CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
Defendant Gary D. Ray appeals his conviction by jury trial of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1]and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found true prior prison term and prior serious felony allegations. ( 667.5, subd. (b), 667.) He contends the court erroneously denied his Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) and committed sentencing error, and his burglary conviction is unsupported by substantial evidence. The People contend the court improperly failed to double defendants burglary sentence pursuant to the three strikes sentencing scheme. ( 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to set forth in writing its reasons for striking the prior strike allegation in accordance with section 1385, and to impose and then stay execution of the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. Court further direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
After Abraham P. Gonzales served his two-year prison term, purportedly a middle term sentence for his conviction for selling base cocaine, the prison informed him and the trial court that the sentence was unauthorized: the correct middle term for the offense was four years. The court resentenced Gonzales to a four year middle term and returned him to prison. At resentencing, the trial court had the discretion to place Gonzales on probation or to sentence him to any of the three prescribed prison terms. Consequently, the courts failure to obtain a supplemental probation report before resentencing Gonzales was error. Court conclude the error was prejudicial and reverse.
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Randy Tsaiyang Su appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury for false imprisonment by violence or menace (Pen. Code, 236) as a lesser offense of count 1 - kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, 209, subd. (b)(1)), two counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2), counts 2 & 3) while engaged in tying or binding (Pen. Code, 667.61, subd. (e)(6)), attempted rape (Pen. Code, 664, 261, subd. (a)(2)) as a lesser offense of count 4 - forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)), and two counts of battery (Pen. Code, 242) as lesser offenses of count 6 - penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)(1)) and count 7 - forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (c)(2)), respectively. The court sentenced Su to prison for life with the possibility of parole with a minimum parole eligibility term of 15 years, plus nine years eight months. Appellant claims trial and sentencing errors occurred. Court modify the judgment and, as modified, affirm it.
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Johnathan Denaro Marquez appeals his convictions for murder and attempted murder. He argues the trial court improperly admitted hearsay and character evidence and failed to instruct the jury to view an alleged accomplices testimony with caution. We conclude appellant forfeited his argument as to the character evidence issue, and the asserted errors on other issues were harmless. Court affirm.
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Michelle A., a minor, appeals from the juvenile courts order declaring her a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1]based on findings that she committed battery on a school employee (Pen. Code, 243.6) and disturbed the peace of a school campus (Pen. Code, 415.5). The court placed appellant home on probation.
We agree that there was not substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a school employee. However, the evidence supports a finding that appellant committed the lesser included offense of battery. (Pen. Code, 242.) On that basis we modify the wardship order to reduce the finding of battery against a school employee to simple battery. Court further conclude that because appellant was enrolled as a student in the school at issue, she could not be found to have disturbed the peace there as a matter of statutory definition. (See Pen. Code, 415.5, subd. (f).) Court therefore reverse the order as to that finding. As to the third contention, Court conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in applying section 602 rather than section 725. |
An employee was told by her manager that she should quit her job because she was a woman and that, if she refused, she would suffer the consequences. She refused. Around 10 months later, she was discharged for allegedly violating the companys attendance policy. No such violation seems to have occurred.
We conclude that where an employee offers direct evidence of discrimination, the purpose of the traditional prima facie case has been served a presumption of discriminatory intent has been created and the elements of the traditional prima facie case need not be proved. The employer must then offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Here, it failed to do so. Accordingly, Court reverse as to the discrimination claim against the employer. |
Mary Anne Saber appeals a default judgment entered in favor of her brother, Sam Saber. The default judgment quieted title to two pieces of real property, one in Calabasas and another in Santa Monica, and awarded Sam monetary damages in the amount of $699,650.[1] We conclude Sams failure to specify an amount of damages in the operative complaint precluded an award of money damages in his favor. (Code of Civil Procedure, 580, subd. (a).) Further, the award to Sam of full title to the Santa Monica property exceeds the demand of the operative complaint in that Sam admitted Mary contributed to the acquisition of title. Court therefore reverse the default judgment to the extent it awards money damages and full title to the Santa Monica property and remand for further proceedings.
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Defendants and appellants Los Angeles Unified School District and the Board of Education for the Los Angeles Unified School District (collectively, LAUSD or the District) appeal an order awarding attorney fees and costs to plaintiff and respondent The Right Site Coalition (Coalition) in the total sum of $254,087.77. The trial court awarded private attorney general fees (Code Civ. Proc., 1021.5) to the Coalition for having succeeded in requiring the District to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) in connection with a proposed elementary school project in Echo Park (the project). The July 10, 2007 order is modified to eliminate the award of $220,647.45 in attorney fees for the CEQA litigation as well as the award of $27,412.50 in attorney fees related to the attorney fee motion. As modified, the order is affirmed.
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In this appeal, a presumed father challenges the juvenile courts dispositional order. Though he is a nonoffending parent, appellant was denied custody of his son. Court conclude that the juvenile courts refusal to give custody to appellant is not supported by substantial evidence, because there is no showing that giving custody to the father would be detrimental to the child. Accordingly, Court reverse the dispositional order.
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Mother Grace S. appeals from the order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to daughter Angel S. Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile courts finding that the exception to termination under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not apply. Court affirm.
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Plaintiffs Robert Shane Lair and Coreen A. Lair sued defendants Ed Cletus Hendrickson and Cecilia L. Hendrickson, alleging breach of contract and fraud by Ed Hendrickson as plaintiffs agent in an attempted purchase of real property, which was purchased by the Hendricksons after the Lair purchase fell through. The trial court granted a defense motion to expunge a lis pendens (Code Civ. Proc., 405 et seq.) and later awarded attorney fees to defendants in connection with that motion. The trial court granted a defense motion for judgment on the pleadings to remove Coreen Lair from the lawsuit as not being a party to the transaction. Robert Lair dismissed his lawsuit without prejudice. The trial court denied a defense request for contractual attorney fees (Civ. Code, 1717; 1032, 1033.5) or attorney fees as sanctions (which defendants sought under inoperative 128.6). Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.
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A jury convicted defendant Joseph Clark of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code 496, subd. (a); unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code) and the trial court found a prior conviction allegation to be true. ( 667.5, subd. (b).) Sentenced to an aggregate prison term of three years, defendant appeals. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for new trial based on jury misconduct, (2) failing to give a unanimity instruction, and (3) failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. Court affirm the judgment.
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Plaintiffs Paul and Cheryl Petrovich, real estate developers, appeal from the judgment entered against them in their suit for unfair competition against defendant Raleys, a corporation that owns a chain of grocery stores and supermarkets. The superior court sustained Raleys demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend.
Court find no error and shall affirm the judgment. |
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