CA Unpub Decisions

Rain damaged a school building during a reroofing project, and the school district ultimately sued the general contractor for breach of contract and the architect for negligence and breach of contract. Two insurance companies that claimed to have reimbursed the district for some of its damages joined in the districts suit, asserting a right of subrogation. A third insurance company, also asserting a right of subrogation based on money it had paid for some of the districts damages, brought a separate suit for negligence against the architect. The two cases were consolidated.

Defendant Sidney Ross Deegan, accused of vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)),[1]making criminal threats ( 422), corporal injury to a cohabitant ( 273.5, subd. (a)), and arson ( 451, subd. (b)), waived his right to a jury trial. The information also alleged he had served two prior prison terms and was ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). The court found him guilty as charged on all counts except arson, and guilty of the lesser included offense of causing a fire that causes an inhabited structure to burn. ( 452, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years in state prison, including the upper term of four years for causing the fire.
The judgment is affirmed.

In February 2007, defendant Teresa Faddis was charged in case No. 06F5110 (the main case) with two counts of possession of a controlled substance, being under the influence of a controlled substance, and possession of a hypodermic needle. The information also alleged she served four prior prison terms. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Malik Numan of corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) and simple battery (Pen. Code, 242). Defendant admitted prior strike and prison term allegations and the court imposed a seven year state prison term. Court modify the award of credits and affirm the judgment.

After the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) sought to collect a deficiency allegedly owed on the 1984 joint income tax return filed by Patricia Tyler-Griffis and her husband Charles (not a party to this action), Tyler-Griffis applied to the FTB for relief pursuant to innocent spouse rules. The FTB denied her application and she appealed to the State Board of Equalization (SBE). The SBE upheld the FTB decision and Tyler Griffis filed this Superior Court petition for writ of mandate.
The SBE demurred on the ground that the petition improperly sought to impair collection of a tax (Cal. Const., art. XIII, 32) and instead Tyler-Griffis should pay the tax and file a refund action to press her claim. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and Tyler Griffis timely filed this appeal. Court affirm.

Following the denial of defendant Rodney Eugene Jeffersons motion to suppress evidence that he claims was the product of his being illegally detained, he pled no contest to possession of cocaine base and was sentenced to two years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

In 2006, defendant Steven Russell Wright began taking his daughter and her friend swimming at an athletic club. The friends brother, eight year old R., would tag along with the group. After defendant and R. finished swimming, they would go to the mens locker room to shower and change clothes. The judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Steven Bellizzi appeals a judgment upholding his termination from employment as an investigator with the office of the San Diego County District Attorney (the District Attorney). He contends the San Diego County Civil Service Commission (the Commission) abused its discretion by upholding the decision of the District Attorney to terminate his employment; the Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction by amending the statutory violations supporting the causes against him after the administrative hearing; and the Commission improperly gave substantial deference to the District Attorney's decision. Court affirm the judgment.

Following denial of her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5), Victoria Pauline Ramirez entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) with a prior conviction of the same offense (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)). The court sentenced her to a stipulated five-year prison sentence: the two-year middle term for possessing methamphetamine for sale and three years for the prior. Ramirez appeals the denial of her suppression motion, contending the police did not have probable cause to contact her in her motel room, the People did not meet their burden of showing she consented to their entry, the court erred by finding the police had reasonable suspicion to detain her, and the police violated her Miranda rights (Mirandav. Arizona (l966) 384 U.S. 436). Court affirm.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory judgment[1]in a partition action. The parties are Elsie Karen DeMers (Karen), whose 18-year marriage to Ben Allen (Ben) was dissolved in 1975, and Tina Allen (Tina), who was married to Ben from 2001 until his death in 2004. The underlying circumstances, although somewhat unusual, are not complicated. Shortly after their divorce was finalized, Karen and Ben resumed living together, ostensibly as husband and wife. In 1980, they purchased a home in Highland, California, taking title in both of their names as husband and wife, as Joint Tenants. Early in 1985, Karen decided to move out. She and Ben verbally agreed they would not sell the house at that time, but rather, they would wait until market conditions improved, at which time it would be sold and the proceeds equally divided. In the interim, Ben would reside in the house, pay all related expenses, and not seek reimbursement from Karen. Both parties thereafter married, Karen once and Ben twice, and Karen moved out of the state. Ben resided in the house until his death, during which time he paid all expenses and made various improvements, without ever asking Karen for reimbursement or contribution. Shortly before his death, Ben recorded a grant deed severing the joint tenancy. Karen filed her lawsuit approximately one year after Bens death, asking that the property be partitioned by sale and the proceeds divided. Judgment was awarded in Karens favor.

Defendant George Jorge Hernandez Batalla was convicted of second degree murder after colliding with a pickup truck driven by Diana Covell (the victim) and pushing it in front of an oncoming cargo truck. On appeal defendant contends (1) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury with a definition of conscious disregard, (2) trial counsel was ineffective because he did not reasonably investigate defendants mental retardation as a defense to the requisite mental state of murder, (3) trial counsel was ineffective in his closing argument and (4) the one autopsy photograph admitted at trial was prejudicial and should not have been admitted. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Darrick Wyliemoore Lee was convicted after jury trial of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)). The jury further found true the allegation that the rape was committed during the commission of a burglary and the special allegation that the victim was particularly vulnerable. After denying defendants motion for new trial, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life. ( 667.61, subds. (a) & (c).)
Court affirm the judgment.

Leonor and George W. Ebey, who were the parents of appellant Barbara Martina Ebey (Tina) and respondent George Ebey,[1] established a trust in 1974. Following George W. Ebeys death in 1995, two separate trusts were created. George W. Ebeys trust became irrevocable, while the other trust could be amended or revoked by Leonor. In June 2004, Leonor executed the Eleventh Amendment, which eliminated her daughter, Tina, as a beneficiary of her trust and made her son, George, the sole beneficiary. Leonor died in March 2005. We understand the principal arguments by Tina, a self-represented litigant on appeal, to be that the trial court should have (1) applied a presumption of undue influence against George and shifted the burden of proof to George to show that he did not exert undue influence over Leonor; (2) allowed Tina to amend her petition to allege that Leonor signed the Eleventh Amendment as a result of mistake; and (3) allowed Tina to amend her petition to allege that George committed financial elder abuse against Leonor. For reasons that Court explain, Court affirm the judgment.