CA Unpub Decisions

At the March 5, 2008 hearing, after reviewing the declaration of Dr. Lai and the unsworn statement of appellant, the court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300 and ordered that he be remanded for postcertification treatment not to exceed 180 days.

Theresa Blackburn petitions this court in propria persona for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). (Lab. Code, 5950, 5952; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.494.) Court deny the petition because the issues were waived by failing to raise them before the WCAB and do not appear relevant to any of the WCABs findings. Moreover, the only finding on reconsideration against Blackburns interest resulted in remanding an issue for further proceedings and therefore is not reviewable as a final order.

Petitioner in pro. per. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) (rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested 12-month review hearing terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[1]as to her five children. Court conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, Court dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

A modification decision.

In 1999, defendant Gregorio Gomez Echeverria began sexually abusing his then 15‑year‑old daughter, C.E. In July 2006, defendant was convicted by a jury of 25 counts of forcible rape, one count of performing lewd acts upon a child, and one count of incest. As to one of the counts of forcible rape, the jury also found true defendant personally used a firearm, and tied and bound C.E. and another person in the commission of that offense. Court affirm. The trial court cured any prejudice that might have been caused by the alleged juror misconduct by excusing the two offending jurors. The record does not support defendants contention the trial courts denial of his motions for a mistrial impaired his right to due process of law or to an impartial jury.

Defendant Thomas G. Parrish pleaded guilty to a felony count of possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)), and admitted a prior conviction for a robbery committed in 1984 (Pen. Code, 211, 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).[1] At sentencing, the trial court denied Parrishs Romero[2] motion and sentenced him to four years in prison. Court appointed counsel to represent Parrish in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts, but raises no specific issues. Court notified Parrish of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. Court received a supplemental brief from Parrish on June 5, 2008. In his brief, Parrish complains that the probation report was inaccurate as it implied that he refused to participate in various drug treatment programs. He also contends that, when ruling on his Romero motion, the sentencing judge failed to consider a letter Parrish wrote to the court in which Parrish sought to correct the inaccuracies in the probation report.

Defendants Toll Dublin, LLC (Toll Dublin), Toll Brothers Real Estate, Inc. (Toll Brothers), and James Whiteley Boyd (Boyd) (collectively, defendants) appeal the trial courts order denying their motion to compel arbitration after plaintiffs Peter V. Thompson, Deborah Thompson, Kim K. Thompson, Brooke Turner, Donna J. Covey, James Turner, Valerie Raymundo-Enrile, Efren D. Enrile, Jr., Alfred Toy, Jennie L. Toy, Sean Toy, Ai-Ling Chin, James C. Jung, Cynthia M. Lai, Joseph F. Castro, and Reno R. Arguello (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against defendants, raising various fraud-related claims arising from their purchase of condominiums built and/or sold by defendants. Defendants claim that plaintiffs lawsuit is precluded by an arbitration agreement previously entered into by both parties. Because we conclude (1) the arbitration agreement did not apply to plaintiffs fraud related claims, and (2) the arbitration provisions were, in any event, unconscionable and therefore unenforceable, Court affirm the order.

On March 19, 2007, after having once been permitted to withdraw a guilty plea in this case and following a full advisement of his rights, defendant Charles Stevenson, represented by counsel, pled guilty to one count of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and admitted a prior conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (A)). Under the plea bargain the proposed disposition was 11 years in state prison. Prior to sentencing, defendant indicated he again wished to withdraw his plea. Conflict counsel was appointed for the sole purpose of investigating whether grounds existed for withdrawing defendants plea. On June 29, 2007, conflict counsel reported that he had reviewed with defendant the preliminary hearing transcripts and the pretrial pleadings. He spoke with defendants attorney and reviewed the complete file. In his estimation, defendants attorney did a very excellent job. Based on his review, he concluded that the plea was properly received. Defendant understood the courts advisements and knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. Counsel found no new evidence to support a motion to withdraw the plea. On July 11, 2007, defendant, once again represented by his original appointed counsel, was sentenced in conformity with his negotiated plea. The judgment is affirmed.

This appeal is from the trial courts imposition of a preliminary injunction restraining appellants Susan and N. Gail Allen from using their property in violation of a restrictive covenant, duly recorded in 1981 in the official records of Mendocino County, limiting certain parcels, including appellants parcel, to one single-family dwelling.[1] Since appellants were not parties to the 1981 agreement to restrict the development of their land, the restrictive covenant is enforceable against them only if it runs with the land or if it creates an equitable servitude. (Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 964, 972 (Taormina).) We conclude the restrictive covenant does not meet the requirements of a covenant running with the land or of an equitable servitude because there is nothing in the recorded instrument reflecting the original grantors intention that the restrictive covenant bind subsequent purchasers such as appellants. Consequently, Court reverse.

Appellant Paul Melbostad challenges an award of attorney fees to respondent Donald Fisher after the trial court granted a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16). He also challenges the granting of a protective order which precluded him from taking discovery related to respondents attorney fees motion. Because appellants notice of appeal was not timely filed, Court lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal, and therefore dismiss it.

Defendant Matthew Paul Scheidt was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state mental hospital. Defendant petitioned for restoration of sanity under Penal Code section 1026.2. Thereafter, his outpatient status was revoked under section 1608. He appeals from an order revoking his outpatient status under Penal Code section 1608. He contends that the revocation standards of section 1608 deprived him of due process of law. Court find no due process violation and affirm.

Appellant Andrea B. is the mother of 10-year-old M.W., a female dependent child of the juvenile court. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights. Specifically, she claims the court should have found applicable the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Court disagree because no such relationship exists on the facts of this case. Accordingly, Court affirm the order terminating Mothers parental rights.

S.D. appeals from an order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court and ordering her placed with her mother on home supervision. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602.) Her counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After review of the record, Court find no error and find sufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile courts findings and affirm.

Appellants Jose Luis Carbajal, Juan Delgado, and Edward Malaquias were convicted, following a jury trial, of five counts of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211,[1]one count of attempted second degree robbery in violation of sections 664 and 211, and one count of second degree commercial burglary in violation of section 459. The jury found true the allegations as to all defendants that a principal was armed in the commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The jury also found true the allegation that Carbajal personally used a firearm in the commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Court affirm Delgado's conviction in all other respects.