CA Unpub Decisions

Albert Adams appeals the judgment following his conviction for first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187/189),[1] robbery ( 211), and burglary ( 459). The jury found true allegations of felony murder special circumstances. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Adams contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of out-of-court statements by a coconspirator, in failing to instruct the jury regarding statements by coconspirators, and in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. He also claims prosecutorial misconduct, and the improper imposition of certain enhancements. Court affirm.

Appellant Trevor Albert challenges the issuance of various coastal development permits and approvals, which allow the construction of two single-family estate homes and an access road on a large parcel of land in the hills of Malibu. The parcel of land is owned by the real parties in interest, Evans Childrens Trust and Rancho Topanga Enterprises, LLC (collectively referred to as Evans), and is divided into four lots with the dead-end access road from Pacific Coast Highway traversing all four lots.
The trial court denied Alberts petition for a writ of mandate brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq.) and the Malibu Local Coastal Program (MLCP). Contrary to Alberts contentions, Court find that the CEQA environmental review was not improperly piecemealed, and that no substantial evidence supports a fair argument that the project has any significant environmental impacts. Thus, an environmental impact report (EIR) was not required in lieu of the mitigated negative declaration issued and approved by respondents City of Malibu and the City Council of the City of Malibu (collectively referred to as the City).

Jose Angel Martinez appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction, after a jury trial, of first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that defendants appellate attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

In this action for damages for fraud in the sale of health insurance, the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants and respondents Phil Quinn (Quinn), Quinn Division, David Mack (Mack), and Mack Region (collectively, the demurring defendants) to all causes of action against them contained in plaintiff and appellant Jerry T. Hopkinss first amended complaint (FAC). As Hopkins waived his right to amend, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Hopkins contends he sufficiently pleaded the demurring defendants were liable for damages based on coconspirator liability. Court hold the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to impose liability on the demurring defendants on a conspiracy theory and accordingly affirm the judgment.

Rafael Lopez appeals the judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,[1] 192, subd. (a)), as a lesser included offense to the charged crime of first degree murder ( 187, subd. (a)). In exchange for his plea, the prosecution dismissed charges for home invasion robbery ( 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and first degree residential burglary ( 459, 462, subd. (a)), as well as the allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of all of the offenses. The judgment is affirmed.

L.C. (mother) appeals from the December 10, 2007 judgment declaring her children R.B., born in 1997, K.B., born in 1998, and S.B., born in 2003, dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] Mother contends: (1) substantial evidence does not support the sustained jurisdictional allegations; (2) the amendment of the petition to conform to proof violated due process; and (3) substantial evidence does not support the dispositional order removing the children from her custody. We hold that substantial evidence supports the dependency courts jurisdiction, mother forfeited her due process contention by failing to object below, and in any event, due process was not violated. Court affirm.

N. C. (mother) appeals following the order terminating parental rights as to two of her children, R.S. (born May 2001) and J.S. (born December 2002).[1] Contrary to mothers contentions: (1) the notice requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; hereinafter, ICWA) was satisfied because the requested return receipt of the notice to the tribes (25 U.S.C. 1912, subd (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, 224.2, subds. (a)(1), (c)) was ultimately received by the court; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied mothers section 388 petition after a full evidentiary hearing. The order under review is affirmed.

On May 30, 2007, Savoy received advice of and waived his constitutional rights, and pleaded nolo contendere to possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Savoy 36 months' probation pursuant to the drug treatment program of Penal Code section 1210.1 ("Proposition 36"). Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Savoy's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Ross B. in propria persona filed a petition for extraordinary writ review to challenge the juvenile courts order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He opposes the courts order denying him reunification services. Because Ross is the biological father of two year old Z.P., he was not entitled to services. Court deny the writ.

Rain damaged a school building during a reroofing project, and the school district ultimately sued the general contractor for breach of contract and the architect for negligence and breach of contract. Two insurance companies that claimed to have reimbursed the district for some of its damages joined in the districts suit, asserting a right of subrogation. A third insurance company, also asserting a right of subrogation based on money it had paid for some of the districts damages, brought a separate suit for negligence against the architect. The two cases were consolidated. Accordingly, as explained further below, Court reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part. As a result, Court likewise reverse in part and affirm in part the postjudgment costs order.

D.S. appeals from the juvenile courts order continuing wardship and ordering him into a short term camp community placement program. D.S. contends: (1) the courts finding he had possessed marijuana for sale was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the upper term should not have been used to calculate the maximum period of physical confinement in light of Cunningham v.California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham); the award of predisposition custody credit was miscalculated; and one of the probation conditions imposed was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Finding there was sufficient evidence to support the finding, Court affirm the order as modified.

Defendants Tony Koursaris and Tavernas, Inc. appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Eftehea Leontaritis entered after a jury trial. The jury awarded plaintiff $1,764,300 in compensatory damages on her causes of action for sexual harassment, discrimination, negligence, battery, false imprisonment, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The jury additionally awarded plaintiff $2,200,000 in punitive damages. Defendants also appeal from various postjudgment orders, including denial of their motion for a new trial. Defendants claim the judgment must be reversed due to numerous procedural irregularities, attorney and jury misconduct, evidentiary error, and an excessive damage award. Court disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Theodore Millender, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, evading an officer, three counts of assault with a firearm upon a custodial officer, and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. He contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the three convictions for assault upon a custodial officer; and (2) there were various sentencing errors. Court reverse the judgment on the three convictions for assault with a firearm on a custodial officer, and remand to the trial court for consideration of two lesser included offenses and for sentencing. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Appellant Demeterius Browner was tried and convicted of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187.)[1] The jury also found true the following special allegations: appellant personally used a firearm within the meaning of 12022.53, subdivision (b); appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c); appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d); appellant committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17); and appellant committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b).
At the time of committing the offense, appellant was 15 years old, but was tried and convicted as an adult. The court sentenced appellant to a term of 25 years to life for murder plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for a total sentence of 50 years to life.