CA Unpub Decisions

Richard Michael Elinski got into an argument with the manager of the complex where he rented a condominium. The manager called the police, who arrested Elinski for suspected drug use. Elinski subsequently sued the manager, respondent Karen Marie Vaughn, and her employer, Palm Colony Homeowners Association, for false arrest, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The trial court sustained with prejudice respondents' demurrer to the complaint on the ground that Elinski's claims, all of which were premised on Vaughn's telephone call to the police, were barred by the absolute immunity provided by Civil Code[1]section 47, subdivision (b). Elinski appeals from the order of dismissal. He contends (1) that Vaughn's communications with the police were malicious and should therefore be subject to the qualified privilege afforded by subdivision (c) of section 47, as opposed to the absolute privilege conferred by subdivision (b); and (2) that the court abused its discretion in denying him leave to amend his complaint to add a cause of action for violation of his civil rights under 42 United States Code section 1983 (42 USC 1983). Court affirm.

Michael Gutierrez appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by a jury of the first degree murder of Joseph Carbajal. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 189.)[1] The jury found true an allegation that appellant had personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death. ( 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court found true allegations of one prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)), one prior conviction of a serious felony ( 667, subd. (a)(1)), and one prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" law. ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Appellant was sentenced to prison for 5 years plus 75 years to life. He contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. Court affirm.

Appellant Francis Brien was discharged from his employment as a police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (the Department) after a Board of Rights found him guilty of engag[ing] in unbecoming conduct when [he] inappropriately and unnecessarily engaged in behavior that had the potential to escalate into domestic violence. The Boards guilty finding is final, having been affirmed by the trial court in an earlier proceeding, from which an appeal was not taken. As a result of that earlier proceeding, however, which reversed a guilty finding on another count, the Board reconvened to determine the appropriate penalty and make its recommendation to respondent William Bratton, Chief of Police. The Board recommended that Brien be discharged, and Bratton adopted that recommendation. Brien filed a new petition for a peremptory writ of mandate, challenging the penalty. The trial court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of respondents Bratton and the City of Los Angeles. Brien appeals from that judgment, which Court now affirm.

In these consolidated appeals, Cornell H. (father) contends that the juvenile court erred by denying his petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]to place his daughter, Destiny D. (child), in his home and to take off calendar a scheduled permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. Court find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Plaintiff, Robert J. Libby, appeals from the entry of summary judgment on his wrongful termination complaint in favor of his former employer, defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. There is no triable issue that he was lawfully terminated from his employment as a liability claims supervisor and the revelation of the facts underlying his discharge to his fellow employees were true. Thus, Court affirm.

Eduardo Ramirez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted in count 1, of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with gross negligence (Pen. Code, 191.5, subd. (a)) with the true finding that after he committed the offense, he fled the scene of the crime within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (c); in count 2, of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs causing injury or death (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a)); in count 3, of driving with a .08 percent blood alcohol causing injury or death (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)) with the finding that in the commission of counts 2 and 3 he personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and in count 4, of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to prison for a total of 11 years, consisting of, in count 1, the middle term of six years plus five years for the enhancement pursuant to Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (c). Sentences on the remaining counts were ordered stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The judgment is affirmed.

Angela D., the mother of 12-year-old E.M., 11-year-old Leonard M., Jr., and 10-year-old Makayla D., appeals from the juvenile courts October 17, 2007 order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Angela D. argues the court erred in failing to apply the parent-child relation exception to termination of parental rights contained in former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A),[2]and also contends the courts failure to inquire about the childrens possible American Indian ancestry violated the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and requires reversal of the termination order. Court affirm.

Ramon C. (father) appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his son, Gustavo C. (child). Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile courts order, arguing that the juvenile court should have applied the parental relationship exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Court conclude that father failed to carry his burden to establish that the exception applied. Court therefore affirm.

At sentencing, the trial court announced its intention to impose the upper term based on defendants extensive juvenile history with failure after failure after failure of many attempts in juvenile hall correction, [and] his prior offenses as an adult, although fairly minor in nature. After argument, in which the prosecutor noted defendant had somewhere around 15 violations of probation as a juvenile under formal probation, the court did not depart from its intention to impose the upper term. The court stated: Mr. Roberson, I hope you will not follow in your fathers footsteps any further than you have. Probation has offered you every service known to man since June 2001, and it has fallen on deaf ears. [] . . . Based on my earlier comments, for violation of Penal Code 487(c), it is the judgment and sentence of the Court you be sentenced to state prison for the upper term of three years. The judgment is affirmed.

After the trial court revoked defendant Wendell Tyrone Bullocks probation, he was sentenced to two years in state prison for possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a).) Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court acted unlawfully in revoking his Proposition 36 probation on the ground that he had made himself unavailable for treatment. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Lorie H., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant contends the court erred in finding no detriment to the minors in terminating her parental rights because, she argues, the evidence showed there was a significant sibling bond. Appellant also contends the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) were not fulfilled. Agreeing only with the latter contention, Court reverse.

The principal defendant in this class action lawsuit, respondent Omni Loan Company, Ltd. (Omni),[1]a Nevada corporation, engaged in consumer lending in California. Although Omni's activities would otherwise be subject to the California Finance Lenders Law (Finance Lenders Law) (Fin. Code,[2] 22000 et seq.), under choice-of-law provisions in Omni's loan agreements borrowers agreed Omni's loans would be governed by the law of Nevada. Court conclude this choice of Nevada law is not enforceable.

A jury convicted defendant James Loften of selling or furnishing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and Loften admitted allegations that he had two prior convictions for selling a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 1203.073, subd. (b)(7)) and had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The trial court sentenced Loften to a seven-year state prison term. On appeal, Loften seeks a new sentencing hearing on grounds the trial court did not perform its responsibilities in determining his fitness for admission to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. He contends that even if we conclude the court implicitly rejected his request for a CRC referral, Court should nevertheless hold it abused its discretion by failing to order him to undergo a CRC evaluation. Finally, he contends the trial court erred by omitting express findings and reasons for its ruling.

T.K. and Benjamin K. appeal jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding their children Dylan K. and K.K. T.K. contends the orders were not supported by substantial evidence. Benjamin asserts the court erred by removing the children from his custody because he was a nonoffending, noncustodial parent entitled to the heightened protections of the Indian Children Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), and insufficient evidence supports the finding of detriment. Each parent joins in the contentions of the other.