CA Unpub Decisions

Juan Pablo Zagarra appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to driving with .08 percent or more of alcohol in his blood (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b)) and his admissions that he previously had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served a prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Zagarra to three years, eight months in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Darryl C. (father) and E.T. (mother), parents of 21-month-old Dahlila C., appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father and mother contend that the juvenile court and the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or Act) (25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq.)[2]as to father, or to make a finding about whether the ICWA applied. The Department concedes that the inquiry requirements of the ICWA were not met, but argues that father was not prejudiced by the failure because father did not claim Indian heritage in the juvenile court and does not claim such heritage on appeal. The Department also argues that the failure of the juvenile court to make a finding on the applicability of the ICWA was harmless. Because the juvenile court did not comply with the ICWAs inquiry requirements, Court conditionally reverse the order terminating fathers and mothers parental rights and remand this case with directions to the juvenile court to ensure full compliance with the ICWA.

Defendant, Christopher David Dehuff, purports to appeal from a March 14, 2008 post-judgment order denying his sentence modification motion. We noted that such an order may not be appealable and issued an order to show cause concerning possible dismissal of the appeal. We did so because we have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126-127; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) The March 14, 2008 order is not appealable. (People v. Cantrell (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 40, 43; People v. Bowles (1933) 135 Cal.App. 514, 516; see People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527.) If defendant has a legitimate jurisdictional issue, he may raise it in a habeas corpus petition. There is no jurisdictional question though as to whether the trial court had the authority to impose a $10,000 restitution fine. (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) The appeal is dismissed.

Laverne D. (mother), appearing in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the order of the juvenile court setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Court section 366.26 with regard to her son J.D. Court summarily deny the petition because mother has completely failed to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court (rule 8.452).

A jury found defendant Eugene Virgil Hall guilty of assaulting Kimberly Smith with a deadly weapon causing great bodily injury, battering Smith causing serious bodily injury, battering Steven Britt, and attempting to dissuade Smith from coming to court. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant had five prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law and for purposes of the five-year enhancement statute. Defendant was sentenced to 78 years to life in prison, with credit for 891 days (775 actual days and 116 conduct days). He appeals, raising various challenges to his convictions and sentence. Court reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing or (at the Peoples election) retrial on the issue of whether defendants 1999 conviction for battery with serious bodily injury constitutes a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law or for purposes of the five year enhancement statute, direct the trial court to award defendant one additional day of presentence custody credit, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant Joseph Simon Moreno entered a negotiated plea of guilty to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and admitted two strike priors (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts (seven counts of first degree burglary) and allegations (six prior prison terms) and a stipulated state prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant waived referral to probation and was immediately sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant appeals, contending only that the 25-year-to-life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, 1237.5) was denied. Court dismiss the appeal.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, Court affirm the judgment.

In December 2006, defendant Anthony Walter Brooks pleaded guilty to failure to register under former Penal Code section 290, subdivision (g)(2). In January 2007, he was sentenced to the upper term of 36 months, execution of the sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation. In September 2007, defendant was charged with violating conditions of his probation by using methamphetamine and not participating in a court-ordered drug treatment program. In October, defendant admitted the charges, probation was revoked, and the previously suspended sentence was ordered into effect.

Defendant Andy Blea entered a straight up guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a) count I), two counts of false personation (Pen. Code, 529 counts II & III),[1]failure to appear (id., 1320, subd. (b)count IV), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, 11364, subd. (a) count V). He also admitted two on-bail enhancements. (Pen. Code, 12022.1.)

This appeal is another phase of the effort by Joaquin B. Robles, plaintiff, appellant and respondent, to obtain an award of punitive damages in this false imprisonment action against his former employer, defendant, respondent and appellant, AutoZone, Inc. (AutoZone). In the first trial in this action, Robles obtained a jury verdict in his favor for compensatory damages for false imprisonment. That jury found AutoZone's employee, Octavio Jara (Jara), acting within the course and scope of his employment, had falsely imprisoned Robles in the course of an internal company loss prevention investigation, and it awarded Robles $73,150. However, the trial court granted a nonsuit on the request for punitive damages, and Robles appealed.

A jury convicted Norman Paul Blanco of assault with a firearm (Penal Code, 245, subd. (a)(2), count 3); discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner ( 246.3, counts 4, 5); unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 1085.1, subd. (a), count 9); evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a), count 10); hit and run driving (Veh. Code, 20002, subd. (a), count 11); assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer ( 245, subd. (c), count 12); possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 13); and unlawful possession of ammunition. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Robert Michael Rubino appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of multiple counts of committing lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)) and displaying harmful matter to a minor with the intent to seduce the minor (Pen. Code, 288.2, subd. (a)). On appeal, Rubino contends the trial court erred by: (1) admitting Evidence Code section 1108[1]evidence of his prior sexual molestations; and (2) excluding evidence of a finding by an administrative law judge (ALJ) that those molestations did not occur. The judgment is affirmed.

In this unlawful detainer action, defendant Michael Winn appeals both the judgment entered against him and the court's order denying his motion for new trial. This case arose after Winn rented two houses located at 940 and 950 Stratford Court (together the Del Mar property) in Del Mar, California. The Del Mar property was the principal asset of the Dorothy McKinnon Brown Trust (the trust). In 1994 Winn and the trustee of the trust, Mark Brown (Mark),[1]entered into a written lease agreement, the two-year term of which commenced on April 15, 1994, under which Winn would pay the specified monthly rent to Mark's brother, Geoffrey Brown (Geoff), who was the beneficiary of the income of the trust. Winn lived in the smaller house and sublet the larger house. Upon the expiration of the two year lease, Winn rented the Del Mar property on a month to month basis without a written lease pursuant to the "Holding Over" clause in paragraph 17 of the written lease. The judgment and order denying Winn's new trial motion are affirmed.