CA Unpub Decisions

After Teresa Vilet Arasheben violated the terms and conditions of her probation, the trial court revoked probation and imposed a previously suspended sentence of seven years and four months. Arasheben contends on appeal that: (1) the trial court did not secure a knowing, express, or intelligent waiver of her right to accrued custody credits; (2) the trial court incorrectly calculated the custody credits she did receive, denying her two days of conduct credit; and (3) under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham), the trial courts imposition of an upper term sentence violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Court affirm the judgment, with directions on remand as to Arashebens custody credits.

Leon Dwight Hammond (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and a court trial in which he was found to have suffered one prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), and 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and served three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to eight years in prison. He appeals, contending that his constitutional rights were violated when the court excluded third-party culpability evidence, and his counsels failure to object to the prosecutors closing argument constituted ineffective assistance. Court affirm the judgment.

Connie Diana Rosales, who appears in pro. per., appeals from an order granting a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16). Court affirm. The trial court properly granted the motion because respondent Keenan & Associates met its burden of demonstrating that the complaint arose from its protected activity of litigating appellants claim before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), and appellant failed to show that she had a probability of prevailing on her claims.

Lessie Mays (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of selling or transporting cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), and a court trial in which he was found to have suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to prison for five years. He appeals, contending that the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay testimony of a chemist, violating his right to confrontation as defined by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) and erred in instructing the jury. He also requests that this court conduct an independent review of the in camera hearing held pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Court affirm the judgment.

Respondents Gregg Corlyn and Pacific Panorama, LLC (jointly referred to as Corlyn) own property at 17000 West Sunset Boulevard in Pacific Palisades. A house sits on a portion of the property, surrounded in part by vacant land. Appellant Robert DeVogelaere contended that in 2003, he entered into an agreement to purchase the vacant portion of the property. In or about 2005, he filed suit for breach of contract, seeking, among other things, specific performance. Along with the lawsuit, he filed a lis pendens, describing the affected properly as certain portions of lots 1 and 2 of tract no. 10238 in the City of Los Angeles.
The judgment is affirmed.

Donald B. Newton appeals from the trial courts permanent restraining order issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, prohibiting him from harassing respondent Randall Blackburn. Appellant contends the restraining order was improperly granted because there was insufficient evidence that respondent suffered substantial emotional distress. He also contends his right to due process was violated because he did not receive the proposed statement of decision signed by the court. Court affirm.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, Charlie Farley pleaded no contest to one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). On appeal Farley contends the small plastic bag containing cocaine and the rock pipe discovered in his pockets after he was stopped as part of a robbery investigation were the fruit of an illegal detention and should have been suppressed. Court agree and reverse the judgment based on Farleys no contest plea.

A.P. (appellant) appeals from the order continuing him as a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602)[1]after a finding that he had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and placing him in the short-term camp program. The juvenile court made the additional finding that the maximum theoretical term of confinement was five years eight months.
Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of second degree robbery as he lacked the larcenous intent that is an element of robbery; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him placed in the short-term camp program.

Court affirm Lamar Timothy Halls conviction for second degree robbery. His counsel filed a brief identifying no issues and Hall filed no supplemental brief. Court briefly discuss one evidentiary issue and conclude that no arguable issue exists.

The juvenile dependency court entered orders terminating fathers parental rights over his daughter. Fathers sole argument on appeal is that the dependency courts orders were entered without strict compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act or ICWA. (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) We agree with father, and conditionally vacate the dependency courts orders, with directions to the court to assure strict compliance with the ICWA.
The juvenile dependency courts orders terminating Terences parental rights are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the court with directions to assure compliance with the ICWAs notice provisions. If, after proof of proper notice under the ICWA is received by the court, a tribe claims that Aniya is an Indian child, then the court shall proceed in conformity with all provisions of ICWA. If no tribe claims Aniya, then the courts orders terminating Terences parental rights shall be reinstated.

J.G. (father)the biological father of L.S.was unaware of L.S.s existence for the first 11 months of her life because L.S.s mother, J.A. (mother), purposely concealed from him both her pregnancy and L.S.s birth out of wedlock. By the time father discovered that L.S. might be his child, she had been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and residing for almost a year with a foster family that was seeking to adopt her. Following our recent opinion in In re Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943 (Vincent M.), Court affirm the orders of the juvenile court denying fathers section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights.

P.M. appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding that her daughter, F.M., is a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Court affirm the courts finding.

Rickey Franklin appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11350). The trial court found that he had previously been convicted of a felony within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).[1] It sentenced appellant to the upper term of three years, doubled as a second strike, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement. Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of evidence that he was arrested for spousal battery under the open the door theory, (2) the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses by precluding cross-examination of the prosecutions expert witness on the experts past overweighing of drugs, (3) the trial court violated his right to present a defense by precluding a defense witness from testifying about police misconduct, and (4) imposition of the upper term sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as articulated in Apprendi and its progeny, as well as the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Appellant requests that we independently review the in camera Pitchess hearing. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Paris Elgin Shanklin of inflicting corporal injury on his cohabitating girlfriend, and pimping his girlfriend. On appeal, Shanklin contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court failed to remove a biased juror. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment.