vernal Griffin appeals from the judgment following his conviction of one count of corporal injury to a co habitant. (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a).) Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this matter. After examining the record, counsel filed a Wende brief raising no issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We directed appointed counsel to immediately send the record on this appeal and a copy of the opening brief to appellant, and notified appellant that within 30 days from the date of the notice he could submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or argument he wished us to consider. Appellant filed a supplemental brief in which he contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and that the trial court committed Crawford error in admitting into evidence statements by the victim to the police and the transcript of the victims preliminary hearing testimony. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.) Appellant also moved for the appointment of an expert in the field of police practices. (Evid. Code, 730-732; Code Civ. Proc., 909.) We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) Court set out below a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crime of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.) Court also briefly explain why we reject the contentions in appellants supplemental brief and deny his motion for appointment of an expert.

Mary M. appeals from the order of the juvenile court denying her reunification services as to her daughter, Nicole B., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b). Court find the court erred in denying her request to continue the contested disposition hearing, but find no prejudice and affirm the order.

On March 1, 2007, pursuant to a plea bargain, Jesus Valenzuela pleaded no contest to second-degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211 and admitted to personal use of a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). As agreed, on March 22, 2007, the court imposed a five year upper term for the robbery plus a consecutive four year middle term for the firearm use allegation. The court dismissed various other allegations, including a separate count of armed robbery, assault with a firearm, possession of an assault weapon, and several counts of receiving stolen property. The court imposed various fines and fees. The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner-appellee David Duvall (Duvall) is serving a California prison sentence of seven years to life, after a conviction in 1962 for one count of first degree murder, two counts of kidnapping for robbery, and 13 counts of first degree robbery. Appellant respondent A. Hedgpeth (appellant), acting Warden of Kern Valley State Prison, where Duvall is currently incarcerated, appeals from an order issued by the Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 18, 2007, granting Duvalls petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition challenged the Governors reversal of the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) on May 4, 2006 finding Duvall suitable for release on parole. Court affirm the order of the trial court granting Duvalls petition and ordering his release.

Victor M. is the subject of a wardship proceeding (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) arising out of a drug-related arrest. He seeks a writ of mandate after the juvenile court denied his Pitchess motion for pretrial discovery of evidence regarding certain types of complaints that may be in the arresting officers personnel file. (Evid. Code, 1043, 1045; Pen. Code, 832.7; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) Court have concluded that Victor established good cause for production of the documents sought. Accordingly, Court grant his petition.

Maria G. (mother) seeks writ review of an order terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to Erika M., Abigail M., Martin M., Carolina M., Moises G. and Jonathon G. Court reject mothers contentions and deny mothers writ petition.

Gilbert B., a minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice Division (DJJ). The minor contends the commitment constituted an abuse of discretion by the court. Court disagree.

Over a two month period, 14 year old Paul S. attempted to steal a car radio, stole alcohol from a grocery store, attempted another auto theft, attacked a teacher, stole a purse from a truck, and threatened a robbery victim with a knife. An amended petition charged Paul with attempted second degree robbery, second degree commercial burglary, petty theft, damaging or taking part of a vehicle, and battery on a school employee. (Pen. Code, 211, 459, 484, subd. (a), 243.6; Veh. Code, 10852.) Paul admitted all counts. While in juvenile hall, Paul beat another minor. A subsequent petition charged him with assault with a deadly weapon. ( 245, subd. (a)(1).) Paul also admitted this count. After his release, Paul got into a fight at school, became menacing toward the school principal, and spoke disrespectfully to the police officer who had been summoned to the school. He removed his ankle monitor and stole more alcohol from a grocery store. During a second stay in juvenile hall, Paul attacked another minor until dissuaded by pepper spray. The trial court committed Paul to the California Youth Authority for a period not to exceed 72 months. Paul appeals, challenging his commitment. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Tito Odilon Lopez of torture (Pen. Code, 206; count 1); assault and battery ( 240, 242; count 2)[2]; kidnapping with the infliction of great bodily injury causing permanent paralysis ( 207, subd. (a), 12022.7, subds. (b) & (e); count 3); forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2); count 4); forcible oral copulation with the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon ( 288a, subd. (c), 667.61, subds. (b)(c) & (e), 12022.3, subd. (a); count 5); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6); assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23); count 7); corporal injury to a spouse/roommate with the use of a deadly weapon ( 273.5, subd. (a); count 8); corporal injury to a spouse/roommate with infliction of great bodily injury causing permanent paralysis ( 273.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subds. (b) & (e), 12022.9; count 9); making a criminal threat ( 422; count 10); and false imprisonment with use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury causing permanent paralysis ( 236, 237, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subds. (b) & (e), 12022.9; count 11). The judgment is modified to strike the count 11 conviction and its attendant enhancements. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly and to forward an amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Ozzie Mancinelli (Mancinelli) appeals an order denying his motion to add Rustie's International, Inc. (RI) to a judgment he obtained against RI's owner, defendant Kathleen Siewak (Siewak), and another company owned by Siewak, defendant Rustie's Unique Designs, Inc. (RUDI). We hold Mancinelli's motion to amend his judgment, made approximately five months after the court denied an identical motion "without prejudice," must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b). Court further hold the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mancinelli's renewed motion because he did not present new or different facts that did not exist before his original motion.

Nicholas James Schwartz was charged with one count of corporal injury upon a spouse and/or roommate (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a).)[1] It was further alleged that Schwartz had two prior strike convictions of a serious or violent felony and that he served two prior prison terms ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 668, 667.5, subd. (b)). On August 14, 2006, a jury found Schwartz guilty as charged. Schwartz waived jury trial on the prior enhancement allegations. The court found true the first prison prior allegation and the two strike prior convictions.
The judgment is affirmed.

In October 2006 Quoc Dang Kien Huynh was convicted of one count of vandalism in an amount over $400 (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a)(b)(1)). Huynh also admitted that he had four "no probation" priors (Pen. Code, 1203, subd. (e)(4)), and a prison prior (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b), 668). At sentencing, the court imposed the middle term of two years on the vandalism conviction, plus a one year consecutive sentence for the prison prior conviction, for a total prison term of three years. On appeal, Huynh asserts that the court erred by (1) excluding evidence that the victim of the vandalism had a character for violence; and (2) instructing the jury under Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) No. 372 on flight as consciousness of guilt.

In this construction defect case, defendants RWR Homes, Inc. and related entities (collectively RWR)[1]appeal an order denying their motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation as to certain plaintiffs. RWR contends the order violates federal and state laws that favor arbitration. RWR, however, did not submit the arbitration agreement that was allegedly incorporated by reference in the plaintiffs' applications for warranty protection. Because RWR did not satisfy its burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration contract, Court affirm the order.

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) appeals a juvenile court's order following a postpermanency review hearing. The Agency argues the court erred when it did not terminate its jurisdiction over minor Joseph A. after it placed him with his mother Nichole in Louisiana. It contends that by continuing jurisdiction, the court placed the Agency in the position of retaining responsibility for a child's safety in an out-of-state placement over which it had no control or ability to provide assistance. Nichole filed a motion to dismiss the Agency's appeal. She asserts the arguments raised by the Agency are moot because the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction at a later review hearing. We conclude the appeal is moot because Joseph is no longer a dependent of the trial court, the relief Agency requests in its appeal. Accordingly, Court grant Nichole's motion and dismiss the appeal.